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**Georgian Supreme Soviet Commission Issues
Final Report on 9 April Events**

*90US0101A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
5 Oct 89 pp 2-4*

[Article by Professor T.G. Shavgulidze, doctor of juridical sciences and chairman of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission To Investigate the Circumstances of 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi: "Findings of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission To Investigate the Circumstances of 9 April 1989 in the City of Tbilisi"]

[Text] Pursuant to an objective investigation of the tragedy that took place in Tbilisi on 9 April 1989 and on the basis of persistent demands by the public at large, Ukase No 2136-XI of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium dated 17 April 1989, in accordance with Article 119 of the Georgian SSR Constitution, created an investigative commission to investigate the circumstances that took place in Tbilisi on 9 April.

The Commission studied the testimony of hundreds of witnesses, victims, MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] staffers who were on the scene to maintain order, and also medical personnel rendering aid to hunger strikers and victims in various locations; heard explanations by officials of party, Komsomol, trade union, soviet, and law enforcement organs of the Georgian SSR who were invited to meetings of the Commission; made use of the explanations of officials of party and administrative organs of Georgia, the Transcaucasian Military District, and other military institutions and the findings of the investigative commission created by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in connection with the events of 9 April; analyzed documentary material available to it from the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the Georgian CP Central Committee, the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, and other organs, and the findings of forensic medical, medical, and chemical-toxicological subcommissions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and also Soviet and foreign specialists. The Commission inspected numerous photographs, videotapes, and other material evidence providing an accurate picture of the events of 9 April. In order to make a fuller assessment of what happened, the Commission comprehensively studied and generalized public opinion in connection with the events of 9 April and analyzed the republic, Soviet, and foreign press.

The Commission also notes that former Georgian CP Central Committee Second Secretary B. Nikolskiy and Transcaucasian Military District Troop Commander I. Rodionov, in violation of a constitutional requirement, failed to appear at a meeting of the Commission.

The facts that have been established as a result of an analysis of the collected materials, and their political-legal assessment, give the Commission grounds for drawing the following conclusions.

**I. On the Necessity and Legality of Making the
Decision to Halt the Rally of 9 April**

As a result of the struggle against the administrative-command system and the extension of processes of democratization in 1988-1989, public opinion in Georgian became considerably more active. Urgent socio-economic and political problems were addressed at numerous rallies and demonstrations. A vigorous public movement was started in defense of the David-Garedzha monument complex and ecological safeguards of the construction of the Transcaucasus Mountain Railroad and certain hydro- and power plants and against the introduction of amendments to the USSR Constitution which would restrict the sovereignty of the republics. Another burning issue was discrimination against soldiers of Georgian nationality in the Soviet Army and the use of violence against them. The demonstrations took on an especially crisis character in November 1988 and February 1989. Eventually, the authorities' attitude toward rallies and demonstrations became extremely negative. This is attested by the fact that of the 38 rallies that were held during the period only four were sanctioned, although the decisions to withhold authorization were, as a rule, devoid of legal grounds. There were also cases of the use of force to stop unsanctioned rallies on 22 September 1988 and 18 and 25 February 1989. Also to be noted is the fact that as far back as November 1988 Dzh. Patiashvili, the former first secretary of the CP Central Committee, requested that the CPSU Central Committee institute a curfew in Tbilisi; that request was not met. All of this fostered a complete polarization of the positions of the leadership and the people.

On 18 March 1989 an assembly was held in the village of Lykhny, Abkhazian ASSR, at which a resolution was adopted, containing anti-constitutional demands, for Abkhazia to secede from the Georgian SSR; the message bypassed the republic and was sent directly to the all-union government.

Starting on 4 April 1989, in front of Government House in Tbilisi, there was an unsanctioned rally by many thousands of people who discussed all the social and political problems that had accumulated in the course of many years. Participants in the rally demanded the restoration of Georgian independence, which was lost in 1921, and Georgia's secession from the USSR on the basis of Article 69 of the present Constitution. To express this constitutional demand they chose the extremely peaceful method of a hunger strike. The hunger strikers were supported by large groups of citizens who took part in the rally in support of the demands.

In addition to the aforementioned demands, various brazen posters appeared at the rally, such as "Down With the Communist Regime," "Down With Russian Imperialism," "The USSR Is a Prison of Peoples," and so on. Posters like this did not constitute demands; they expressed the evaluative attitude toward reality of just one segment of the demonstrators and, most important, they

did not include any calls for action. Consequently, they could not have altered the peaceful character of the rally.

At the same time, the rally was accompanied by violations of public order, manifested in the disrupting of traffic along Rustaveli Prospekt, refusal to obey the lawful orders of representatives of authority, and certain cases of unauthorized actions. A strike movement was launched which resulted in practically no serious consequences; not a single production facility was stopped. Also raised was the demand that the republic leadership resign, although no concrete plan of action whatsoever was put forth to accomplish this.

A great many pieces of evidence gathered by the Commission, in particular video films and the testimony of witnesses, testify to the peaceful character of the rally. There was no violence, no calls for violence; there were no threats on the life or health of citizens; there were no cases of damage to state, social, or personal property; there were no calls for violence against representatives of other nationalities or the fomenting of interethnic strife. The demonstrators had no firearms or cold weapons or any other objects designed for violence. This fact was confirmed by Georgian SSR Minister of Internal Affairs Comrade Sh. Gorgodze, Tbilisi MVD Administration Chief Comrade R. Gventsadze, Georgian SSR Procurator Comrade V. Razmadze, Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman Comrade O. Cherkeziya, former Georgian SSR Council of Ministers Chairman Comrade Z. Chkheidze, former Georgian CP Central Committee First Secretary Comrade Dzh. Patiashvili, and others.

The rally was not of the nature of an ultimatum; no one intended concrete violent actions which the rally participants might resort to if their demands were not met. On the contrary, it was announced publicly that the rally would be ended in any case on 14 April.

Hence, the rally did not aim toward the immediate accomplishment of a concrete political result; rather, it reflected the overall national aspirations of the people.

Under these conditions, the Georgian SSR MVD (Sh. Gorgodze) and the Tbilisi MVD Administration (R. Gventsadze), which, according to the law, are directly responsible for maintaining public order, submitted to the republic's leadership the question of halting the rally taking place in front of Government House, and restoring order in the capital city using the forces at their disposal. They proposed that the rally should be halted at dawn, when the number of hunger strikers and demonstrators on the scene would be minimal (100 to 200 persons), after which the square should be posted with guards in order to prevent a new rally. In their judgment, the MVD organs had the forces necessary to do this. This proposal was not shared by the republic's leadership, on grounds that halting the rally would intensify the people's dissatisfaction and would lead to massive demonstrations. Under those conditions, the maintenance of public order in the capital city and all over the republic would be impossible.

For this reason, the Georgian SSR MVD (Sh. Gorgodze) asked the USSR MVD to send internal troops to Georgia to maintain public order, while the republic's leadership (Dzh. Patiashvili) submitted to the CPSU Central Committee a request that additional forces be assigned to maintain public order. Materials of the Investigative Commission of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies confirm that a conference was held on 7 April 1989 under the chairmanship of CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee Secretary Ye. Ligachev. The conference was attended by CPSU Central Committee Politburo members N. Slyunkov, V. Chebrikov, and V. Medvedev, Politburo candidate members A. Lukyanov, D. Yazov, and G. Razumovskiy, USSR KGB [Committee for State Security] Chairman V. Kryuchkov, and USSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs V. Tushin. The conference decided to comply with the Georgian CP Central Committee's request for aid in the form of military forces [pomoshch v voyennoy sile]. On the basis of this decision, the USSR MVD and Ministry of Defense issued orders to send the applicable troop units to Georgia.

Another conference was held on 8 April in the CPSU Central Committee to discuss the situation in Georgia. This time the work of the conference was conducted by V. Chebrikov. The conference was held with the same participants, except that the proceedings were not participated in by Ye. Ligachev, and USSR Minister of Internal Affairs V. Bakatin attended in place of V. Tushin.

On 7 and 8 April, militia and internal troops units were sent to Tbilisi, including a regiment of the Dzerzhinskiy Division. In addition, a regiment stationed in the Transcaucasian Military District entered Tbilisi on the night of 7 April. On orders of USSR Minister of Defense D. Yazov, Transcaucasian Military District Troops Commander I. Rodionov returned to Tbilisi from Leninakan on 7 April. He was accompanied to the republic's capital city by USSR First Deputy Defense Minister K. Kochetov. It is to be noted that on arriving in Tbilisi, K. Kochetov took part in all stages of the decision to stop the rally. According to I. Rodionov, he was ordered by the Defense Minister to familiarize himself with the situation in the republic's capital city and act according to the situation, at the same time making use of the troops of the Soviet Army only to protect vital installations.

Official documents confirm that prior to 8 April, I. Rodionov was against the Soviet Army's participation in stopping the rally. In particular, on 7 April I. Rodionov sent Defense Minister D. Yazov a coded telegram in which he noted that Georgian CP Central Committee Second Secretary B. Nikolskiy insisted that he enlist [privlecheniye] military units to stop the rally. According to Rodionov, he deemed it inadvisable for the army to carry out militia functions, inasmuch as that would complicate the people's attitude toward the army.

On 7 and 8 April there were meetings of members and candidate members of the Buro in the Georgian CP Central Committee, during which they discussed the

developing situation and measures to normalize it. No minutes of these meetings were recorded. K. Abuladze, the former head of the Central Committee's General Department, whose duties included record-keeping, was not invited to these meetings. The formulation of the statements expressed during the meetings, in the form of decrees of the Central Committee Buro, was undertaken by the General Department on instructions from Dzh. Patiashvili and B. Nikolskiy after 9 April, although they were never put in final form. The Buro's decrees lack the necessary features of official documents. They were not accompanied by minutes, so that it is impossible to establish by documentation who took part in discussing the issue and what position he took. Interrogation of Buro members and candidate members has established that on 7 April the Georgian CP Central Committee leadership decided to institute a "state of emergency [chrezvychaynoye polozheniye]" in the capital city if necessary. Yet no specific time or forms of implementing this measure were stipulated. This was due to the fact that the institution of a state of emergency (curfew) might become necessary only in the event that a tense social-political situation developed after the rally was stopped. On that same day, a meeting with representatives of the intelligentsia was held in the Georgian CP Central Committee. Former Central Committee First Secretary Dzh. Patiashvili assessed the situation as catastrophic. Participants in the conference (A. Dzhabakhishvili, R. Chkheidze, E. Gugushvili, and N. Kikvadze) noted that the republic's leaders ought to meet with leaders of the informal organizations and hold a dialogue with them. Despite the republic leaders' willingness, such a meeting never took place, because the leaders of the informal organizations expressed lack of trust in them and demanded a meeting with the leaders of all-union organs of authority.

At 20:35 on 7 April, the CPSU Central Committee received a telegram signed by Dzh. Patiashvili, the text of which had been prepared by B. Nikolskiy. The telegram states: "The situation in the republic has sharply deteriorated recently. It is almost out of control. Extremist elements are whipping up nationalist sentiments and calling for strikes and disobedience to the authorities; they are organizing disorders and discrediting party and soviet organs. Under the circumstances, extraordinary measures must be taken. We deem it essential to:

1. Immediately institute criminal and administrative proceedings against extremists coming out with anti-Soviet, anti-socialist, and anti-party slogans and appeals (the legal foundations for this are in place);
2. Institute a state of emergency (curfew) in Tbilisi, enlisting additional forces of the MVD and the Transcaucasian Military District;
3. Implement a complex of political, organizational, and administrative measures, using the forces of the party, soviet, and economic aktiv, to stabilize the situation;
4. Prohibit all-union and republic mass media from using materials that will complicate the situation."

The telegram concludes with the following sentence: "We request consent on points 1, 2, and 4." This is of special importance, because USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium First Deputy Chairman A. I. Lukyanov did not announce that portion of the text of the telegram at the First USSR Congress of People's Deputies, creating the impression that all measures undertaken to normalize the situation in the capital city of Georgia had been implemented without the knowledge of the Center, without any consultation with it, and this does not accord with the facts.

On the evening of 7 April, B. Nikolskiy brought up the issue of the advisability of a show of military force which, in his opinion, would frighten the participants in the rally and would result in a reduction in their numbers in front of Government House. On orders from I. Rodionov, this action was in fact carried out on 8 April, at about 1:00 in the afternoon. Military equipment was driven through the ranks of the protesters on Rustaveli Prospekt, and military helicopters appeared over Tbilisi. This action led to the opposite result. The number of participants in the rally increased substantially. A large portion of the population sensed a real danger threatening young people and considered themselves obligated to share their lot. This accounts for the fact that more than half of the persons attending the rally were women. On the morning of 8 April, Col-Gen I. Rodionov, accompanied by General of the Army K. Kochetov, announced to Dzh. Patiashvili that he had been appointed director of the operation to stop the rally. It was later determined that this appointment was made on orders of USSR Defense Minister D. Yazov.

On 8 April there was a meeting of the Georgian party aktiv, which discussed the tasks of the party organization to normalize the political situation in the republic. The meeting was participated in by CPSU Central Committee sector head V. Lobko and Georgian CP Central Committee member K. Kochetov. It should be noted that CPSU Central Committee senior officials V. Lobko and A. Selivanov, who were sent from Moscow in connection with the situation in Tbilisi, took active part in working out the measures to put a stop to the rally.

The meeting of the aktiv was addressed by Dzh. Patiashvili. He noted that an extraordinarily tense and explosive political atmosphere had developed in the republic. Extremist leaders were calling for the overthrow of Soviet rule and the socialist system. To defuse the situation it would be necessary to make use of all political methods, permitting no political weakness or unjustified concessions and compromises.

Participants in the discussion (Sh. Shioshvili, S. Gogiberidze, and others) spoke in favor of an open dialogue and the necessity of offering the demonstrators the chance to express themselves in the press, on television, and so on.

Participants in the meeting were told of only part of the immediate political and organizational plan of measures

to normalize the situation in the republic (the aktiv being informed by Georgian CP Central Committee Secretary N. Popkhadze), although the plan of measures called for the following points as well:

- create groups in each VUZ class [kurs] and the upper grades of public schools to act against extremist-oriented students (Point 17);
- institute criminal and administrative action against the leaders and activists of the informal associations who come out with illegal slogans and foment illegal actions (Point 20);
- draw up a specific, special plan of action for law enforcement organs and military subunits designed to stop negative manifestations (Point 21);
- if necessary, implement measures to institute a state of emergency, enlisting troops of the Transcaucasian Military District, to ensure public order (Point 23).

The absolute majority of members of the Central Committee Buro were unaware of the content of the plan of action. Moreover, the document was presented to the meeting of the aktiv as if it had been discussed and approved beforehand at a meeting of the Central Committee Buro. It must also be noted, at the same time, that Points 17 and 21 of the plan were not announced at the meeting of the aktiv, while Point 20 was accorded special support on the part of most of the participants in the meeting of the aktiv. (A contrary view was expressed by poet Dzh. Charkviani.) The meeting did not pass a resolution on this issue; no vote was held.

It needs to be mentioned that the plan of measures did not include Point 17 just by accident. It had already been implemented in practice. In particular, during the breaking up of the rally held on 18 February 1989 in front of the Georgian Polytechnic Institute, MVD officers in civilian clothes were actively joined by activists comprising Komsomol members of the Polytechnic Institute (G. Chogovadze, rector; V. Kelbakiani, secretary of the party committee; Z. Gudavadze, secretary of the Komsomol committee). During the breaking up of the rally, 12 citizens were injured. In connection with this fact, criminal proceedings were instituted.

The meeting of the aktiv also endorsed the Georgian CP Central Committee's, the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's, and the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers' Appeal to communists, workers, and young people of the republic; Central Committee Secretary N. Chitanava acquainted the participants in the meeting with the text of the Appeal. It states, in particular, "there is still time to prevent any drastic development of events.... Our people have already suffered so much that it is not worthwhile to add one more misfortune."

This appeal was published in the republic newspapers on 9 April, after the tragedy had already taken place.

In his concluding remarks, Dzh. Patiashvili asked the participants of the aktiv to go to the rally after the

meeting and act as they saw fit. "And if it is impossible to calm people down," he said, "the necessary, legally justified 'state machine,' such as exists in every normal law-governed state, will go into action."

Participants in the meeting of the party aktiv did not appear at the rally. Special mention should be made of the inaction of participants in the aktiv, in particular members and candidate members of the Georgian CP Central Committee Buro, who did nothing to normalize the situation.

While the meeting was going on, Dzh. Patiashvili spoke with Moscow. He was informed of the Politburo's proposal to send comrades E. Shevardnadze and G. Razumovskiy to Tbilisi to help. Dzh. Patiashvili did not consider it necessary to accept this proposal, as a result of which no use was made of an additional opportunity to settle the situation in the republic by political methods.

After the meeting of the party aktiv there was a conference of the republic's leaders, participated in by representatives of the military command, a so-called session of the Defense Council, but there is no official document confirming that this session was held.

As a result of questioning officials and comparing the statements given by them to the Commission it has become possible to establish only a few facts. In particular, the conference was attended by Dzh. Patiashvili, B. Nikolskiy, Z. Chkheidze, O. Cherkeziya, K. Kochetov, I. Rodionov, and A. Novikov. Invited to the session were Georgian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Sh. Gorgodze, Georgian SSR Supreme Court Chairman A. Karanadze, Acting Procurator N. Shoshiashvili, Georgian SSR Minister of Justice V. Sharashenidze, and Georgian SSR KGB Chairman G. Gumbaridze, inasmuch as there was a question about the adequacy of legal grounds for instituting proceedings against the leaders of informal associations and isolating them from society. G. Gumbaridze did not actually take part in discussing this question, because he left the conference immediately after it opened. After a hearing of reports by officials of the law enforcement organs they were dismissed, so that no final decision in regard to this issue was taken.

Later on at the same conference, it was decided to clear the demonstrators out of the square in front of Government House using forces of the Georgian SSR MVD, internal troops of the USSR MVD, and the Soviet Army. As has already been mentioned, I. Rodionov was appointed director of the operation.

I. Rodionov designated the following as his aides: from the Soviet Army, I. Kuznetsov, first deputy commander of troops of the Transcaucasian Military District; from internal troops, I. Yefimov, chief of operations and administration of the headquarters of internal troops; from the militia, Georgian SSR Minister of Internal Affairs Sh. Gorgodze.

Drafting of the plan of operations was assigned to I. Rodionov. It was stipulated, however, that the operation

was to be carried out when the number of demonstrators in front of Government House was at a minimum.

Sh. Gorgodze asked the republic's government for the appropriate legal document to carry out the operation. On the evening of 8 April, the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers issued the order, which was signed by former Council of Ministers Chairman Z. Chkheidze. The order states: "...in connection with the situation in the city, the Georgian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, enlisting [s privilecheniyem] personnel of internal troops and the Soviet Army, is to take additional measures to maintain public order:

- remove all citizens taking part in the unsanctioned mass demonstrations from the territory adjacent to the building of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers;
- block free access by citizens to the building of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers;
- apply measures stipulated by the law against the organizers and active participants in the unsanctioned mass demonstrations.

Carry out similar actions on the territory adjacent to the republic television and radio building and, where necessary, other parts of the city as well."

In order to carry out the aforementioned order of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers and with the aim of ensuring law and order during the operation, Georgian SSR Minister of Internal Affairs Sh. Gorgodze issued an order that same evening, according to which the appropriate subunits of the Georgian SSR MVD and the Tbilisi MVD Administration were instructed to use militia forces to guard Government House, to escort hunger strikers from the territory in front of Government House and the Committee for Television and Radio building to medical facilities, and also to detain the organizers and active participants in the unsanctioned rally.

The plan of operations to put a stop to the rally was never discussed at any meeting. At a sitting [zasedaniye] of the USSR People's Deputies Commission, I. Rodionov stated that the specific plan of operations was supposed to be drawn up by I. Yefimov, while he himself had only a general outline of the operation. I. Rodionov and members of the Georgian CP Central Committee Buro have stated that the time the operation was to start—4:00 in the morning of 9 April—was decided on by a narrow circle of officials (Dzh. Patiashvili, B. Nikolskiy, I. Rodionov, and K. Kochetov).

One more circumstance is worth noting: In particular, at 20:50 on 8 April—that is, when the question of putting a stop to the rally had already been decided, the CPSU Central Committee in Moscow had been sent a telegram signed by Dzh. Patiashvili, the text of which was prepared by B. Nikolskiy. The telegram notes that "the situation in Tbilisi continues tense. A rally of many

thousands of people is taking place in front of Government House, and the main slogans are still what they were: secession from the USSR, the creation of an independent Georgia, the liquidation of autonomous entities, and so on.

"On the whole, the Georgian CP Central Committee, the government, and local party and soviet organs are in control of the situation and are taking the necessary steps to stabilize it. Specific plans have been drawn up and are being implemented jointly with the MVD and the Transcaucasian Military District to maintain law and order and, in case of necessity, to undertake exhaustive measures to prevent unlawful actions. The entire apparatus of the Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers, the Tbilisi Gorkom [city party committee] and Gorispolkom [city executive committee] are performing their functions precisely and doing active work among the public and the demonstrators. At present, no measures additional to those already taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR government are needed."

After this telegram was sent, there were no changes whatever of a substantial nature in terms of any greater worsening of the situation at the rally or in the capital city. Nor were there any attempts to attack or seize governmental installations. Quite the contrary: on the part of the public, attempts were undertaken to defuse the situation. In particular, near the home of Dzh. Patiashvili there was a demonstration by mothers demanding that bloodshed be prevented. Some 500 women declared a hunger strike for the same purpose near the K. Gamsakhurdia monument. At the same time, the number of participants in the rally in front of Government House increased substantially with the addition of parents and dear ones of the demonstrators. Most of them were women. This radically altered the situation, in and of itself requiring that the government change the plan that had been drawn up earlier. Because of these circumstances, before the stopping of the rally was to start the Minister of Internal Affairs, Sh. Gorgodze, spoke out against the operation and asked the republic's leadership (Dzh. Patiashvili) to postpone it.

One half hour before the start of the operation, there was a telephone conversation on the subject between Dzh. Patiashvili and I. Rodionov (at that time Rodionov was on Lenin Square with the troop units, while Patiashvili was in his office). Rodionov told Patiashvili that stopping the rally would not result in grave consequences. As a result of these talks, it was decided to start the operation at the designated time (4:00 in the morning).

It is worth noting that at the session of the Commission Dzh. Patiashvili stated that on 9 April he was in full authority and could have postponed the operation to stop the rally up to the last minute.

The operation to stop the rally started at 4:00 in the morning on 9 April and, ended tragically.

However, the telegram which Dzh. Patiashvili sent to the CPSU Central Committee that same day, at 10:25, states: "After 21:00 on 8 April, despite all the measures undertaken by party, soviet, and law enforcement organs, the situation at the rally in front of Government House, participated in by about 15,000 persons, also other parts of the city, began to be heated up to the maximum by the extremists and to get out of control. The leaders of the so-called national liberation movement began to proclaim plans to seize power in the republic. Under the circumstances, in order to ensure public security and prevent unforeseen consequences it was decided to use force at 4:00 in the morning to clear the rally participants out of the square in front of Government House.... In accordance with the plan drawn up beforehand by competent organs, use was made of subunits of the republic's MVD and the Transcaucasian Military District.... As a result of the crush that developed, 16 persons died: 13 young women and three men. More than 100 persons received wounds of varying degrees of severity.... At present, the square in front of Government House has been cleared of demonstrators and placed under guard by troops." (The text of the telegram was prepared by B. Nikolskiy.)

Such are the factual circumstances of the decision to stop the rally on 9 April of this year in the city of Tbilisi. A legal assessment of them, taking into account the requirements of the USSR and Georgian SSR constitutions as well as all-union and republic legislation, gives grounds for drawing the following conclusions concerning the legality of the decision to stop the rally:

1. The decision to stop the rally on 9 April 1989 of this year in the city of Tbilisi with the use of force was brought about by the republic leadership's erroneous assessment of social-political processes taking place recently in Georgia, and the formation of politically incorrect attitudes toward them.

The activation of the movement of broad segments of the people, primarily young people and the intelligentsia, to strengthen the republic's sovereignty and to resolve the urgent socioeconomic and national-cultural problems that had accumulated during the stagnation period, efforts utilizing institutions of immediate democracy (manifestations, demonstrations, rallies, and so on) was seen by the republic's leadership as an attempt by the informal associations and extremist groups to destabilize the overall situation and to seize political power in their own hands, i.e., as anti-Soviet, anti-socialist actions.

As a result of the weakness and sterility of the ideological work (N. Popkhadze), the republic's party organization and organs of authority and administration were unable to deal with the processes taking place in society and to normalize the situation by political methods, hence they resorted to the policy of using force.

2. In view of the fact that the rally that took place from 4 through 9 April in front of Government House was peaceful in character and did not involve the use of

violence for purposes of overthrowing the Soviet system or any actions posing a threat to people's life and health, there were no appropriate legal grounds for or necessity of the decision to stop the rally with the use of subunits of the Soviet Army.

The decision that was taken by the republic's leadership and officials of the USSR Ministry of Defense (Dzh. Patiashvili, B. Nikolskiy, O. Cherkeziya, Z. Chkheidze, K. Kochetov, and I. Rodionov) to stop the rally constitutes an illegal act for which proceedings ought to be instituted against them as prescribed by law.

At the same time, the Commission states in particular that a large share of the blame for taking this illegal decision goes to former Georgian CP Central Committee First Secretary Dzh. Patiashvili and former Second Secretary B. Nikolskiy.

The Commission believes it essential immediately to raise the question of recalling USSR people's deputies Dzh. Patiashvili, B. Nikolskiy, I. Rodionov, O. Cherkeziya, and Z. Chkheidze, also Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet deputy N. Popkhadze, the official in charge of the republic's ideology.

3. The decision to stop the rally was taken in gross violation of Paragraph 14, Article 119 of the USSR Constitution, because subunits of the Soviet Army were enlisted to stop the rally without a declaration by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of martial law or a state of emergency in the capital city of Georgia.

4. Despite A. Lukyanov's statement at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the Commission believes that the Central authorities were informed about the situation in Tbilisi from the day the rally was started, and all the actions carried out by the republic's leadership were agreed on [soglasovany] with the Center. In particular, the illegal decision to enlist military force to stop the rally was taken with the consent of Politburo member V. Chebrikov and on orders of USSR Defense Minister D. Yazov.

5. The Georgian SSR Council of Ministers' order of 8 April 1989 (Z. Chkheidze), in accordance with which internal troops and units of the Soviet Army were instructed to clear the demonstrators out of the square in front of Government House and carry out other measures to maintain public order, constitutes an illegal act, inasmuch as the constitutional laws that are in effect, and other normative acts, do not invest the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers with such powers.

6. The decision as to the question of instituting criminal proceedings against the leaders of the informal associations in accordance with the plan of measures drawn up by the Georgian CP Central Committee Secretariat, and its discussion at the meeting of the party aktiv, constitutes a gross violation of the law.

According to present legislation, the question of instituting criminal proceedings against a person is to be

decided by a competent organ invested with the appropriate powers rather than by a meeting of the party aktiv.

The fact that most of the participants in the meeting of the party aktiv approved that point of the plan of measures indicates an inadequate level of awareness of the law on the part of representatives of the party aktiv and attests to the blatant use of methods characteristic of an authoritarian regime even at the present stage.

7. Since the decision to stop the rally constitutes an unlawful act, and also considering the fact that the implementation of this decree resulted in especially grave consequences, the Commission submits to the Georgian SSR Procuracy and the USSR General Procurator the matter of properly examining and deciding the question of the responsibility of all officials who took part in making the decision.

8. In order to put a stop to cases in which officials of the USSR Armed Forces take the law into their own hands [samoupravstvo], exceed their authority, and invest the Soviet Army with functions not proper to it in the sphere of the country's internal affairs, it is essential to review the declarative proposition adduced in Chapter 5 of the USSR Constitution in order to define precisely the duties and limits of the competence of the Armed Forces.

It is also necessary to review legislative acts concerning regulations on holding rallies and demonstrations and the powers of internal troops, since practical experience in using them has failed to confirm the effectiveness of such acts. At the same time, they contain norms which are not in accordance with the present Constitution.

II. On the Legality of the Execution of the Decision to Stop the Rally

1. The decision to stop the rally was carried out at 4:00 in the morning on 9 April 1989. The operation was directed by Col Gen I. Rodionov. Under his command were all branches [roda] of troop units headed by I. Kuznetsov, first deputy troop commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, and I. Yefimov, chief of the operations administration of internal troops. The Georgian SSR MVD and the Georgian militia under it had in effect been given a vote of no confidence; in addition, the militia itself became the target of the assault of the troop units.

The actions of I. Rodionov and the troop units under him were not, objectively, designed to disperse the rally. This is confirmed by the following facts:

a) the attack on the rally was started when the number of demonstrators exceeded 10,000;

b) absolute calm reigned at the rally prior to the attack; people stood holding lit candles in their hands, praying and singing, thereby much more resembling an oblation than an active resistance;

c) prior to launching the attack, the military units did not issue the demonstrators an ultimatum demanding that the rally be dispersed;

d) no use was made of methods less dangerous to people's life and health (directed streams of water and the like) to disperse the rally prior to the direct actions of the troop units. That was not the purpose of the fire trucks on Lenin Square. They came after the military equipment and were intended to put out any fires that might start;

e) prior to the attack, all exits from the square in front of Government House, except for one narrow street adjacent to Kashveti Church, were blocked off by military units and equipment. In fact, all routes for the demonstrators to withdraw had been blocked off beforehand;

f) troop units surrounded the demonstrators and beat them unmercifully with clubs and with entrenching tools utilized specially to inflict injury on people; use was made of banned toxic chemical agents as well as firearms. The soldiers pursued fleeing persons, broke into buildings where citizens were hiding, and beat up fallen persons, not sparing women, minors, and old people. They smashed windows and deliberately damaged state and personal property;

g) among persons wounded and mutilated by the military personnel there were hunger strikers, medical workers providing aid to the victims on the scene, and unarmed officers of the Georgian militia who were performing their official duties.

As a result of the attack on the peaceful demonstration, 19 persons died, including 16 women (among them two underage girls and one pregnant woman). There were no deaths among the military personnel. It should be noted that attempts are still being made to determine the accurate number of person who died, because the public believes that the number of those killed was greater.

Thus, I. Rodionov's promise to Dzh. Patiashvili that the demonstrators and hunger strikers would not be hurt turned out to be a total lie.

2. The operation carried out in Tbilisi under the direction of Col Gen I. Rodionov constitutes a gross violation of constitutional norms and other norms of existing legislation:

According to Point 14, Article 119 of the USSR Constitution, "in the interests of defending the USSR and the safety of its citizens, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium... shall declare martial law or a state of emergency throughout the country as well as in particular localities—with obligatory examination of the question with the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the respective union republic."

The institution of martial law or a state of emergency is the exclusive competence of the USSR. A union republic is not invested with that competence.

Hence, the sole legal grounds for bringing in troops for the purpose stipulated in Point 14 of Article 119 of the USSR Constitution is the Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on instituting martial law or a state of emergency. By the order of the USSR Ministry of Defense, troops were brought into the city and the attack on the rally was launched without the adoption of a USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase on the institution of martial law or a state of emergency—that is, without legal grounds.

Accordingly, a stipulation of the Fundamental Law of the state was grossly violated, resulting in grave consequences.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase of 28 July 1988 "On the Duties and Rights of Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Maintenance of Public Order" contains an exhaustive list of circumstances in which internal troops may use weapons. The purpose of the list is to strictly limit the use of weapons and totally rule out their use at the discretion of troop unit commanders.

According to Article 6 of the Ukase, "in carrying out their assigned duties, personnel of internal troops shall have the right, under exceptional circumstances, as an extreme measure, to use weapons:

- a) to protect citizens against an attack threatening their life or health if it is impossible to protect them by other methods and means;
- b) to repel an attack on special-regime and other vital facilities, also to repel an armed attack on facilities under guard;
- c) to repel an attack on officers of the militia, members of the people's patrol, and military personnel when their life is in immediate danger;
- d) to restrain persons who have committed a crime, are putting up armed resistance, or are caught in committing an especially dangerous crime, when other methods and means of restraining them are impossible."

That is the exhaustive list calling for the use of weapons; in all other circumstances, internal troops are supposed to maintain public order without the use of weapons.

None of the aforementioned circumstances obtained in the city of Tbilisi on 9 April 1989.

Consequently, one of the most important stipulations of the aforementioned Ukase was violated: weapons were used under circumstances prohibited by the Ukase.

The weapons that were used, in particular, were:

- a) sharpened shovels. Sharpened shovels constitute a non-firearm weapon if they are used specially to inflict injury on people. The "Manual for Conducting Classes in Military Units" states directly: "A shovel is a reliable weapon in the hands of a skilled soldier engaged in hand-to-hand combat without a carbine or automatic

rifle.... The edge of the shovel blade can inflict cutting blows on the head, neck, or arms of the opponent."

There have been confirmed cases in which citizens were killed or severely wounded as a result of such blows;

b) the chemical-toxicological subcommission has established that during the breakup of the rally on 9 April in Tbilisi, troop units made use of:

- 1) "Cheremukha" of various kinds, consisting basically of the toxic substance chloracetophenone ("CAP");
- 2) the even stronger chemical agent CS;
- 3) chloropicrin, the use of which has been determined by up-to-date, highly reliable methods.

At the same time, post-mortem examinations and clinical charts of the dead and wounded of 9 April do not in any way fit within the framework of the effects of CAP and CS alone. For this reason, it is quite likely that use was made of even more powerful toxic chemical agents which block the special receptors of the nervous system.

The findings of the chemical-toxicological examiners have been confirmed by highly qualified specialists from Moscow and Leningrad as well as specialists from the FRG, the United States, France, and representatives of the International Red Cross.

It should also be mentioned that in the samples submitted by the Military Procuracy, in addition to Cheremukha and CS (K-51), the subcommission detected agents which it was unable to identify; all of them contain components which they should not include, according to their formula.

The chemical-toxicological subcommission charted the place and quantity of the use of CAP and CS, starting with the square in front of Government House and ending at Republic Square.

The use of chemical agents such as CS (K-51) and chloropicrin is prohibited even in cases where the use of weapons is considered lawful. The list of special weapons that may be used by internal troops does not include either CS (K-51) or chloropicrin. It was the use of the prohibited chemical weapons that resulted in especially grave consequences; in 12 of the 19 fatalities, death was caused by suffocation that resulted from breathing poisonous chemical agents, as is confirmed by microscopic examination of the autopsy material and the findings of the forensic medical examination and medical subcommission. Three persons died as a result of severe poisoning complicated by mechanical injuries and wounds to the area of the head which caused damage to the brain tissue.

More than 4000 persons went to treatment and prophylactic facilities for medical help due to poisoning by chemical agents, and more than 500 of them were placed in hospitals for treatment. A total of 3828 citizens are undergoing outpatient treatment.

In a number of cases the poisoning caused by the chemical agents proved to be quite severe and the pathological state was prolonged. As a result of this, the Georgian SSR Ministry of Health formed a specialized examination department [dispansernoye otdeleniye] which provides treatment and medical observation for these patients. According to foreign and Soviet specialists, this observation should continue for several years.

Some of the severely poisoned persons are in the FRG for treatment.

What we have here, then, is an action which contains elements [priznaki] of premeditated murder, committed with special brutality and using agents that are dangerous to the life of many people (Point 6, Article 104 of the Georgian SSR Criminal Code).

The order to use the prohibited chemical agents could only have been given by Maj Gen I. Yefimov. He and I. Rodionov, the overall director of the operation, must bear responsibility for the aforementioned crime;

c) in addition to sharpened shovels and toxic chemical agents, firearms were also used on 9 April. This is confirmed by the case of David Irakliyevich Paylodze: he was severely wounded in the area of the head by a firearm, as a result of which he lost both eyes and is in critical condition; at present he is being treated in France.

In the case of D. Paylodze, then, there was attempted murder with aggravating circumstances. The case is being investigated by the USSR Military Procuracy.

3. According to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase of 28 July 1988, "the use of weapons is prohibited... against women and minors, except in cases of armed attack on their part." In spite of this, however, of the 19 fatalities 16 were female, and of the victims of mutilation and poisoning, most were young girls.

4. Special mention must be made of the crime committed against personnel of the Georgian SSR's MVD organs.

On 9 April, as on the preceding days, on orders of the appropriate organs militia personnel were stationed on the square in front of Government House. It is common knowledge today that the lives of many hundreds of people were saved thanks to their dedicated efforts. Many officers of the militia received severe bodily injury and were hospitalized. Meanwhile, according to Point 6 of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase of 28 July 1988, internal troops are obligated to render aid to militia personnel when they are being attacked. What happened in Tbilisi on 9 April was the opposite: the military personnel attacked officers of the militia and beat them unmercifully just because the latter were doing everything they could to carry the victims to emergency vehicles.

What we have here, then, are elements of a crime—in particular, an attempt on the life of an officer of the militia in the course of his performance of his official duties.

5. It is worth noting that the military troops prevented the medical aid brigades, medical personnel wearing white smocks, from helping the injured; they smashed the emergency vehicles. As a result of all this, the victims also include medical personnel. These actions constitute a gross violation of universally accepted norms of international law.

All the foregoing enables us to draw the following conclusions:

The illegal decision to stop the rally was executed by criminal means and methods. It did not constitute a dispersal of the rally but rather a punitive operation which resulted in the inflicting of especially severe consequences, criminal responsibility for which should be placed primarily on I. Rodionov, as the organizer of said criminal operation, and his aides Gen I. Kuznetsov and Gen. I. Yefimov.

The identities of the immediate instigators and specific culprits of this grave crime must be established by the USSR Procuracy, which should also investigate the crime and make a decision as to the criminal responsibility of said persons.

The Commission has been notified that the cases of certain military personnel charged with committing specific crimes during the attack on the rally are being investigated by the Military Procuracy, while cases of the leaders of the informal organizations in accordance with Article 206³ of the Georgian SSR Criminal Code are being investigated by the Georgian SSR Procuracy.

III. Legality of the Actions of Representatives of the Military and Civil Authorities After the Stopping of the Rally on 9 April

At 10:25 in the morning on 9 April, Dzh. Patiashvili sent a telegram to the CPSU Central Committee, the text of which was prepared by B. Nikolskiy. In the telegram, the republic's leaders asked the CPSU Central Committee to impose a curfew in the republic's capital city in order to normalize the grave situation that developed after the rally was stopped.

It should be pointed out here that prior to the imposition of the curfew, the Soviet Army units that had been brought into Tbilisi in effect carried out an occupation of the city, deliberately damaging citizens' vehicles and committing other high-handed acts of that nature. Special mention needs to be made of cases of wounds inflicted on minors by military personnel using firearms. At about 18:15 on 9 April—that is, prior to the curfew—soldiers of military units passing by the Batumi Movie Theater on Kakhetinskoye Shosse began shooting for no reason at some children playing in the street, wounding 15-year-old Dato Mkhattrishvili in the leg. Seeing this, 12-year-old Levan Chanadiri, who was nearby, got frightened and jumped on his bicycle in an attempt to escape. But an officer fired a weapon at him and wounded him in the buttock. The boy is still in the hospital. Despite the boy's severe bleeding, the soldiers

would not allow people near him but threatened them with machine guns. Only after the column of soldiers had passed by were they able to render aid.

Thus, an attempt was made to kill two minors—despite the fact that according to Soviet legislation the use of a weapon against minors is totally prohibited with the exception of cases of an armed attack on their part. Investigation of this case is being conducted by the USSR Military Procuracy.

The Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium prepared a draft Ukase on the imposition of a curfew, which was approved by the Georgian CP Central Committee Buro and, by the decree of 9 April 1989, submitted the draft Ukase to the Supreme Soviet Presidium for discussion.

At 19:00 on that same day, a sitting [sasedaniye] of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was convened, attended by Presidium Chairman O.Ye. Cherkeziya, Deputy Chairman T.Sh. Kabulova, Presidium Secretary V.A. Kvaratskheliya, and Presidium members I.O. Andriadze, V.B. Blazhiyevskiy, Z.A. Kvachadze, V.A. Kochoyan, D.V. Margvelidze, K.S. Mamedov, M.A. Mezvrishvili, and R.N. Chikhladze. Of the 19 persons forming the total composition of the Presidium, 11 attended the sitting.

From the record made by Presidium Secretary Comrade V.A. Kvaratskheliya it is clear that O.Ye. Cherkeziya gave a report at the meeting concerning the situation. He noted that "the situation in the city at present is complex and tense. The Georgian CP Central Committee Buro, in consideration of the situation, considers it essential to impose a curfew in the city. For this reason, we submit the matter for your discussion." Z. Kvachadze, D. Margvelidze, M. Mezvrishvili, V. Kvaratskheliya, R. Chikhladze, and I. Andriadze spoke; they endorsed the imposition of curfew in the city. No one spoke against the proposal.

It was noted at the meeting that USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium First Deputy Chairman A. Lukyanov had been informed of the imposition of the curfew.

Thus, at 19:00 on 9 April 1989 the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium unanimously passed the Ukase to impose a curfew in the city of Tbilisi. The Ukase states: "In consideration of the situation, a curfew is to be imposed in the city of Tbilisi starting 9 April 1989."

That same day, the news program Vremya on Central Television broadcast a report on the events that occurred in Tbilisi on the morning of 9 April; it was stated that curfew had been imposed in the capital city. At the end of Vremya, at 22:52, Col Gen I.N. Rodionov, commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Military District, appeared on Georgian television and stated that he had been appointed military commandant of the city of Tbilisi and, in accordance with a decision by the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, curfew was imposed in Tbilisi starting 23:00 on 9 April. I.N. Rodionov completed his statement at 22:56—that is, four

minutes before curfew was to go into effect. (It should be noted that the taping of I. Rodionov's statement was completed 14 minutes before the announcement of curfew.)

On 10 April 1989, TASS distributed information about the situation in Tbilisi through the Central press; the report stated that curfew had been imposed in the city by decision of the republic's authorities (IZVESTIYA, 10 April 1989).

On 11 April 1989, the republic newspapers carried I.N. Rodionov's address to the people and workers of the city of Tbilisi, which repeated his statement on television on 9 April.

On 16 April 1989, the mass media (television and radio) broadcast a report by the military commandant, in which he stated: "On recommendations of the Georgian CP Central Committee Buro, it has been decided to shorten the hours of curfew. As of 16 April, curfew will be in effect from 24:00 to 5:00." The republic press published this statement on 17 April (KOMUNISTI, 17 April 1989).

On 17 April 1989, the Georgian CP Central Committee Buro concluded that as of 18 April 1989 conditions in the city would be such that curfew could be lifted completely, and it submitted a recommendation to the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium that it make the appropriate decision.

On that same day there was a sitting of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, attended by Presidium Chairman O. Cherkeziya, Deputy Chairman T. Kabulova, Secretary V. Kvaratskheliya, and Presidium members I. Andriadze, B. Vashakidze, V. Blazhiyevskiy, Z. Kvachadze, V. Kochoyan, K. Mamedov, M. Mezvrishvili, O. Patiashvili, and R. Chikhladze. There is no record whatever of the proceedings of the Presidium meeting. The Presidium passed a Ukase reading as follows: "As of 5:00 on 18 April 1989, lift the curfew imposed on the basis of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on 9 April."

That same day, the text of the Ukase was broadcast on radio and television; it was published in the press on 18 April (TBILISI, 18 April 1989).

Such are the factual circumstances of the imposition of curfew in the city of Tbilisi in April of this year.

A curfew is a special measure which calls for special regulations governing the life and activities of citizens and organizations in the event of the declaration of martial law throughout the country or in particular localities.

According to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase of 22 June 1941, titled "On Martial Law," martial law shall be declared in the interests of defending the USSR and maintaining public order and state security. In the event of a declaration of martial law, all the functions of the organs of state power in the sphere of defense, the maintenance of public order, and state

security shall pass into the hands of the military council of the military district of the respective territory.

Point 3 of the aforementioned normative act spells out in detail the rules encompassed by the content of the concept of curfew: stipulation of the operating hours of institutions, enterprises, and organizations, prohibition of street traffic or the appearance of citizens on the street after the stipulated time, when necessary, searches and detention of citizens, restrictions on entrance to and exit from localities declared to be under martial law, and so on.

According to the existing legislation, consequently, curfew should be imposed after martial law is declared.

Inasmuch as martial law entails special legal regulations which place substantial restrictions on a number of constitutional norms, the power to declare it, according to the USSR Constitution of 1977 (prior to the change added on 1 December of last year), belonged solely to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium (Point 15, Article 121). On the insistence of the public in the union republics, including our republic, after the changes and amendments to the USSR Constitution introduced by the Law of 1 December 1988, the right to declare martial law or a state of emergency did, to be sure, remain within the competence of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, but with the difference that the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium is obligated to review the matter in consultation with the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the respective union republic (Point 14, Article 119). Consequently, the union republic does not have the right to declare martial law or a state of emergency on its own or, accordingly, to impose curfew. It may only state its own proposal when such a question is being decided by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

An analysis of the existing factual circumstances in connection with the imposition of curfew in the city of Tbilisi in April 1989, and legislation in force, gives grounds for drawing the following conclusions:

1. The Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase of 9 April 1989 imposing curfew in the city of Tbilisi was an anti-constitutional act, inasmuch as the republic's highest organ of state authority is not invested with that power either by the USSR Constitution or the Georgian SSR Constitution.

Officials of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium exceeded their authority and adopted a legal act which clearly went beyond the powers conferred on them by the law.

2. Senior officials of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium failed to take measures to immediately publicize the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase imposing curfew, thereby grossly violating Point 2 of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase of 4 March 1959 titled "On the Publication and Procedures for Enacting Laws of the Georgian SSR, Decrees of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, and Other Acts, Ukases, and Decrees of the Georgian SSR Supreme

Soviet Presidium," in accordance with which acts of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium which require broad and immediate application shall be published in the republic newspapers KOMUNISTI and ZARYA VOSTOKA, and may also be announced on television and radio.

As a result of the negligence of officials of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the inhabitants of Tbilisi were not informed of the imposition of that measure in the city prior to the time curfew went into effect. Moreover, the text of the aforementioned Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase, in the name of the Presidium, was not published in the republic newspapers nor broadcast over television and radio.

This circumstance was also facilitated by the fact that the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase of 9 April 1989 concerning the imposition of curfew did not stipulate the time the measure called for by the Ukase was to go into effect.

3. In view of the fact that the Ukase passed by the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on 9 April 1989 to impose curfew in the city of Tbilisi goes outside the Presidium's competence, and is therefore an anti-constitutional act, and inasmuch as the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium had not declared martial law or a state of emergency (or even a curfew) in Tbilisi, USSR Defense Minister D. Yazov did not have adequate legal grounds or, consequently, the right to appoint Col Gen I.N. Rodionov, commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Military District, as commandant of the city of Tbilisi, nor did the latter have the right to implement extraordinary measures stipulated by curfew.

4. Col Gen I.N. Rodionov carried out his official duties in an improper manner and informed the population of Tbilisi of the imposition of curfew four minutes before it went into effect, as a result of which numerous Tbilisians, as well as citizens coming to the city from other parts of the country, who could not have seen the television broadcast, and happened to be on the streets, inadvertently became violators of the law.

5. Inasmuch as the unlawful actions of officials of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR Defense Ministry, also Col Gen I.N. Rodionov personally, resulted in grave consequences (the killing of one citizen, Giya Karseladze, and the inflicting of wounds on several citizens as a result of the use of firearms by military servicemen during the very first minutes of the curfew, and so on), the USSR General Procurator and the Georgian SSR Procurator should take up the matter of instituting criminal proceedings against the aforementioned officials for criminal negligence and exceeding their authority.

6. There are substantial gaps in the laws of the USSR concerning a state of emergency. The present normative act concerning martial law was passed almost half a century ago and, naturally, reflects the spirit of the times. The content of the institutions of "state of emergency"

and "special forms of administration" stipulated in Article 119 of the USSR Constitution has yet to be defined by a single normative act; there is no precise legal regulation governing procedures for the practical implementation of the extraordinary measure of curfew that was lately introduced.

In a civilized, law-governed state, the rule of law should be in effect both under normal and under extraordinary circumstances. To accomplish this, it will be necessary to develop appropriate legislation as soon as possible.

Cases of violation of the law took place both during curfew and after it was lifted. On 17 April, in connection with the poisoning of students and staff members, the Theater Institute building was checked by military specialists. This investigative action was carried out by Justice Col I.A. Klimov, deputy military procurator of the Transcaucasian District, and Maj V.V. Vertyukh, the military procurator of the investigative department of that procuracy. The operation was participated in by specialists Maj Gen A.N. Burkov, Lt A.Yu. Ligin, and Maj V.G. Sadyuk, who were warned in accordance with Article 134¹ of the Georgian SSR Code of Criminal Procedures.

They determined that there were no traces of any toxic agents in the building. After that, classes in the Theater Institute were resumed, with the result that dozens of students and staffers were poisoned. As a result of complications received due to serious poisoning, Sh. Gogidze died a short time later. It became necessary to conduct another check, which was assigned to a laboratory of the Georgian SSR Ministry of Health. As a result of the check on 22 April, chlorocetophenone and other toxic agents were detected in the building. An investigation was also conducted in the building of the institute by the chemical-toxicological subcommission of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet investigative commission, which detected both chlorocetophenone and CS (K-51).

What we have here is a serious violation of the law.

The military authorities' concealment of the use of toxic chemical agents, and their nature, must be considered a criminal act.

It was not until 14 April 1989 that the internal troops and military departments admitted the use of chlorocetophenone (CAP) and not until 3 May 1989 that they admitted the use of CS. To this day there has been no official statement concerning the use of a third toxic chemical agent, chloropicrin.

The lack of information, naturally, provoked universal indignation, and a large group of the victims declared a hunger strike; subsequently, with the consent of the patients, their places were taken by healthy young people as a gesture of solidarity, not only in Tbilisi but also in other cities of Georgia.

On 29 April it was decided to move the official mourning ceremonies from the square in front of Government

House to Sioni Cathedral. During the moving of the wreaths and flowers, there were more new massive poisonings of the citizens. There were also mass poisonings in Secondary School No 1.

The second wave of poisonings of people is accounted for as follows: the persistence of chlorocetaphenone and chloropicrin is rather high; the persistence of CS is about two weeks; a variety of it, CS-2, lasts up to a month. These agents, in solid or liquid form, soaked into the soil on 9 April when they were used; later, the ground was covered with wreaths and flowers, and when these were moved the conditions were created for the evaporation of these agents, which caused massive poisoning.

The Commission believes that it is difficult to find a case in the history of the civilized world in which a state has used toxic chemical agents against its own citizens. It is also impossible to find a precedent for the fact that representatives of military departments concealed from physicians the nature of the chemical agents that were used, thus hindering effective treatment of the victims.

IV. The Press Concerning the Events of 9 April

The tragic events that took place in Tbilisi on 9 April constituted a kind of test of the professionalism, morality, and objectivity of the mass media. The errors and shortcomings of all ideological work were reflected in the mirror of the all-union and republic press; it revealed the dictatorship of the party leadership, which had neither the ability nor the desire to listen to alternative opinions. The administrative-command style of supervision of the press was manifested with special clarity during the very first days following the suppression of the rally until the Georgian CP Central Committee plenum, which gave a political assessment of the events in Tbilisi. The ideological service of the Georgian CP Central Committee (Central Committee Secretary N. Popkhadze) imposed strict censorship on journalists, the briefings held in the Georgian CP Central Committee were anti-democratic in character, and blatant pressure was imposed, designed to conceal from the public the causes and scale of the tragedy and to assess them in a politically one-sided manner. Nevertheless, in certain cases the republic press did attempt to elucidate the events objectively. Mention must be made of the civic courage of the youth newspapers and a number of publications (in particular, MOLODEZH GRUZII and Yu. Rost's article), which attempted, even under conditions of curfew and censorship, to present a truthful and objective picture of the events and the complex set of factors that caused the tragedy. In this context, a very negative assessment goes to the article "Our Duty Is To Return Calm to Georgia," which was published under conditions of curfew and martial censorship in ZARYA VOSTOKA (A. Ioseliani, editor) on 14 April 1989 and which was reprinted by VECHERNIY TBILISI (V. Anastasiadi, editor) without indicating the source. This editorial states directly that the rally in Tbilisi was not peaceful, that the events of April had been instigated by adventurists and demagogues, that there was a real

threat of a seizure of power, and that the decision to use force was well-founded and totally justified. The fact that this article was published in the Russian-language newspaper ZARYA VOSTOKA and not in the Georgian-language KOMUNISTI, which generally offers assessments of crucial social phenomena, is convincing proof that it was designed to accomplish particular purposes. It turned out later on that this article was written and published on the direct instructions of former Georgian CP Central Committee Second Secretary B. Nikolskiy, and was subsequently quoted in detail by Col Gen I. Rodionov at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies to justify the actions of the military. This and several other tendentious publications in ZARYA VOSTOKA and VECHERNIY TBILISI were exploited by the military press as a basic argument to falsify the events in Tbilisi and disinform the public at large.

The editorial board's explanation of the publication of this article, which was offered while the Congress was in session—that is, almost two months after it was published—and then only in connection with I. Rodionov's statement, cannot be taken as a desire to give serious and honest thought to mistakes committed earlier.

The Commission focuses special attention on the fact that during that period there was a group of Moscow correspondents in Tbilisi. It turns out that they were subjected to a certain amount of pressure by the leaders of the Georgian CP Central Committee in order to prevent the all-union press from presenting a truthful account of the tragedy in Tbilisi. This accounts for the fact that the Central press and media, with rare exceptions, confined themselves to skimpy and unobjective information given in small doses from above, or else printed deliberate lies. On this plane, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, SOVETSKIY PATRIOT, MEDITSINSKAYA GAZETA, PIONERSKAYA PRAVDA, LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, SELSKAYA ZHIZN, and others especially distinguished themselves.

In the campaign of lies and distortions of the truth that was launched against the Georgian people, the most ignoble role was played by the Transcaucasian Military District's organ LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA (V. Martynyuk, editor). Edition after edition published false and tendentious materials, lengthy blocks and cycles of articles giving a one-sided account of the events in Tbilisi, designed to defend the actions of the commander and the army. The newspaper placed all the blame for the tragedy upon the leaders of the informal associations and criticized the people's deputies and their statements as well as the republic press, and insulted representatives of the Georgian intelligentsia. An analysis of articles in LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA gives grounds for concluding that the newspaper's editorial board manifested moral-political irresponsibility and lack of principle, ignoring the elementary norms of professional ethics and, most important, fomenting interethnic strife.

Special mention must be made of the arrival of USSR people's deputies I. Yakovlev, A. Gelman, B. Vasilyev,

and D. Lunkov in Tbilisi in April 1989 at the invitation of the Georgian Cinematographers Union. These deputies immediately got to the bottom of the events of 9 April, with the result that MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI published the first full and objective account of the tragedy in Tbilisi to appear in the pages of the all-union press. Also worth notice are the materials published in the Central newspapers and broadcast over Central television (Nedelya, Vzgl'yad, and Do i posle Polunochi), which were infused with a tendency to establish the truth. Also to be mentioned is the press conference that was held by Georgian cinematographers on 21 April in Moscow, in the USSR Cinematographers Union, for Soviet and foreign journalists, which marked the beginning of objective information to the Western media concerning the events of Tbilisi.

The Commission's detailed study of the foreign press shows that in the long run they presented a much more impartial account of the tragedy in Tbilisi than the all-union press.

The events of Tbilisi have shown us that the mechanism of glasnost today is not adequate to extreme situations. Under such conditions, the methods of administrative-command supervision and party dictatorship over the press and other media are still in force. In connection with this, the Commission considers it essential to speed up the passage of a law on the press which will provide a firm, legal guarantee of the freedom and independence of the press.

The Commission considers it advisable for the Georgian Journalists Union to examine the question of the work of the republic press in connection with the events of 9 April and the responsibility of journalists guilty of falsifying the tragedy of 9 April.

V. Public Opinion on the Events of 9 April (Results of a Social-psychological Study)

As a result of a social-psychological study participated in by around 10,000 respondents and 15 experts it was determined that:

In the context of perestroika and democratization, the republic's party leadership and government failed to find new forms of administering society and attempted to deal with the problems facing them by means of administrative methods and policies of force. The erroneous position of the leadership in regard to crucial national problems was compared especially graphically with the position of the leaders of the so-called informal groups. The incompatibility of the positions of the party leadership and the informals led to a situation in which any dialogue or relations between them soon became very difficult. The people grew increasingly remote from the leadership's orientation and became closer to the position of the informal groups. Disregard of the just demands of the people led to rallies and to an extreme form of civil protest—hunger strikes. Ultimately, social processes went out of the leadership's control, so it appealed to the highest all-union organs of authority for help.

The bloody suppression of the rally, naturally, could not have solved the problems, which required the public for a solution. On the contrary, as is clear from the findings of the sociological study, the sociopolitical situation in the republic deteriorated even further. An analysis of the data thus obtained enables the Commission to draw the following conclusions:

1. The idea of genuine Georgian independence is supported by 89 percent of those questioned. These data reflect the main orientation of the public's consciousness of the question of the future status of our country.

2. The actions of 9 April introduced particular changes in the people's attitudes. First of all, there was an abrupt rise in negative attitudes toward the republic's leadership and positive attitudes toward the informals; 71 percent of those questioned expressed a negative attitude toward the republic's former government and leadership, considering, in their opinion, that the republic's leadership did not reflect the aspirations of the people. And, contrariwise, 79 percent of those questioned believe that the informal groups do express the national interests.

3. The people's negative attitude toward the republic's leadership extended to apply to the armed forces after the tragedy of 9 April. According to 82 percent of those questioned, the Soviet Army no longer serves the interests of the people.

4. Eighty-seven percent of those questioned demand an objective investigation and punishment of the guilty; a relatively small number believe that the guilty will get their just desserts. In particular, 62 percent believe that the guilty will be punished, while 34 percent have doubts about that outcome. This, of course, hampers the normalization of the situation.

In the minds of the people, the events of 9 April are linked to the Central and local leadership, the Russian people, the ideas of democratization and the defense of the Constitution. Public opinion in the assessment of these events was grouped as follows: 87 percent of those questioned believe that the rally was not anti-Russian in character. According to 80 percent, the rally was not anti-constitutional. A total of 80 percent of those questioned comment that vital political, national, and social problems were raised at the rally.

The barbaric suppression of the rally provoked a sharply negative attitude toward the authorities [instantii] which carried out the actions. The people believe these entities to be the Central authorities, the Georgian leadership, and the Army.

The introduction of troop units into Tbilisi, according to those questioned, was brought about by the position of the Central and republic authorities (65 percent), the position of the military leadership (53 percent), and the irreconcilability of the positions of the Georgian government and the informals (34 percent).

It was also determined that responsibility for the tragedy of 9 April should, according to those questioned, be placed on the same entities: 81 percent blamed the Central party leadership; 71 percent blamed the military leaders; and 55 percent blamed the Georgian leadership.

It can be stated, therefore, that in accordance with the law of systematic redistribution of relations, the events of April strengthened negative attitudes toward the all-union leadership and the armed forces and enhanced positive attitudes toward the informal groups, leaving the Russian people and constitutional principles untouched. The Georgian people's national movement did not take on either an anti-Russian or an anti-constitutional character.

5. The main goal of our people is shaped in the form of Georgia's genuine independence and freedom. According to 89 percent of those questioned, Georgia must become an independent and democratic republic structured on the principles of justice. Entirely consistent with these goals is the Georgian people's positive attitude toward democratization, glasnost, and perestroika, which are favored by 79 percent of those questioned. Rallies that were held prior to 9 April are assessed by the people as manifestations of processes of perestroika.

6. Most of the problems which brought about the tragedy of April remain unresolved to this day. These unresolved problems and unmet demands themselves provoke impulses of social activity, the need to hold rallies and demonstrations. Until our society and authorities formulate a joint, goal-oriented program of action, it will be difficult to avoid uncontrolled movements. It is essential to draw up a program of national development around which social forces may consolidate.

VI. Overall Political Assessment of the Events of 9 April

The tragedy of 9 April occupies a special place among a series of events which are seriously impeding perestroika and the democratization of our society, leading to violence and crimes. An in-depth study and analysis of this tragedy enables the Commission to draw the following general political conclusions:

1. One of the causes of the serious crime committed on 9 April in Tbilisi was the fact that the law—including the Constitution itself—was unable to play the role of guarantor of the protection of the individual and of society against arbitrary action [proizvol]. At all stages of the course of events, both the republic and the all-union party organs and organs of supreme authority ignored present laws. They were replaced by so-called "telephone laws." An analysis of the events of 9 April shows convincingly that it is still difficult to speak of any supremacy of the law or even compliance with elementary requirements of socialist legality, when the law is opposed by the highest party organs and highest organs of authority and administration.

Society was powerfully affected by the dictatorship of the bureaucratic-command apparatus, headed by the first secretary of the CP Central Committee. There were simply no forces to be found in the republic state system capable of standing up against it. The power of the first secretary was assured chiefly by the submissiveness which he showed toward the Central party authority of the Soviet Union. The Buro of the Central Committee was in effect merely a consultative organ carrying out the will of the first secretary of the Central Committee.

The constitutional principle of the supremacy of authority in the republic is a fiction. The highest organs of authority and administration in actuality constituted an obedient executor of the will of the first secretary of the Central Committee. The fact that the chairman of the Supreme Court can be summoned to the first secretary of the Central Committee, where a narrow circle is deciding the question of instituting criminal proceedings against leaders of the informal organizations, also the fact that such a matter can be approved by the so-called party aktiv, testifies graphically to the impossibility of speaking of any independent judiciary [pravosudiye] in the republic. Moreover, under the emergency situation such party organs as the Tbilisi Gorkom [city committee], the raykoms [rayon committees], and also local soviet organs, the Komsomol, and the trade unions remained in effect practically functionless. None of the above-listed organs was able to take its own position in regard to the events of 9 April, because the main condition by which the leaders of these organs acquired and kept their jobs, frequently, was obedience to the first secretary of the Central Committee.

All three functions of the administration of the state, in particular the legislative, executive, and the judiciary, were in fact concentrated in one person—the first secretary of the Central Committee. All this confirms that the pyramid of state administration that is characteristic of a totalitarian regime has not been broken up. The situation has not changed. And this sometimes provides the basis for unresolvable contradictions: conditions of democratization and glasnost have proved totally alien to a system of administration based on violence, terror, and bloody dictatorship. This is why, in an emergency, it resorted to the method embedded in its essence—violence.

Juridical services are poorly developed in the republic, and society's legal consciousness is low, constituting one more characteristic feature of a dictatorial-bureaucratic state.

Tragedies like the one in April can be avoided, primarily, under conditions of a law-governed state which establishes the separation of powers and the supremacy of the law.

2. One of the factors which brought about the events of 9 April was the fact that the sovereign rights of Georgia, conferred upon it by the Constitution, are a fiction, thus complicating both the exercise of the sovereign rights of the nation [natsiya] and interethnic relations within the republic. The Center ought to regulate only inter-republic

ethnic relations and not interfere in the process of regulating the specific interethnic relations within the republic.

3. The events of 9 April above all constituted a catastrophe of official ideology, the reason for it being that the republic's ideological work never underwent perestroyka. It was consistent with the ideology of a dictatorial regime founded on dictatorship, monopoly thinking, and demagoguery.

Prior to the tragedy of 9 April, society, influenced by processes of democratization and perestroyka, put forth legitimate national demands. As a result of the old, entrenched stereotype of thinking, the Georgian government failed to comprehend these processes and manifested a negative, hostile attitude toward these demands. The leaders of the informal groups pitted their point of view against that of the government, and a sharp polarization of their positions took place. As a result of their national-democratic essence, the ideas of the "informals" became increasingly popular among the public, and soon the people's position, together with the position of the "informals," became opposed to the authorities. The government failed to find effective ways to exert social-psychological influence on the masses and internal means of normalizing the situation (psychological, social, social-psychological) and attempted to resolve problems by enlisting outside forces. This led to the bloody outcome.

The Commission believes that it is essential to radically change the forms of ideological work in the republic and fundamentally renovate the entire apparatus of ideological administration.

4. The tragedy of 9 April revealed most graphically that Soviet reality is still strongly infused with the kind of thinking—customary for a totalitarian regime—according to which anti-Soviet slogans and appeals are assessed as being a much more serious crime than any crime against the individual. The ideology of preserving the existing regime at any cost is in actuality rejected by the Constitution's proclaimed fundamental principle in accordance with which the Soviet Union constitutes a voluntary union of free republics. The carriers of this ideology consider it a most serious state crime even to entertain the idea that any union republic, by reference to the relevant article of the Constitution, might raise the question of seceding from the USSR. Proof of this is seen in the mass slaughter that was inflicted in Tbilisi against participants in a peaceful rally advocating basically constitutional demands and a few extremely radical slogans.

5. At the present stage, the national movement is closely linked to social demands and, in general, with the struggle for justice. In particular, it stands firmly against the bureaucratism, careerism, graft, and other manifestations of corruption that are widespread throughout the country. For this reason, the struggle that has been launched against the national movement by the careerists and corrupt elements simultaneously constitutes a struggle to preserve unlawful privileges, advantages, and

unearned income. This struggle is also based on the fear which is the constant companion of corrupt elements and which forces the latter to carry out even the unlawful desires of all those upon whom their fate depends. For this very reason, obviously, they are deprived of the ability to defend the interests of their people in the face of higher-level Central authorities.

Thus, the formation of a law-governed state, the implementation of perestroika, and the intensification of processes of democratization and implementation of national aspirations, can be effective only on condition of a successful fight against bureaucratism, careerism, and corruption.

6. Among the real manifestations of democratization and glasnost are peaceful rallies and demonstrations at which the people directly express their will. For this reason, it is wrong to fight against the people's expression of their will; rather, legal foundations for holding rallies should be perfected.

7. One of the gravest consequences of the tragedy of April is the fact that the people have become sharply opposed to the army, manned by soldiers of non-Georgian nationality. In order to overcome the negative consequences of this phenomenon, the Commission raises the question of creating national army formations in the republic. At the same time, the republic MVD should form units of internal troops made up of citizens of the republic, whose duties would include stopping disorders exclusively within the republic.

The Commission considers it essential to dismantle the military subunits which carried out the barbaric actions in Tbilisi, actions unworthy of the Soviet Army.

8. In conclusion, the Commission finds that: the crime committed in Tbilisi on 9 April is one of the most serious in the history of the Soviet state. It was of the nature of a punitive operation, constituting a pre-arranged [zaranye organizovannoye] slaughter of innocent people, carried out with special brutality using prohibited chemical agents. The action contains the elements of an international crime, in particular a crime against humanity. The Commission has determined the main guilty parties in the republic; at the same time, the question of the responsibility for the perpetration of this action cannot be resolved only on the republic level, inasmuch as a share of the blame rests with officials of the Central organs of authority. The Commission deems it essential to determine and punish all such officials. Unless this demand is met, responsibility for the tragedy of Tbilisi will be assigned to the highest state leadership of the Soviet Union as a whole.

Validity of USSR Law in Lithuanian SSR Discussed

90UN0095A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
4 Oct 89 pp 3-4

["Debates on the Speech On Ratification of the Decrees of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium." Statements of deputies (Egidijus Bichkauskas, Lyuvikas Sabutis, and Pranas Kuris)]

[Text] Speech of USSR People's Deputy (Egidijus Bichkauskas)

Esteemed deputies! I feel that the draft decree on the procedure for application of Article 70 of the Lithuanian SSR Constitution (Fundamental Law) in the redaction presented today cannot be adopted. First of all, it contradicts the redaction of the Lithuanian SSR Constitution, Article 70 ratified in May of this year. Thus, this draft decree is unconstitutional and cannot be adopted in accordance with Lithuanian SSR Constitution Article 171.

Secondly, now, when we are striving for the republic's sovereignty, this would seem to be a moral, as well as, a political step backwards. I would like to remind you of Lithuanian SSR Constitution, Article 70. I quote: "In the Lithuanian SSR, only the laws adopted by the republic's Supreme Soviet or by referendum are valid. Laws and legal acts of the USSR organs of state power administration are valid within the territory of the Lithuanian SSR only after their ratification by the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet." It states in the aforementioned Lithuanian SSR Constitution Article 70 that in the Lithuanian SSR, USSR normative acts, I emphasize, are valid only after their ratification and registration. We see in the draft decree that they become valid directly, without any expression of the will of the Lithuanian SSR supreme state authority. How then is their ratification and registration expressed? This is an obvious contradiction to the Lithuanian Constitution. True, it is cited in the draft decree that they are valid if they do not contradict the sovereignty and the economic independence of the Lithuanian SSR. In my opinion, however, economic independence is a constituent part of sovereignty. Thus, where is the mechanism which will determine their contradiction? Article 70 was also adopted in part so that every USSR normative act be verified before it comes into effect within the territory of the Lithuanian SSR, so that it not violate the republic's sovereignty.

Article 2 of this decree is quite incomprehensible. It defines who may limit or halt the validity of USSR legal acts. But it is after all quite certain that this may be done by any deputy, the Council of Ministers, or the Supreme Soviet Presidium are far as changes in both the laws and the sub-legal acts are concerned. If we are speaking of who prepares the issue, then it is clear that in every concrete case this is done by a person entrusted by the Supreme Soviet to do this.

Again, Article 3 contradicts the Lithuanian SSR Constitution, according to which the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers is not granted the right to resolve matters on the procedure for the effectiveness of a norm of legal acts of the ministries, state committees, or other departments. But this is the exclusive prerogative of the Lithuanian SSR organs of supreme state authority. As is apparent in the draft decree's preamble, it speaks only of the laws regulating economic relations. Unfortunately, the laws do not regulate only these relations. Thus, the decree does not encompass all possible cases of legislation. We should evaluate it as a deviation from the

aspiration for the republic's sovereignty, including the aspiration for its political independence. If at this session we should somehow mention the 27 July 1989 USSR Supreme Soviet Decree on the proposal of the Supreme Soviets of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia concerning these republics' transition to economic accountability, then would it not be better to ratify and register this decree now. In essence, this would not have any relation to the mandatory statutes of a general nature on the procedure for application of article 70.

Esteemed deputies! We are going to appear most unseemly by adopting a decree such as the one proposed by the Supreme Soviet Presidium. So it would be better not to adopt it at all. I have a draft decree which, incidentally, corresponds to the primary version of the draft decree proposed by the Supreme Soviet Presidium; unfortunately, the majority of deputies do not know this decree, since it was prepared for a session which was to have been held 5 September.

I propose the following redaction of this draft decree:

In striving to explain the procedure for application of Lithuanian SSR Constitution (Fundamental Law) Article 70, the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic resolves to establish such a procedure for the validation of USSR laws and legal acts of the organs of USSR state authority and administration within the territory of the Lithuanian SSR:

1. "The USSR laws and norms of legal acts of the organs of USSR state authority become valid within the republic's territory: a) when they are directly included (incorporated) in the Lithuanian SSR laws or other acts by the decision of the Lithuanian SSR organs of supreme state authority; b) when the Lithuanian SSR organs of supreme state authority make a special decision on the validity of these norms in the republic, registering them in a registration book of USSR legal acts valid within the Lithuanian SSR territory.

2. The norms of legal acts for the USSR state administration are valid after their ratification and registration by the Lithuanian SSR organs of supreme state authority in a registration book of the legal acts of the Government and other USSR organs of administration valid within the Lithuanian SSR territory.

3. The Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers is to be charged with establishing the procedure for systematization of norms of legal acts and instructions of the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR ministries, state committees, and other departments, and obligate them to present these to the Lithuanian SSR organs of supreme state authority.

4. To establish that until such time as the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet begins its work after being reconvened, USSR laws and norms of legal acts of the USSR organs of state authority and administration are ratified and registered by the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet

Presidium. Issues of suspending their validity are resolved solely by the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet.

5. Proposals on the limitation or suspension of the validity of USSR laws, acts of USSR organs of state authority and administration currently valid within the territory of the Lithuanian SSR, or their individual statutes, is put to the consideration and discussion of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet in the procedure established by the regulation of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Once more, I want to ask you not to adopt the decree which has been proposed to you. It could be that I am mistaken. Fairly experienced lawyers, the minister of justice, the republic procurator, and the representative of the Supreme Court are participating in the work of this session; let them express themselves on this issue.

The Speech of Deputy (Lyudvikas Sabutis)

Esteemed deputies! Deputy E. (Bichkauskas) announced one of the variants proposed in the Presidium. It was discussed in the permanent commissions. Today, a shorter text is presented, and if we examine its essence, we must establish at least a minimum procedure of realization of the Constitution's complicated Article 70.

The Presidium, which examined the issue again, came to the conclusion that before opening of the activity of the newly elected Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, it would be advisable to establish not the procedure for registration of union laws, but the procedure for presenting the validation of USSR laws for your discussion. I am in agreement that if we were to speak of the procedure of applying the given article on the whole, that there could be variants in the section expounded in the first part of the constitutional article. Yet today, the issue is presented in such a form, and for clarity's sake, there should probably be the insert "On the procedure of application of the second part of Lithuanian SSR Constitution (Fundamental Law) Article 70." When we adopted the amendment to the Constitution, we wrote, "Their validity may be limited or suspended." By what means are we resolving the issue? Who will do that? Of course, I am in agreement with what has been said: There must exist the registration of every USSR law; every USSR law must be discussed at the sessions, and put up for evaluation. But the USSR Supreme Soviet works for 3-4 months. If we were to approve such a form, it would have to be decided how to do this. After all, we cannot work this way today. So let us discuss the variant presented. If this variant is also unacceptable, something has to be regulated. After all, it is written in the first point that the USSR laws are valid within the republic territory if they do not contradict Lithuanian SSR sovereignty and economic independence. This is stated with the second part of Article 70 in mind. If we were to make such an amendment—and I propose to discuss this and I am in favor of a temporary decree, since this is a procedural decree—we would move away from the standstill.

Without adopting the decree, we are in no condition to decide what will happen with USSR laws.

I agree that the initiative must come from each deputy. But a certain procedural order is necessary. All this must be presented for discussion in the permanent commissions, commissions specially created for this purpose, the Presidium, and possibly, the Supreme Soviet. No matter how it is there, a preparatory stage is needed. It seems that according to the USSR Council of Ministers decrees, it would be possible to listen to the instructions to the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers which would be presented for the issues under discussion; in the sense of implementing control, it would be possible to suspend or change any proposal of the Council of Ministers. We have drafts for the suspension of their validity, but unfortunately, we cannot present them to you today only because the very procedure for resolution and evaluation of USSR normative acts has not been established. If there are any doubts, I propose that the commission of legislative proposals meet again during the recess, and if we continue our work tomorrow, we can make a motion and vote on this decree. If we are not going to continue the work of this session, let us decide now.

The Speech of Deputy (Pranas Kuris)

Esteemed deputies! In its time, the Ministry of Justice received instructions from the Supreme Soviet Presidium to develop a model of a judicial mechanism to validate a correction to the Constitution's Article 70. I can say that our model is similar to the one announced by Deputy E. Bichkauskas. We thought for a long time of how to formulate the statute on USSR laws valid in Lithuania, in the state register, and other ones; in my view, the draft presented today is unconstitutional. Why?

Let us recall the history. In May, while discussing the amendments to the Constitution, a more radical formula was adopted than the analogous amendment to the Estonian Constitution, during the fall session. The formula was more radical, since here, in accordance with the amendment to Constitutional Article 70, practically only Lithuanian laws are valid, and all-union laws are just included in the register. And only the permanently active Supreme Soviet includes them in the register. And only then does the USSR law become our law. Such a formulation was adopted. You all voted for this. You felt that you got more freedom, but freedom must be paid for.

In order to realize this, a judicial mechanism must be established. Supplemental staff is needed. We proposed establishing the following order in the Ministry of Justice draft: The Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium receives the union laws. It decides whether the law can be immediately applied within our republic's territory, or if Lithuania must prepare its own law. Therefore, the Presidium presents the proposals to the permanently active Supreme Soviet. Let us say that the Council of Ministers receives the normative decree of the USSR Council of Ministers—it also gives the conclusion, can the decree be immediately valid or should the consent of

the Supreme Soviet be sought, or should a Council of Ministers draft decree be prepared? The ministry receives the judicial act from the branch ministry, and again, the analogous procedure. As you see, staff, people are needed. And resolving this is not simple. Hence the idea arose in the Presidium to propose a draft somewhat different from ours, even though a certain lack of correspondence with the amendment to the Constitution can be observed in it. But as long as the Supreme Soviet is not permanently active, many such laws and other all-union normative acts will accumulate in the Presidium. Meanwhile, it is necessary to make a decision on some decrees quickly, whether to apply their statutes or not to. That is why the given Supreme Soviet draft document has turned up in such a paradoxical situation. I explained the situation to you; deciding it is your affair.

Report on Draft Lithuanian Decree on Military Service

90UN0091A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
4 Oct 89 p 3

[Speech by Deputy Yu. Antanaytis, chairman of the Editorial Commission for the Draft Decree "On Military Service of Lithuanian SSR Citizens"]

[Text] We have inserted a number of corrections in the draft. Over the relatively short time we have not, perhaps, succeeded in formulating everything precisely and in literary fashion, but the essence and the content are there. Here are the new suggestions.

Deputy Yu. Nekroshyus suggested that the following text be inserted in the introductory section: "The session holds the opinion that it is necessary to democratize the Soviet Army, and that everything should be done to establish the spirit of perestroika there, and to ensure that respect for each man, his safety, health, and dignity become the primary concern of the Soviet Army." This would be added to the end of the first paragraph.

The preamble to the first item reads as follows: "To propose to the USSR Supreme Soviet" (earlier it was "to the Presidium") "to bind the USSR Ministry of Defense, and to charge the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers to begin negotiations with this ministry immediately, so that:

a) beginning in 1990, Lithuanian SSR citizens will serve on Lithuanian SSR territory or, if the opportunity does not temporarily exist, in the Baltic Military District, if they so desire; to take measures to begin to implement this in the current year;

b) the subitem has not been changed;

c) the wording of the subitem is as follows: "the conscription of Lithuanian SSR citizens into Ministry of Defense construction units will be halted and, in the future, military units of this type in the country will be eliminated entirely." And here I wish to add that Colonel General G. Krivosheyev, a deputy who participated in the work of our committee, also supported this wording;

USSR people's deputy Yu. Olekas suggested that sub-item "d" be reworded anew:

d) the opportunity for alternative service will be created for those youths who refuse to serve in the military on grounds of personal convictions.

As the specialists will agree, this conforms to international legal norms and would represent one of the subjects of future negotiations.

e) Subitem. (As the respected G. Kakaras and other deputies proposed)—ensure that pensions, compensations, and other privileges are increased to provide adequate aid to youths disabled in the military and to parents of youths killed in the military.

A new item 2 is also introduced: To charge the republic's Council of Ministers (this would be a sort of summary of item 1) to inform the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium by 1 January 1990 of the results of these negotiations and to systematically report to the people of the republic concerning the results of negotiations. If the demands that have been raised are not met in this fashion, then apparently it will be necessary to seek out other ways of implementing these planned legal demands.

A new item 3 is proposed: To establish that, starting this year, those youths in the republic who are orphans will be sent to serve on the territory of Lithuania, if they so desire. As you have heard, the military commissar said, and even guaranteed, that this would be implemented.

In the draft decree, the former point 2 will become number 4, without any changes. In point 3, which is now point 5, there are certain changes after the words "order No. 260 on the medical examination in the Armed Forces" to be inserted into the text: "And order No. 317 of 1 September of this year are incomplete," so that our doctors will prepare alternative proposals.

And, as our deputies suggested, to make the following entry at the end of item 3, which has become item 5: "To publish in the press the last names of the members of the draft boards created under republic, as well as city and rayon, military commissariats."

Point 6 (formerly point 4) remains unchanged.

The wording of point 7 would be as follows: (the proposal is from deputy Yu. Nekroshyus): "To propose that the Council of Ministers resolve the issue of the perpetuation, at the Antakal'nskiy military memorial, of the memory of the republic's youths who have perished in the military in peacetime as a result of combat operations, and that it publish the last names of Lithuanian youths who have perished as a result of nonregulation treatment while serving in the military.

Point 8 (formerly point 5) remains unchanged.

The following wording for point 9 was proposed: To charge the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

with the immediate resolution of the issue of hiring permanent employees to strengthen the republic's commission on military service.

The beginning of point 10 has not been changed, but it continues in the following manner: "And to inform the people of the republic of this regularly." There were additional proposals. For instance, there was a proposal to change the stationing of the military unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. But there is no need to note this in the present decree, because the republic's Council of Ministers has undertaken to resolve the issue. Several other proposals will be introduced into our other documents. We unanimously agreed to present the amended draft decree at a session of the Supreme Soviet.

The commission thanks all those who helped us with constructive and professional proposals and materially improved the initial draft decree that we have prepared.

LiSSR Supreme Soviet Decree on Military Service for Lithuanians

90UN0096A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian, 5 Oct 89 pp 1-3

[Decree of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet on Military Service of Lithuanian SSR Citizens, issued 29 September 1989]

[Text] Having discussed the report of the Yu. Antanaytis, chairman of the Commission on Matters of the Military Service of the Republic's Youths, concerning the problems of military service for the republic's youths in the USSR Armed Forces, the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet notes that these problems give rise to profound concern on the part of the public. Among servicemen on active duty, nonregulation treatment and discord on the basis of nationality has been widespread. As a result of the conflicts servicemen are abandoning their military units without permission, and quite a few of the republic's youths are returning from the military with physical injuries, illnesses, and psychological disorders.

The Supreme Soviet of the republic believes that it is necessary to democratize the Soviet Army and to do everything possible to ensure that it is founded on respect for each man, his dignity, and care for the health of the youths performing their military service.

With a view to the creation of normal conditions for the republic's youths performing their military service in the USSR Armed Forces, the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To propose to the USSR Supreme Soviet to bind the USSR Ministry of Defense and to charge the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers to begin negotiations with said ministry immediately, setting as their goal:

a) to guarantee, starting in 1990, that Lithuanian SSR citizens will serve on Lithuanian SSR territory if they so desire, or, if that should not prove possible, in the Baltic

Military District; and to implement this on at least a partial basis in the current year;

b) to reconstitute on Lithuanian SSR territory national military combined units in which Lithuanian SSR citizens may perform their military service;

c) to halt the conscription of Lithuanian SSR citizens into construction units which are not subordinate to the USSR Ministry of Defense; and to resolve the issue of eliminating such construction units in the future;

d) to render real aid to youths who have received severe injuries while serving in the military and to parents of soldiers who have perished in the army—to increase the size of pensions and compensations paid them, and to specify other supplemental privileges.

2. To address the USSR Supreme Soviet with a request to revise the USSR Law on Universal Military Service in order to specify the creation of an opportunity to perform other, alternative service for youths refusing service in the USSR Armed Forces by reason of conscientious objection.

3. To oblige the Council of Ministers to report to the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium by 1 January 1990 concerning the results of the aforementioned negotiations and to regularly inform the people of the republic of this.

4. To charge the Lithuanian SSR Military Commissariat with retaining on Lithuanian SSR territory for military service, beginning this year, those of the republic's youths who are orphans, if they so desire.

5. To establish that questions of basic military training of the republic's youths are under Lithuanian SSR jurisdiction, and to charge the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers with specifying a system for the practical implementation of this statute.

6. Noting that the current USSR Ministry of Defense orders of 9 September 1987 No. 260 "On the Introduction in the USSR Armed Forces of Regulations on Medical Examination" and of 1 September 1987 No. 317 are incomplete with respect to determining the fitness of youths for military service, to charge the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Public Health with preparing, by 1 January 1990, proposals enumerating illnesses and physical defects for which youths may not be drafted into active military service, and to present them to the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers.

To publish in the press the personnel of the republic, city, and rayon draft boards, their location, and their hours of operation.

7. To consider it necessary that the USSR Ministry of Defense, in accordance with the proposals of the Commission for Military Service Affairs of the Republic's Youths under the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, transfer for further service on Lithuanian SSR territory or some other place those youths of the republic

subjected to nonregulation treatment, as well as those who cannot perform military service due to unaccustomed climatic conditions, state of health, or family circumstances.

8. To propose that the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers resolve the issue of the perpetuation, in the Military Memorial of the Antakal'nskiy Cemetery, of the memory of the republic's youths who have perished in the line of duty, and that the Lithuanian SSR Military Commissariat publish the last names of other Lithuanian youths who have died as the result of nonregulation treatment while performing military service.

9. With a view to the development of cooperation between the public and the military commissariats as well as the military units in the oblast, and to the improvement of work on drafting youths for active duty service, and to the struggle against negative phenomena in the Armed Forces, to recommend to the city and rayon Soviets of People's Deputies that they form commissions for military service affairs of the youths and grant them support.

10. To charge the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium with augmenting the personnel of the Commission for Military Service Affairs of the Republic's Youths with permanent employees.

11. To charge the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium with exercising control over the course of implementing the present decree and with informing the people of the republic of this.

The Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium believes that any hasty, ill-considered acts of people, such as, in particular, attempts to return military cards or boycott the draft, only hamper the dialogue that has begun with the government and the USSR Ministry of Defense, and can have negative consequences not only for the draftees, but for those of the republic's youths currently performing military service.

Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Discussion of Elections

90UN0097A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
5 Oct 89 pp 1-3

[Speeches by Deputy Vytautas Astrauskas, chairman of the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, Deputy Yustinas Martsinkyavichyus and USSR People's Deputy Romas Gudaitis: "Debate at the 10th Meeting"]

[Text] Vytautas Astrauskas

Respected comrade deputies! I would like to say a few words about the work of the Supreme Soviet. We are truly living in a special time, one requiring from us political wit, diversity of opinion and tolerance of the opinions of others. Only on this basis is it possible to have effective dialogue and consent, which would serve the good of residents of Lithuania. Is this the sort of

spirit in which we are all working? In principle, yes. But exceptions exist as well. Unfortunately in our activity there is much impatience, irritation and, I would say, even maliciousness, which is always, and especially in politics, a poor helper. The Supreme Soviet is working in difficult conditions. It has been subjected to many attacks, and labels have been attached. I think these are traces left over from yesterday in the spirits of many deputies. Sometimes it is even hard to understand how on one day there are flowers and applause, and on the next—angry shouts. Whatever the case, some of this obviously appears staged. In my opinion we should refrain from such things. Such conflicts do not help Lithuania, and do not promote its aspirations. On the contrary they do a great deal of harm.

In general, our deputies are doing a lot of work, and not just during the session: They talk with their constituents, explain adopted documents to them, and seek counsel in regard to particular bills. And this is very good. But recently it has become a practice to hold meetings in which all deputies elected within a given rayon are invited into the same auditorium, and where pressure is applied and extreme demands are imposed on them supposedly in the name of the electorate. This places deputies in an uncomfortable position. I would like to emphasize that the work place of every deputy is his specific district and its voters. Therefore problems requiring correction should be discussed primarily in the election district.

It is my deep conviction that the activities of the present convocation of the Supreme Soviet, no matter how it is assessed, will enter Lithuanian history as the activities of a parliament which did many things for perestroika, for revival. Therefore I reject the accusations and ridicule addressed to the Supreme Soviet and wish the deputies courage and great political wisdom, and appeal for full exertion of effort so that positive processes occurring in the life of Lithuania would gather strength and acquire wide scope, so that we would be able to achieve those hopes and those aspirations which the nation has posed before us.

A few words about the work of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. I would like to say that we are hardly able to accomplish everything, we understand the shortcomings, and we are trying to correct them. In this sense the Presidium is also restructuring its work, it is working collectively, seeking counsel in all things. Documents are not doctored after a session. I would like to announce very responsibly that all that occurs in this hall is recorded. If anyone suspects the Presidium or its apparatus of making any correction in decrees adopted by the deputies, and of doctoring the thoughts they express, he may listen to the entire stenographic recording and persuade himself that this is not so. We can create conditions in which they could listen and make comparisons, since such suspicion is hardly helpful to the work. If we make mistakes, tell us about them, and we will take steps and try to keep them from happening in the future, but we should not be reproached each time for this thing.

At the same time I cannot but agree with the critical remarks expressed by Deputy Z. Vayshvily concerning poor control over fulfillment of decrees. There are in fact many shortcomings in this area, and they should be corrected. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is making the appropriate conclusions. I think that the Council of Ministers and many ministries and departments should also reach such conclusions.

Now about the elections. We discussed this subject yesterday in the Presidium, and I will submit a proposal in the name of the Presidium. As we know, on 18 May of this year, at a session of the Supreme Soviet, we resolved to organize elections to the Supreme Soviet upon expiration of the term. The idea of holding elections in late February or early March 1990 was suggested. The powers of the present convocation of the Supreme Soviet expire on 24 February. Therefore we suggest holding elections on 24 February. We must adopt the decree announcing the elections at a session of the Supreme Soviet 3 months before the date of the elections. Therefore we propose announcing elections to the Supreme Soviet in the following session of the Supreme Soviet.

Now about elections to local soviets. Considering the wishes of the public and ideas expressed by some deputies in this session, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet feels that the elections could be held earlier than planned. You have received a draft of the decree in which extending the powers of local soviets until June is foreseen. But now we have proposed organizing elections in early May. It is true that doing so in April was proposed. But most members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet expressed the opinion that April is a busy season for farmers. In my opinion May would be more appropriate. Therefore we should convene one more session of the Supreme Soviet next year—in early February. During it we could adopt the Law on Self-Management, which is needed by the local soviets. The Law on Self-Management is being written, but the work needs to be spurred on, and the draft needs to be discussed in permanent commissions.

In addition the date of elections to local soviets should be announced and other problems that may arise should be discussed during the above-mentioned session. I would ask the respected Supreme Soviet to uphold this procedure for organizing elections to the Supreme Soviet and local soviets.

Yustinas Martinskyavichyus

As we can see, time is really all too short, and we should utilize it very sensibly. I agree with all who assert—and this is in fact so—that the present convocation of the Supreme Soviet has adopted many significant laws, and that its significance is very great. But there is still very much work ahead, and I am especially troubled by the fact that we did not adopt the Law on the Referendum yesterday. It is my deepest conviction that without the Law on the Referendum we will be naked and weaponless in the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in which

the law on the republic's economic independence will be discussed. The Law on the Referendum would at least be a kind of trump-card for us. We haven't adopted it, so what are we to do? I think that prior to that session of the USSR Supreme Soviet this law must be adopted. Therefore one more session of our Supreme Soviet should be held in October.

Now about the elections. I do not fully understand the passions that have flared up about their date. History teaches us that nations and states live through their traditions. It seems to me that the tradition of Lithuania's statehood—it has been torn asunder over the course of centuries, and in our century as well—has been torn apart fundamentally, and possibility for putting these pieces back together must be sought. Therefore it would be suitable for us, beginning with the new Supreme Soviet, to begin reviving or continuing the traditions of Lithuania's statehood. It seems to me that all nations and all people of Lithuania would benefit if the Supreme Soviet convened for its first solemn meeting of the next convocation on 16 February.

For this to happen, the elections to the new Supreme Soviet would have to be carried out prior to 24 February. Therefore I propose thinking about 4 February—moving the elections up to this date. Such is my proposal, and I ask you to consider it.

Romas Gudaytis

We don't like each other very much. Our positions and views differ, and it is difficult and, alas, often even impossible for us to agree on the fundamental, the most vitally important issues. Let me dare to disturb the honored atmosphere of the session and focus your attention on the issue as to the time of the elections, which I am certain will not elicit your approval. I would be lucky if the reverse were to occur.

I'm sorry, but the arguments brought forth by the honorable Chairman V. Astrauskas concerning the time of elections did not convince me. Even if we were to seriously talk about the need for holding the elections sooner by 1 day—both in the republic's Supreme Soviet and in self-management organs at all levels, then I would be joyful, as to a saving grace, for this one hard-won day, wrested from the waiting period. Today, even an hour's delay would increase tenfold the difficulty of the mission of the republic's future parliament, the future new government. Not only money but also values are undergoing devaluation before our eyes. It would be a profound tragedy were we, who declare responsibility, to deceive ourselves that many doors to the future have already been opened by legislation. Yesterday we debated hotly about the number of members of parliament, but I was thinking about their selflessness and their boldness, their risk and their far-sightedness, about how they would achieve that enticing ideal—independence, about how they should behave themselves and act when the public demands lightning-fast changes. You—the Supreme Soviet—decided not to hurry, to wait decorously until

your power runs out; your decision as to the date of the elections is extremely logical, and thus it is totally out of line with the logic of the political situation. After all, national revival and renewal is certainly not the only sentiment circulating today: The people are tormented by the lack of clarity, the lack of concreteness, there are many things which they do not trust, and they feel that the structures of power and the methods of their activities are obsolete. These sentiments are also felt in the government. It seems to me that ivory-tower disregard of these sentiments and the hope that passions will subside are the greatest illusion and mistake. Placing my hand over my heart, I cannot but recognize that each day complicates the psychological climate also because officials of various rank—even those who do not believe in God—are praying daily for the hope of hearing from the heavens whether or not they would be needed any longer. We know before the face of the electorate—and more keenly in our own hearts—that the conditions are truly unfavorable for real work, that postponing democratic self-determination of all Lithuanian citizens in general and every citizen taken separately is making the situation even worse. The new parliament and the new government will have to raise themselves out of the quagmire in which we are all floundering. The people associate delay with a desire to follow the single union-wide scenario of elections, with the reluctance to take the bull by the horns—that is, to solve our own problems and carry on our own affairs. "Measure seven times before you cut" is a deeply meaningful folk saying. But as we hurry to catch up to events and sentiments, we have measured and cut so many times that all that is left of the Constitution is but multicolored fragments, bits and pieces, while in the meantime the crisis has grown the nine heads of Hydra. By February the number of these heads will doubtlessly double. We have talked here about the party's political firmness, but that is something only a congress can reveal, and I don't think that delaying the elections would be useful to the Lithuanian Communist Party, to its healthy and honest faction, to its aspirations.

It is fashionable to say today that we are bound by numerous knots with the Soviet Union, that we are integrated with it. They are also trying to integrate us, the people's deputies from Lithuania—that is, to dissolve us in the aggressive and passive majority of the union parliament. Our proposals are being assessed in different ways in this palace, but we came to this session not because we were brought here by our emotions, but with the conviction that our constructive participation is needed here. Alas, working in Moscow, within the USSR Supreme Soviet, we do not feel warm winds blowing; more likely the reverse—we sense a danger to democracy, the danger of a unionwide economic disaster. To say that the policy on the nationalities issue is troubling, that it is disturbing, that no one would stir to find community and cooperation between sovereign states, is not enough: This policy shows that an attempt is being made to serve up the old as if it were new. Attempts are

being made to legalize things from the times of stagnation in the package of state laws defining state sovereignty provided to this session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The independence of the republics is recognized, while at the same time this independence is torpedoed by unionwide unified mandatory regulations. This elicits considerable alarm, and it is not diminished even by the mechanism of constitutional protection created here, in Lithuania. The USSR Land Use Law introduces the concept of union-republic ownership (this is that same old whole people's ownership that compromised itself earlier; it is simply referred to in seemingly legal language). When the Tax Law grants the prerogative to the republics, this is clearly an obvious attempt to shear all sheep in all republics with the same shears, while the Law on Leases and Contracts once again emphasizes a form of union ownership, and the draft Property Law defines land as union-republic property (such that every chunk of our soil remains the property of the USSR, as in pre-perestroika times). Of course these are still drafts, but we have sufficient evidence that conservatism will reflect itself in the laws, and it will be institutionalized by means of automatic voting so much more up-to-date than in this auditorium. It is as if our protests had not even been voiced at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies: The USSR Committee for Constitutional Supervision was conceived as an institution that would decide legal conflicts, without appeal, in favor of a somewhat embellished but nonetheless the same union state. It took a few years of perestroika to get more than just defense and foreign policy into the circle of union-level concerns; attempts have been undertaken once again—just like in the times of the unfortunate Tashkent conference—to interfere from the center in the sphere of language, which requires delicacy and tact, to push us back, to neutralize the Law on the State Language and to aggravate national conflicts. Unfortunately, everything is being done in Moscow to keep the Soviet of Nationalities from functioning, to keep us from using that

podium to express what is unacceptable to us in union programs concerned with the nationalities issue. Statehood and the right of nations to self-determination are being transformed into an object of scholastic conclusions. National polarization and division will obviously reveal itself ever-more distinctly in December at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies; we will have to act decisively in order not to lose what we have acquired, in order that we could satisfy the aspirations for real statehood, in order that in an unfavorable and contradictory atmosphere we would not be transformed into just a handful of deputies, and in order that we could promote development of democratic independence in our own land.

We cannot ignore this important context all the more so because a tendency is manifesting itself here for turning the furrow of perestroika in the direction of conservatism. Concern for a straight furrow must be left to the individual, to the voter; let him, and only him, straighten it according to his knowledge and understanding. This individual, this voter certainly has no faith in any regulators, including those of union significance. My hopes that we will vote for 14 January are not very high. Nonetheless what I am proposing is in my opinion a maximally delayed date, in support of the arguments of those deputies who talked about the practical aspect of voting in two rounds. I propose this because my thoughts are with the simple individual, who is already fed up with the convolutions of politics, the wide discussion, the intrigues and the parliamentary multiplicity, my thoughts are with the individual who wishes to express his will, with the individual who is tuned to labor, to business management, who hates with all of his soul the disorder that has become the norm of life. This individual, this future voter, hopes that you will determine the date of the elections to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet in this session. In my opinion it will be impossible to explain any delay tactics.

Readers Discuss Creation, Location of German Autonomous Republic

90US0076A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Oct 89 p 11

[Article by Ye. Domnysheva and G. Tselms, with contributions by Aleksandr Nikitin and Kurt Vidmayyer: "German Autonomy: Where? When? How?"]

[Text] The matter of forming a German Autonomous Republic is discussed in our chamber today. Let us assume that "LG" [LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] correspondent Aleksandr Nikitin presents a report, and journalist Kurt Vidmayyer makes a co-report. As the reader will see, their positions differ. Therefore, at the end of the "meeting," the newspaper will ask the readers to take part in a discussion of the proposals advanced.

Information in the Discussion Participants' Files

The first Germans had appeared in Russian cities even before Ivan the Terrible. A mass arrival of immigrants occurred during the years 1764 and 1765, when thousands of immigrants from Germany, Austria, Holland, and France settled in the steppes beyond the Volga at the invitation of Catherine II. German immigrants were arriving in Russia until the end of the 19th century, and settling in the Ukraine, Crimea, and Caucasia.

In 1918, there was formed, by V.I. Lenin decree, a Volga Region [Povolzhye] Labor Commune for Germans, which was transformed into an autonomous republic in 1924. The Soviet Germans who lived in other regions had cultural and nationality autonomy (rayons, village soviets).

The Volga Germans were exiled to Siberia and Kazakhstan by a ukase of 28 August 1941 for supposedly having harbored tens of thousands of spies and saboteurs. The other German settlements also were exiled to the East. The men and women from 15 to 55 years of age were mobilized into a "labor army"—they worked in mines, on construction sites, and at felling trees.

The exile was declared eternal in 1948. This was repealed by a 1955 ukase; however, the Germans were forbidden to return to their native locations.

The founding conference of the "Restoration" Society, which has set itself the goal of restoring the German Republic on the Volga, took place in March 1989.

Today, 2.2 million Soviet Germans are scattered throughout the country. They are losing their language and culture. This is one of the reasons for their emigration.

About 130,000 Germans had emigrated before 1986. Over 50,000 emigrated last year, and 46,000 during the first half of this year....

I Do Not Want Him To Leave

By Aleksandr Nikitin

I am the same age as Fedor Vilgel'movich Shults, and from the same place. I am a Russian, and he is a Russ. He was born on the Volga, and I spent my childhood there. But we met for the first time at Sheremet'yev Airport. How he turned up there is a long and sad story.

Bewildered lambs roamed about the streets, unmilked cows rushed, lowing, to a human being, all was swept and scrubbed within the sturdy houses, the harvest was ripening in the fields and gardens, and—not a soul was there. We had been evacuated into the Volga Region ASSR for Germans a week after 400,000 of its inhabitants had been taken away to the East. A few longtime residents told us the same thing—I remember it perfectly—about the reason for the Germans' exile. It seems that NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] officers in Hitlerite uniform had been landed in the steppe. These were withdrawn to the place whence they had come. Nevertheless, a week later, there was the order: Exile all Germans—within 24 hours.... In 1944, another story—I also remember it very well—was being told: Seemingly the NKVD officers had been hidden in a village. Between the two versions—4 years of a most terrible war.

Is there any point in reminding you of what the war was for us? Less well-known is what it was for the Russ Germans—the people who were put behind barbed wire. However, was such a fate prepared by the "father of the people" for them alone?

In 1972, a middle-aged lady in a "Zentrum" Department Store in the GDR asked me: "Are you from the Soviet Union? During the war, my sister was also in the Soviet Union, in Karaganda—My mother was there, too—in a camp." She yelled, loud enough to be heard throughout the store: "Martha, Komm her [Martha, come here]! Seine Mutter war auch in Karaganda, im Lager [Your mother was also in Karaganda, in the camp]!" With tears in their eyes, they both kissed me repeatedly, and would not let me pay for my purchase. "I, too, am your countrywoman...." It is obvious that our unfortunate mothers and "the wives of enemies of the people" have not been separated by nationality there.

Inasmuch as the "German Republic" is also my homeland to some extent, I have a special interest in it. What was it? What have we lost?

It was a strong, well-developed republic—its harvests the richest in the Volga Region.

It was a cultivated republic. It had 2 theaters, its own publishing house, 20 separate, exclusively German-language newspapers, and 5 higher educational institutions, in which everyone studied where they wished without restriction: Germans in Russian-language institutions, and Russians in German-language institutions. Is it bad to know two languages?

It probably was the most musical republic in the country. Every village had its choir and orchestra. There were songs for every occasion, from folk airs to historical songs about Pugachev and 1812. And there was a song about exile. Yes, indeed! The Czar was planning the Germans' exile for April 1917. His affairs in the war with "those" Germans were doing poorly, and he had decided to requite himself on "these." After the revolution, a stanza was added to the song: Who, it says, is making trouble for whom.... Will such a song be composed about Stalinism? The case against Stalin in this incident is not closed. There are still people who think that "Comrade Stalin would not have exiled the Germans without good cause."

Let me say one thing: The Germans never fought against Russia, and they fought for her more than once, together with the Russian people, beginning with the Pugachev Rebellion and ending in June of 1941, when thousands of the republic's men voluntarily reported to the military commissariats, but they were sent to Siberia. Some changed their surnames, and the repressed nationality provided a whole bevy of heroes.

Once his excited little six-year-old son ran up to Ivan Andreyevich Lederer, a cultural enlightenment worker respected by everyone in the city of Marks: "Pop, the children say the Germans will come here soon, and there will be a war."—"Son, your papa is a German."—"No, you are not really a German to us!"

Where do such homey conversations come from? Today, 20,000 Germans, who have returned to the homeland of their forebears, live in Saratov Oblast, and there are about 4,000 in Marksovskiy Rayon. They were living—everybody says—in perfect harmony with the Russians. Apprehensiveness and alienation literally appeared within a month. One worker at a machine shop said: "Karlych and I were friends, and drank vodka together, but now we are suspicious of each other...." What had happened? The "Restoration" Society had been formed. Its goal: restoration of the republic on the Volga. Many in the country have supported this idea, including a number of People's Deputies.

"Restoration" conducted an introductory-meeting dialogue in Marks. It turned out to be such a failure that writing about it is painful. One lady schoolteacher, for example, spoke irrelevantly thus: "You need not shed crocodile tears here. Your adopted brothers burned down the peasant houses in Belorussia." And she was applauded! But when prosecuting attorney A. Shevchenko came out with the constitution, and reminded her that inciting ethnic animosity is a crime, there was an attempt to run him off the podium. There were, it is true, both bold speeches in defense of internationalism and businesslike criticisms of the society's not-very-well-prepared proposals. On the whole, the opinion was as follows: The Germans may return, even to the Volga—we are not opposed. However, the republic must be created in some other place, where there is a German population majority; Germans are in

the minority here. These thoughts are in a number of letters sent to various agencies.

Generally speaking, there was no dialogue; the party's city committee let nature take its course, and rumors filled the city—the one no less groundless than the other. The Russians will be displaced. Their homes will be taken away. They will be forced to speak German.

What lies at the base of this rebuff? You cannot accuse the residents here of chauvinism. This is the Volga! It is a region where dozens of peoples live and the last serious internationality conflict was Ivan the Terrible's seizure of Kazan. And relations with the Germans were—I repeat—most friendly. One enterprise manager in Marks said, accurately in my opinion: "Maybe 5 or 6 years ago, everyone would have said 'we approve....'" The outbreaks of nationality animosity in other places have frightened them. They are afraid—and are fanning the flame themselves.

Let me say at once: I do not know where, when, or how the German Autonomy will be created. There is the proposal: Here, in the former location. Let us examine this as one of the alternatives. Why here, and not in Kazakhstan or Siberia? And why there, and not here? At a Central Committee Plenum, farm equipment operator Ms. N. Gellert, in disagreeing with Volgograd "First" V. Kalashnikov, asked, quite justifiably: What are we, still exiles? I do not think that either she or the majority of her compatriots would leave the places where they are living; it might be possible to create nationality rayons there, and the minority might move elsewhere. However, the very fact of restoring the republic—a national home, a place from which teachers and cultural enlightenment workers might emanate—would greatly raise the spirits of the entire German "diaspora." Most importantly: It would become a symbol of the people's final rehabilitation. I spoke with the Moors, father and son farm equipment operators of the "Meliorator" Sovkhoz near the city of Marks. The younger said:

"Do you want the whole truth? Look, we lived there in Kirgizia. We worked better than all of them, but the rewards went to someone else. The new machine—the order and medal besides—went to the locals. Yet we also were faintly praised from time to time: The Germans, they said, are hardworking people. Father spent half of his life in a labor camp, and in what way do I differ from him? I, too, am a workhorse. We want to be like everybody else—understand this! There are more of us than there are of the natives in another union republic. Why do we not at least have an autonomous republic? We are not asking too much. Give us what the others have, our language, schools, theaters, and higher educational institutions. For whom will things be made worse, and against whom will we trespass by this?"

Pride, personal, and especially national, is a great force. Offended, it can destroy, sow animosity, and take people abroad. Offense redressed, it can create. The Germans, I am sure, would make a marvel of their republic. What

sort of living conditions would people of other nationalities have there? How do the Russians live in Komi or Chuvashia? Do they not live in Russia? Are they oppressed there? The same applies to our Germans....

Having run an ad for people in the newspaper, a non-Chernozem-Area chairman I know is putting the letters from Germans in a separate basket: "My foreign currency." Here they have a chance to get 250,000 to 300,000 workers into their sparsely populated and largely run-down territory [kray], and they are afraid of God knows what.... There is no getting along with such a nationality, and it can be kept away by just one thing: not recognizing it as a nation with its own national rights, language, and culture. We are contriving to do this. In many of us there lurks an instinctive, "well-meaning Russifier": You be just like me, buddy, and everything will be fine. Speak Russian, not your own language, and dance the kamarinskaya [Russian folk dance], not the "Hopse-Polka" [hop polka]. We, ourselves, then are hurt by the boredom and sameness in the country. The society suffers irreparable damage with the loss of each nationality, especially such a major one.

As for a state German language (there are the fears brought on by the Baltic States), one cannot talk about this without smiling: God grant that the Germans themselves will remember the language....

"The Germans will take the leading positions." Yes, they will! If you elect them. There are quite a few Germans among the kolkhoz chairmen in Kazakhstan. There is no autonomy there. Can it be that they are not elected for their surnames?

[Question from the meeting room] There are 5,000 persons on the waiting list for housing in Marks. In Saratov, for meat costing 5 rubles—there is a waiting line. We are beset and beleaguered by waiting lines and shortages. The immigrants will pour in under these circumstances. Will this not lead to absolutely unbearable living conditions for the local people?

[A. Nikitin] Yes, it will! If the state bureaucratic machinery actually there is not first replaced by cooperative enterprise, leasing, and farming on privately owned or leased farms. Like the people of Marks, I do not trust offices and bureaucracy: they mess everything up, and cause dissension among us all. The republic must be built in accordance with reason. It must be built in accordance with goodness as well. Like the wise Laub at "Meliorator": He summoned his entire brigade, including two Russian families, to the land of his forebears.

Who might become the republic's organizer? As a beginning, it would be necessary to legalize the "Restoration" Society—those people have been fighting for their (our) people's rights for 20 years. Put them on the staff of a Supreme Soviet commission, and incorporate various nationalities from the Trans-Volga area and other regions into that staff. Incorporate advocates of the republic and—without fail—opponents of it: A good opponent is an assistant in a serious matter. And I would

put two people in charge of all the work: a knowledgeable economist—a "German head"—and a considerate, even-tempered, people-loving politician—a "Russian heart...." There would be no confrontation, a maximum of compromises, and gradualness. Indeed! Is there really even one nationality problem that we cannot solve in the normal manner, without altercations, imprecations, and senseless, mulelike stubbornness on both sides?

[Question from the meeting room] Where will we get the money for this whole idea? In the budget—there is a hole....

[A. Nikitin] That is a difficult question. It might be worthwhile to seek the advice of economists and politicians, including specialists on international matters. Perhaps, as I have heard, the FRG will provide substantial assistance. Some people in Marks see a source of trouble even in this, and talk about a sellout for peanuts. Let us see. In the FRG, to which especially many Germans from other countries are traveling for reunion with their relatives, the state is trying to accommodate each. The laws there are most considerate. However, the country is groaning under the torrent of "Easterners," and the natives are beginning to grumble. It is simply cheaper and more advantageous to slow the migration. And it is not to our advantage to lose trained people.

It is not Stalin alone, who is to blame for the Soviet Germans' fate. Had there been no invasion from the outside, the "German Republic" would be in existence even today.

Here in the Volga Region, it would have been possible to create mutually profitable enterprises with the FRG, the GDR, and Austria—brick and tile plants—and housing for locals and immigrants, as well as small plants for processing vegetables and meat....

At present I am at Sheremetyevo Airport. The waiting room is packed. There are Russian faces, and there is Russian conversation. German Russ are leaving Russia. Shults, my landsman and contemporary, is sitting with his wife and two small, orphan grandchildren. He discourages deliberately:

[Shults] Every person needs a homeland. The Greeks—Greece, the Turks—Turkey, and we, Germany.

[Nikitin] Excuse me, Fedor Vilgelmovich, but what the devil kind of German are you? You are ours, a Russian German, and your homeland is the Volga.

[Shults] I had a homeland. They could have returned it after the war. Instead of that—30 years at various jobs in Kirgizia. Well, maybe the grandchildren will have a homeland.... Anton, throw that can in the trash receptacle. You must be a neat boy....

Nobody Wanted To Leave

By Kurt Vidmayer

Talk about the republic's future location would not have arisen at the end if the Germans had previously had an

opportunity to discuss the problem. However, a ban had been imposed on its discussion, and you really cannot deliver the Germans to the newly formed republic under a return exile guard. The republic itself must attract the people, and not just by a chance to assemble as a gypsy band in order to dance the hop polka, but primarily by its geographic location, climate, and economic promise.

Where is such a place?

The proponents of plans to form the autonomy "at places of dense settlement" in Siberia and Kazakhstan are now being earnestly implored not to propose the places of exile! The "density" in mind is represented by 30 to 40 German villages scattered from Orenburg to Barnaul. Any place beyond the Ural would duplicate Birobidzhan's living conditions: It thus would remain without new settlers.

Is it possible to dance to the tune of the past? In that case, is the place the Black Sea Coast or the Azov Coast, where the majority of the Germans lived before the war? Is it the Crimea, the Caucasus, or the Transcaucasus, where many of them, although a minority, lived? All of these are attractive but unrealistic alternatives: There is already ethnic unrest in that area. Is it the non-Chernozem Area abandoned by its residents? The strip from Pskov to Smolensk—why is it not a region for settlement? There is not a word against it! As they say, however, "Dottie is fine, but not ours" ["Khorosha Dasha, da ne nasha"]. It is better to let the owners return to their native Russian homes than to settle people in these on an autonomy or organized-recruitment basis.

In their appeals to the administration, the movement for autonomy's activists have insisted on the Volga Region for so long that their point of view has almost become the official one. It has been maintained since the time of the 1965 Memorial Delegation, the mission of which, as you know, ended in failure. The delegation's members even then (more accurately, still) tended to have differing opinions concerning the future territory. However, inasmuch as there were more of the Volga Region people, immigrants from the former Volga Region ASSR for Germans [ASSR NP], these prevailed, and all the others were obliged to talk only about the Volga "for the sake of unity."

At that time, it is true, the Volga Region Autonomy might still have been realized in a surge of short-lived enthusiasm. Representatives of the other German groups also would have gone there.

Since that time, radical changes—toward hopelessness, lack of desire to continue living as they do, and willingness to leave—have occurred in the Soviet Germans' attitudes, and the chance to leave that has arisen—the Department of Visas and Foreign Citizen Registration's Visa Division [ovirovskiy] roadblock has been raised somewhat since last year—has increased the difficulty of finding a location for the republic. It seems that those who advocate the Volga through inertia have not noticed these changes.

A brief explanation is required here, or else the reader who has grown accustomed to considering all Germans living in the Soviet Union as "Germans of the Volga Region" will miss the point. About 10 years ago, one highly placed official, in receiving emissaries of the Crimean Tatars, confusedly inquired: "What have you come to get? You have a republic in Kazan." It is about the same with the Soviet Germans. I do not dare to rebuke the lofty Congress for its order: "Study and present recommendations...on the problems of restoring the Volga Region Germans' rights." However, I cannot help but ask: What about the rest, the non-Volga Germans? Are we to let them despond in rightlessness?"

The point is that only a fourth of all USSR Germans lived in the republic on the Volga before the war, and that these were never of a single ethnic origin. They came from various principalities and even countries, at different times, and they settled densely, but separately, there—from Bessarabia to the Trans-Volga. In the final analysis, they differed in dialects, religion, character traits, and temperament. Their customs, houses, living standards, and types and methods of economic activity differed from region to region.

Of course, our common lot in the last half century largely eliminated our differences. However, we did not even come out of the Stalinist meat grinder as altogether the same kind of sausage. The nostalgia for our prewar homeland still retained its different addresses.

The Society's program simply leaves the other groups out in the cold by having set as its goal: a republic in the Volga Region—cultural autonomy for a small fraction and, for each of the remaining groups, the place of its present displacement.

I am prepared to pacify the Volga Region's residents—a great migration does not threaten them. Even if the "Volga Region Alternative" prevails, I think that no more than 150,000 Soviet Germans will arrive there within the next 5 years. Aeroflot and Lufthansa will carry most of them away.

Today's Volga Region is unattractive as the "restoration" site for many reasons.

The soil has been ruined by erosion and the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources. The houses and villages have become dilapidated with age, the small rivers have almost dried up, and the Volga itself...(I shall keep quiet about the Volga—it is a generalized pain). The climate and landscape, especially in the Trans-Volga, do not differ essentially from those of North Kazakhstan. Who will be drawn here to leap from the frying pan into the fire [menyat shilo na mylo (trade an awl for soap)]? Does the extensive farming here require many working hands?

Neither housing nor jobs in their occupational specialties were found for the already small number of professional people and working urbanites (there now are about 800,000 of these) in the first 7 to 8 years, a

circumstance that would, in addition, set a low immigrant cultural and educational level for a long time.

On the Volga, we might succeed very, very slowly in creating a living standard capable of offsetting the FRG's socioeconomic attractiveness, at least somewhat, and that at the cost of substantial budgetary infusions.

Obviously, we shall not succeed in satisfying everybody's nostalgia. One cannot join even the Volga group a second time. It is wiser, more practical, and easier to set up the common home in a new place. In a place, let me say further, unexpected by many.

The territory of the present Kaliningrad Oblast, upon its conversion into a free-enterprise zone, could become such a uniting place, and perhaps the only realistic and promising one for a vitally dynamic autonomy.

The objections that burst out upon mention of this neuralgic place are entirely familiar to me: "It is a base, a military staging area, an ice-free port, the revanchists and the Poles will be opposed, and the Lithuanians will protest." These boil down to a resolution as crude as an axe: "Who is going to give you the place?"

There is also talk about overpopulation. By Soviet standards the oblast is very densely populated—55 persons per square kilometer. By European concepts it is a wasteland (In the FRG, for example, there are 260 persons per square kilometer). Population density—first of all, this is a matter of economic and management-development level, and only then a demographic matter.

The circumstances have so taken shape that something will have to be "given up"—either the land acceptable for adaptation to their living, or the deprived immigrants themselves.

[Question from the meeting room] But why, out of all the Union's expanse, precisely this vulnerable, controversial choice?

[Vidmayyer] Because we have seen that the overall selection is not great, and this choice seems the most versatile and acceptable one to me.

I think that a republic created here could counteract and absorb the emigration because I am sure Soviet Germans will come here.

I know the landscape here is no delight. However, the land here is still reclaimable.

On the Baltic, it would be possible, in 3 or 4 years, to solve national, cultural, and economic problems that could not be overcome on the Volga in 20 or even 40 years, and not without funds from the state treasury at that.

Only one condition, but that one indispensable, would be demanded of the leadership and, to some extent, the society: willingness to take this extraordinary step decisively and in earnest.

Maybe I never would have decided to come up with my "Baltic Alternative" if I had seen in it just the self-seeking and narrowly national aspect. However, its attractiveness lies in its feasibility, and in its implementation's possibly bringing rapid and substantial benefits to the country as a whole—economic, financial, and political:

- The oblast could become the scene of close economic cooperation with the West. A chain of joint enterprises, primarily for the production of high-quality consumer goods might quickly spring up here.

- The territory, having enterprising executives, could become a sort of proving ground for new technologies and alternative economic models.

- The oblast itself might receive diversified cultural and educational support and specialized assistance from both German states, and loans, subsidies, and private donations from the FRG on top of that. Through the [Free Enterprise] Zone, and with its good offices, the door might even be opened to financing projects connected with other places in the Soviet Union.

- Correction of the ecological and restoration of the cultural and historical surroundings, construction of hotels, organization of public services, and, most importantly—complete openness [otkrytost]—might transform the oblast into an attractive destination for international tourism.

A certain concentration, a sufficient critical mass, just as in a chemical or nuclear reaction, for example, is required for the Germans' self-expression, for their full display of national attributes. In the present dispersed state, their loss and their continuous entropy are occurring.

And—I have strayed into a physics vocabulary once—let me finish with Niels Bohr's statement: "Your idea is wrong because it is not crazy enough."

If the "Baltic Alternative" is evaluated by this criterion, there should be a glimmer of hope for it.

[Question from the meeting room] I should like to find out: What is your certainty that the majority of Soviet Germans will actually prefer the "Baltic Alternative" based on? On intuition? Or was a sociological survey of all Soviet Germans conducted and its results precisely this?

[K. Vidmayyer] So far, only on intuition and a personal survey. Undeniably, however, this is not enough. A survey of all Soviet Germans is necessary. It would be great if "LG" could provide assistance in this.

[Response from the meeting room by Nelli Vakker, member of the Pavlodar Writers Union [SP]] Before exile, our family lived in Crimea. So why is the road to our homeland closed to us just because "ethnic unrest" exists there?

I think everyone should have the right to return to the place from which he or she was illegally exiled. Only time

will tell where the autonomy should be. The place to which more Germans return—that is where it should be. As for the “Baltic Alternative”—in my opinion, it is purely speculative.

[Question for all attendees and readers] How should the autonomy be set up? With what, and when, should one begin? What are the setting up's stages? In short, what is your plan?

Guidelines for Planning (Suggested by the “LG” Department of Public Political Life)

Neither the authors nor the editorial office can specify the future autonomy's location and status. We can only suggest certain principles, mandatory in our opinion, for its setting up.

- An All-Union agency for its creation must be formed.
 - The republic will be proclaimed as the goal, but its setting up will proceed in stages. An alternative: Start with the rayon.
 - Maximum benefit and minimum inconvenience for the new settlers, the longtime residents, and the country. No “temporary difficulties” with housing, a place to work, or supplies. Start with the infrastructure and the construction industry.
- The possible economic base: a free-trade zone, small and medium-sized enterprises (joint, cooperative, leased, family, etc.), and high-technology and ecologically clean production with the emphasis on export and the domestic consumer goods market.
- In choosing foreign partners, consider their ethnic relations with the autonomy's population.
 - The state, its agencies, and those forming the autonomy, as well as the Soviet and joint enterprises established there, might be able to assume the payment to local soviets for the arriving workers.
 - Guarantee the children of those arriving and the longtime residents the opportunity to be taught in their native language.
 - Along with the republic, it is necessary to form nationality rayons or districts outside the autonomy for the Germans who may wish to remain in their old localities.
 - Under these conditions, the autonomy can become an attractive place for both those arriving and the people presently living there, and regions will compete for the right to form it.

Homework Assignment

Each of our readers has the right to answer these questions, but it is particularly important to us to find out the opinions of Soviet Germans. Therefore, we ask our “LG” readers to acquaint even those who are not subscribers to the newspaper with the meeting's materials.

1. In your opinion, where is it best to form the republic for Soviet Germans? [Blank spaces provided for answer]

2. In the event of the republic for Germans' formation in one or another location, do you and your family intend to move there, or do you have other plans? Underline your answer. (This question is for Soviet Germans only!)

2.1. I shall move only if the republic is formed (write where) [Blank space provided for answer]

2.2. I should prefer: [Blank space provided for answer]

2.2.1. to remain at my previous place of residence [Blank space provided for place-name]

2.2.2. to leave for the FRG.

3. If you consider it proper, indicate your nationality (German/non-German) and your place of residence (oblast, rayon, city) [Space remains for response]

Officials, Readers Interviewed on Soviet German Emigration

90US0161A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 44, 4-10 Nov 89 pp 6-7

[Article by Yu. Sigov: “Why Are They Leaving?: As of 1 September 1989, 61,000 Soviet Germans Had Left for the FRG”]

[Text] There has recently been a sharp increase in the number of Soviet Germans wanting to depart for permanent residence in the FRG. Thousands of people with packages and suitcases are spending days and nights in the waiting rooms of airports and railroad terminals.

In their long days of trial, some of them are accusing employees of the FRG embassy in Moscow of “foot-dragging with visas.” Others are cursing the USSR MVD Administration for Foreigner Visas and Registration (UVIR) and, together with them, also the editors of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY (AiF), who, in their opinion, made the pages of the weekly available for the “Comrade Kuznetsov's false and scandalous request to departing Germans” not to sell off [their property], not to resign from their jobs, etc. (see AiF, No. 31).

In order to clarify the situation, AiF has decided to give the floor to all interested parties—to a representative of the FRG embassy, to a worker of the USSR MVD UVIR, and to our readers.

Here is what the acting West German charge d'affaires in the Soviet Union, E. Haiken thinks about the “German emigration boom” that has broken out in the USSR:

[Haiken] Germans were invited to take up permanent residence in Russia as far back as Catherine the Second. They settled mainly in the Volga region. The majority of them were peasants, artisans, and working people. In the middle of the present century, for reasons you know, the Germans left behind the regions where they had originally settled. The process of family reunification began

after diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and the FRG in 1955 and the first Germans left the Soviet Union for West Germany.

The largest number of Germans left the USSR in 1976—10,000. Then this number became sharply reduced and in 1985 a total of 500 persons left the Soviet Union for the FRG. An emigration "splash" occurred in 1987, when a new statute on departures was passed in your country. Then, 16,000 Germans left for the FRG. Already in 1988 there were 47,000 of them and, this year, 5000-6000 are departing the USSR every month. In August alone, 11,000 persons set out for the FRG and by the end of the year the number of Soviet Germans who will have left the USSR will exceed 90,000.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] What is the professional and social make-up of the Soviet Germans who are emigrating to the FRG?

[Haiken] Mainly these are skilled workers, collective farmers, physicians, teachers. Among those leaving for the FRG are representatives of practically all age groups, but primarily this is the stratum that is socially—people from 25 to 40 years old, frequently with children. At the same time, it is necessary to note that while representatives of the older generation still speak and understand some German, the young people frequently do not know the language at all.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] How long does it take Soviet Germans to receive visas to emigrate to the FRG?

[Haiken] The maximum period is a week. But usually a visa is issued in 2-3 days.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Does the FRG government provide any assistance to Germans coming from the USSR?

[Haiken] The West German Red Cross is taking upon itself assistance to people who are sick and in need of medical help, and the government is providing assistance in finding work and in German language courses, and is helping with housing.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] How do you explain the fact that Soviet Germans are leaving for the FRG specifically, and are not going to other countries where they speak German, for example, to Austria?

[Haiken] The reasons for this are historical and social. The majority of Soviet Germans have relatives living specifically in the territory of the FRG, especially in Land Hessen and, in fact, this is a condition, that is, the presence of immediate relatives in the FRG is necessary for your citizens to receive permission for residence.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Many of our citizens of German origin believe that, having gotten to the FRG, they will quickly be able to "make their way in life" and become rich. How justified are such hopes?

[Haiken] If Soviet Germans think that they will be able to "make their mark" with us, like, for example, the Soviet Jews in the USA, then they are mistaken. Hopes for a "life of bliss" in the FRG are no more than an illusion. Yes, in our country people do live well, but for this it is necessary to work well, even very well. And, also, a great deal depends upon luck. So that Soviet Germans wishing to move to the FRG to live permanently need to make a sober assessment of their possibilities so as to avoid disappointment later on.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] AiF has received several letters from residents of Kaliningrad Oblast in the RSFSR who, referring "Deutsche Welle" broadcasts, report about a supposed agreement has been reached between M.S. Gorbachev and H. Kohl regarding resettlement within its territory of Germans from the FRG who lived there before the start of the Second World War...

[Haiken] During M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Bonn the question of the RSFSR's Kaliningrad Oblast (formerly East Prussia) was discussed, but in an entirely different context. Chancellor Kohl asked the Soviet leader to facilitate familiarization trips by Germans from the FRG who had earlier lived in this region. There was no talk about any resettlement of FRG Germans for permanent residence in the territory of the USSR. I would also like to make one more thing clear. If Soviet citizens who have dual citizenship want for any reason to return to the USSR, they may do this without hinderance, because there are no exit visas in the FRG.

And here is the opinion of the deputy chief of the USSR MVD UVIR, A.V. Luzinovich, concerning this problem:

[Luzinovich] According to Soviet law, exit documents are issued to persons who wish to leave for permanent residence abroad, including in the FRG, as a rule, within a month's time. The period for reviewing a case of this category may not exceed 6 months.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Many AiF readers of German background who want to go to the FRG are accusing the UVIR of "disseminating false information" in the pages of our weekly concerning the rules for departure from the USSR...

[Luzinovich] The information itself is absolutely correct and, for those who do not understand its meaning, I will repeat again—it is necessary to resign from work, to sell off property, and to remove oneself from the military register only after receiving an authorizing signature in your foreign passport. I would advise those Soviet Germans, particularly residents of Kazakhstan, who are waiting for an exit visa to the FRG, to send some member of their family to Moscow after it. There is no need to create agitation where it can be avoided without work.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Can mixed families (for example, the husband is a German but the wife is Russian) emigrate from the USSR to the FRG?

[Luzinovich] Our exit questionnaires do not have a question about "nationality" and therefore there are no barriers to the departure of a family of mixed composition.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] In their letters to AiF, L. Shleyfer, B. Ayzen, and certain others complain that the Soviet state supposedly is "fleecing" them and that permitting them a total of 90 rubles when leaving violates international agreements. What do you have to say about such "severity" on the part of UVIR?

[Luzinovich] Let us first sort out who is "fleecing" whom. During the first 9 months of this year, 150,000 persons have left the USSR. All are leaving the borders of the USSR to live permanently, to be with their relatives. Consequently, these relatives, as the party issuing the invitation, should bear material responsibility for those they have invited from the USSR. The sum of 90 rubles may in fact seem small. But multiply this by 150,000 and you get more than 15.5 million rubles, which are being paid out in hard currency that also is in short supply in our country.

And something else. Any family that leaves the USSR, including a German one, has the right to take along objects that are necessary for it get settled—a refrigerator, television, furniture, even a personal car. But notice, they take things that are in the shortest supply, things that our stores are not full of. So that talk about the "fleeced Germans" who are leaving Soviet borders in no way corresponds to the facts.

From the Editors

And thus, the problem of Russian Germans departing for the FRG is a very keen one. Why, despite the development of restructuring processes within our country, despite affirmation of the processes of democratization and glasnost, why are Soviet Germans abandoning their homes, their land, and leaving to live abroad. "I am leaving the Soviet Union because I do not love the country in which I was born and because I do not believe in the possibility of solution of the German question," a reader from Pavlodar writes to AiF. "If a decision is reached to create a German autonomous oblast in the USSR, I assure you that, immediately, there would be nobody wanting to leave for the FRG", thinks L. Shmidt from Saratov.

At the same time, there are also among our readers those who consider Soviet Germans "superfluous people." "Let them go; we'll survive without them, no reason to be sorry for them," S. Prikhodko from Volgograd Oblast declares categorically. A. Titkin from Karaganda believes that "if they had sent them to Germany yesterday, then things wouldn't be like they are today." Well, and so, changes in our emigration laws have in fact permitted representatives of the many national minorities living the USSR to leave to live permanently abroad. But do we have the moral right to watch indifferently as skilled workers, rural workers, and representatives of the intelligentsia forsake our country?

Indeed, the Soviet state has spent no small amount of money on raising, educating, and providing employment for these people and as a result [of leaving] they are putting their knowledge and skills to use abroad. Waste-fulness of this kind can have an extremely serious affect on our economic structure and national economy. "It is necessary to fight for each person who is wavering, who has doubts about the final victory of the process of perestroika," opines V. Appolonov from Leningrad, and then continues: "People are our principle wealth, irrespective of what nationality they may be—Germans, Jews, or Armenians. All of us are the Soviet people, and if somebody thinks that some kind of 'foreign uncle' is going to build a just society for us, then this is a profound error. We must restructure our own life ourselves, with our own hands, our own minds, and our own hearts."

Baltic Front Groups Declare Territorial Integrity

18000001A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
13 Sep 89 p 3

["Declaration on the Territorial Integrity of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania"]

[Text] The territory of the three Baltic countries is the foundation of their state integrity. Territorial-administrative changes can be enacted only by legal and constitutional means as well as by means of inter-state treaties. Otherwise these changes will be, and will remain, unlawful.

Therefore any attempts to change the territorial integrity of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as for example, regarding north-eastern Estonia, Daugavpils, or south-eastern Lithuania, must be seen first and foremost as a means of crude political pressure. Such actions are aimed against the aspirations for independence and self-sufficiency of the Baltic countries, and against the interests of the peoples who live there. These actions are nothing other than attempts to leave unsolved the existing problems and to create new ones, to increase the tension and to divide the nascent civil unity of the populations which permanently reside in the three republics.

We call on all citizens of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania not to support initiatives and attacks of this sort which would create additional obstacles on our common path to a law governed state. Mutual understanding and legal guarantees of state integrity define the success of our efforts.

[Signed] The Baltic Council of the Estonian National Front, the Latvian National Front and Sajudis, the Lithuanian Movement for Perestroika

E. Savisaar, D. Ivans, V. Landsbergis

Panevezhis, 9 September

Azerbaijani Official Evaluates Ongoing Party Elections

18310040D Baku KOMMUNIST in Azeri 10 Sep 89 p 2

[Interview with Sabuhi Abdinov, deputy director of the Party Organization and Affairs Department of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee: "Analysis. Criticism. Proposal: We Must Work From These Criteria When Evaluating the Work Of Communists At Meetings and Conferences"]

[Excerpts] [Question] Present accounting meetings in the party are taking place under very complicated and contradictory conditions. What kind of duties stand before party organizations under these conditions and, in your opinion, to what extent are they ready to do their duties?

[Abdinov] True, the situation in the country and the republic is rather complicated. Perestroika has exposed a lot of rust which has been accumulating for decades. So many problems have piled up in party work, social and economic life, internationalist education and interethnic relations that solving them all at once is a complex issue. All these are having such a strong impact on people's minds that it is causing an increase in dissatisfaction among the people. The Central Committee of the Azerbaijan CP, taking the situation into consideration, has done a lot of work in preparing for a political campaign in connection with the elections. We have given communists detailed information on the events of November and December of last year, we have held private talks with them and held regional seminars and conferences for primary party organization secretaries. Later, at seminars for the party commissions attached to party committees, for chairmen of inspection commissions of raykoms and gorkoms and for party committee instructors open exchanges of ideas on these questions were conducted.

Workers in ideological and general departments have also conducted special preparations. Thus, the party apparatus have received new data and recommendations on perestroika and political reform in the CPSU CC. As for the duties facing primary party organizations, these have found their reflection in the decree of the CPSU CC "On Holding Accounting and Election Meetings in Party Organizations in 1989." The basic duty is that every party organization succeed in holding accounting meetings and elections under the conditions of increased glasnost, inner-party democracy, and creative discussion.

In a word, party group organizers and primary and shop party organization secretaries have received enough information. Will they be able to fulfill their commitments in a worthy manner and succeed in holding an organized political campaign? As of this moment it is hard to say.

[Question] At any rate, one could make certain prognoses with regard to the meetings held so far...

[Abdinov] Accounting and election meetings in the 11,377 party groups active in our republic are almost over. More than 61,000 communists and close to 24,000 nonparty members took part in the meetings. The fact that the party has been subjected to criticism due to the passivity of some party committees and organizations is exerting a serious influence on communists. They think that there is a strong need for deep changes in the work of the CPSU, its leading organs and primary organizations. Thus, every communist is obligated to defend the party's influence.

Now accounting and election meetings in shop and primary party organizations with up to 15 members have begun. There are more than 9,500 such organizations. The proposed CPSU platform on nationality policy under current conditions and the events occurring in Nagorno-Karabakh are causing broad discussions at meetings. In some organizations justifiable criticism is being addressed to the AzSSR CP Central Committee, the Baku gorkom, some rayon party organizations and ministries. It has been noted that the leadership of higher organs meet only rarely with worker collectives.

Along with this, communists at meetings of some party groups and shop party organizations in Yevlakh, Vartashen, Dashkesen, Zangilan, Imishli, Gadabay, Lerik and other rayons have not demonstrated the necessary activity. In the August accounting-election meetings the activity of 196 party groups and 19 shop party organizations were graded "unsatisfactory," and 204 group organizers and 21 organization secretaries could not garner enough votes for reelection.

I want to talk about another example. One can say without exaggerating that the discussion of the CPSU Platform turned into a serious test requiring maturity of party organizations, communists of various nationalities, and all Soviet citizens. Unfortunately, some of them lost control of themselves in the face of life's contradictions. Instead of making an effort and resolving urgent questions which are complicating the issue, especially in the social sector, in the development of national culture and language and in ecology, they made it possible for random forces to circulate. The recent strikes in the republic violated the harmony of accounting-elections in party organizations. In general, these events exposed the clumsy actions and indecisiveness of certain party organizations and communists in leading positions in defending their principled position.

[Question] In our opinion, the pride and steadfastness of party cadres reveals itself clearly in such conditions. The CPSU has demanded often that above-average, creative and diligent persons be attracted to work in party organs. But sometimes in practise the obedient, literal or petty-minded types prevail, and they distance themselves from independent, creative people. This has often been the case during elections at primary organizations. What basis is there to think that this situation will not repeat itself during the present campaign?

[Abdinov] I agree with you. The selection, placement and training of cadres has decisive importance in party work. But party organizations in some places are still not paying enough attention to this important question.

For example, during the last accounting and election campaign it was suggested to primary party organizations that alternative candidates be submitted for the post of group organizer or secretary. Unfortunately this experiment was not conducted everywhere. There were no alternative candidates in the secretarial elections of the Gubadly and Salyan party organizations. Similar situations were permitted in Mirbeshir, Pushkin, Absheron, Balakan and other rayons. This practice was criticized when results of the last campaign was summed up. It has had a definite influence. In this year's accounting-election meetings more than 83 per cent of the party group organizers and 91 per cent of the shop party organizations were elected from the alternative candidates. But at a number of party organizations in Kirovabad, Ali Bayramly city, Aghsu, Guba, Yardymly and other rayons this issue was forgotten once again and elections were conducted under the old rules. They have to know once and for all that the time of "appointing" party cadres, including primary party secretaries, has passed. They must be elected by the will of the majority of communists under conditions of broad democracy and glasnost. This is one of the primary conditions for the implementation of perestroyka in party organizations.

[Question] One of the tendencies created by perestroyka and to which we have not become accustomed and have not seen before is a passion for criticism and an indifference to the elimination of shortcomings. In general, how does self-criticism in the party differ from past years?

[Abdinov] One of the major reasons for the serious shortcomings created during the years of stagnation is that criticism and self-criticism expressed the personal wishes of certain people. It had gone so far that leading workers and organizations were freed from party control. Criticism was out of bounds. As a result, shortcomings and mistakes in their work and instances of dereliction of duty were kept secret intentionally. The Central Committee is implementing measures that guarantee that every communist will hold a principled and militant position so that criticism and self-criticism will convey a party character. Discussions are going on not only about creating the conditions for principled criticism but also to guarantee its effectiveness. This is an important condition.

You said correctly that a passion for self-criticism and an indifference to the actual consequences of criticism are revealing themselves. These are very harmful tendencies. Some people, by coming forth with some trivial self-criticism, are giving themselves a kind of insurance. The ineffectiveness of criticism directed at others is also turning into a tradition. The time has come for a definitive struggle against such instances. Criticism for the sake of criticism or deliberately angry criticism leads us in the wrong direction. We have to approach events in

a realistic and objective manner. For us constructive, communist criticism and self-criticism are our basic weapon. This is the only correct path. Any other way will drag us backwards, and there is no way back.

[Question] As a leading party worker, what do you expect from the current accounting and election meetings? How do you in the party think the campaign will help in the process of renewing our society?

[Abdinov] Under the present political conditions the importance of the accounting and election meetings is great. The implementation of the ideas of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the decrees of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies fall at an important stage. The specifics of the present stage will define the activity of every party organization and make major demands on this activity.

Today there is no campaign more important than the accounting-elections in party life. As noted in the decree of the CPSU CC, the party meetings, plenums and conferences have truthfully turned into a creative laboratory of political ideas in connection with the preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress.

Meeting of People's Front Cell in Azerbaijani Writers' Union

18310040C Baku ADABIYYAT VA INJASANAT in Azeri 22 Sep 89 p 6

[Article by Ne'mat Veysalli: "In the Writer's Cell of the Azerbaijani People's Front"]

[Text] We have often witnessed sharp discussions at the Natevan Club. The regular meeting of the cell of the APF [Azerbaijani People's Front] within the Writers' Union in connection with the tense situation in the NKAO also occurred in an excited atmosphere.

Writers' unions in the Baltic states and among our neighbors have turned into the main centers of the people's movement. Unfortunately, we have to say that our organization had still not taken a position in the struggle for our people's national sovereignty and justice during the process of the present conflicts. Writers are taking part in the Azerbaijani People's Front's organizational work throughout the republic and at meetings. Our Writers' Union and the APF cell must show selflessness in the realm of perestroyka and glasnost and must be at the most critical turning points of the people's struggle with their writer-patriots' hearts. Hope is expected from the people's writer and the intellectual in these dark days.

The poet Gabil, a member of the front's council of elders, and the writer Sabir Ahmadov, chairman of the cell's ispolkom, have appealed to writers to act in these difficult moments of our history.

What can Azeri writers do at the present stage? What is our major obligation? What are our duties? What do the

people expect from us? Primarily, we have to send writers officially to Nakhichevan, to villages and regions of the NKAO, to businesses and winter pastures and to rayons adjoining the republic. These should not convey the atmosphere of normal journeys. Our writers will act on a comprehensive and effective program. We must take possession of our villages which are threatened by danger and bring help to the people. We must join in their sorrows and concerns. We must defend them as we sow our fields and gardens!

The relationship of government circles to the APF has changed. We must relate our work to the front's activity. Along with all this, there is a sector of work which pertains to writers. Members of the cell's ispolkom have decided that a chronicle reflecting events and situations pertaining to the NKAO from the first moment up to the present time should be compiled. What will be the basic objective of this book? Witness who have seen Azeris being forcibly driven from Armenia must examine and study the roots and causes of the Karabakh events. Documents and statistical materials will be given in the book, and conversations with eyewitnesses to the agonies of those driven out and our brothers and sisters exiled from their own land will be included. Our publicists, scholars and historians will take part in composing the book.

We must evaluate and express our relationship to the NKAO affiliate of the Azerbaijani Writers' Union and to subsequent activity of the journal GRAKAN AZARBAYJAN.

Among the writers who spoke, M. Ismayyl, N. Jabbarov, M. Suleymanly, H. Ali, I. Gasymzade, S. Azeri and I. Ismayylzade, returned over and over to the subjects of the settling of the Azeris who had been forced to leave the land of their forefathers and concerns for their standard of living, to our sovereignty and national unity. The time has come to call everything by its proper name. For years they fed our people white lies. They have sold our lands time and time again.

We are a people bound to the land. How is it that a people who loves and nourishes its land has lost so much land in the last century! At the beginning of the century khans and beys sold the land; in the last seventy years raykom secretaries, chairmen of village soviets and kolkhozes, and others have sold the land. And this anti-people tradition continues even now. It is strange that newcomers are exiling us from the lands of our forefathers.

B. Azeroghlu, A. Mammadli, S. Tahir, U. Rahimoghlu, Kamila Ne'mat, Kh. Rza, S. Alysharly, Azer Abdulla, Dilsuz and A. Abdulla expressed their views on ways out of the situation.

Actions of USSR internal forces in the NKAO, legal violations occurring in front of the eyes of "special administration" leaders, the fate of Azeris living in Georgia, current duties of literary and artistic journals, the republic's sovereignty and questions on the people's

unity were also touched on. It was stated once again that despite the instructive events of recent years there were still cowards and sycophants among us. They talk about the people's fate and national independence, but think about their own comfort and life style. They still cannot free themselves from hypocrisy or sham and are an obstacle to the actions of healthy forces in society.

The exciting speech by Niyaz Jahangirov, a teacher from Tugh village in Hadrut Rayon, angered all of us. He said that for two years we have known neither sleep nor comfort. For two years Armenians, who control the upper end of the village, have allowed no water into the Azeri part of the village. Nevertheless, we dug a ditch and suffered along with it. We cannot go to the store or the club. We cannot hold classes for the village children because the "bearded Armenians" have made it impossible. We are dissatisfied by the coldness and apathy by the party and Soviet organs in Aghdam, Fuzuli, Jabrayyl and Beylagan Rayons and their leaders: "It has nothing to do with me, it is my brother's problem." They have to be made to understand that this sorrow is not someone else's, it is the people's sorrow. We must all be one. We have to think about our tomorrow and our future. The Azeri people believe in their intellectuals, their minds and their wisdom. We must stand above petty concerns and material and other inadequacies and bring about a rebirth in the people's faith through our actions. We must mobilize our will and direct it toward service to the people.

Then the writers' cell of the APF and its ispolkom drew up a plan of active measures for subsequent activity.

Uzbek 'Voters Association' Informal Group Outlines Agenda

*90US0049A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 22 Aug 89 p 2*

[Article by A. Ibragimov, secretary of the primary city Komsomol organization at the place of residence, and P. Akhunov, USSR people's deputy: "The Voters Association Proposes"]

[Text] There is news every day! This time there was the report that a "Voters Association" has been created in Moscow Rayon of Andizhan Oblast. And together with the news—a draft of the first document proposed by the "new-born" informals—the platform of the republic Komsomol for the forthcoming elections to the local Soviets.

I put in a call to Shakhrikhan. Yes, they say, we exist. For the time being, there are only eight of us. But even if there would have been two, all the same we would not have remained silent. We ask that it be published. . . .

Recently, we too often, before saying anything, say "for the first time." I, to confess, am a little bit afraid of this word, because all the time I am expecting the following venomous—for the first time, my dear, this was 200 years ago. . . . But what, indeed, is really for the first time

is for our republic lads—not the Muscovites, who with their authors' projects are here and are there, but ours—to be in the newspaper. And for this reason—we are publishing and inviting discussion.

The USSR Congress of People's Deputies has become one of the stages of the reform of the political system of our country. The elections to the republic and local Soviets must become the next stage. We believe that it is necessary to carry out elections in October-November 1989 because another path is the restraint of restructuring in the republic.

In our view, already today it is necessary to begin discussion about what the Law on Elections in the Uzbek SSR will be like, what paths young people see for the practical realization of the slogan "Power—to the Soviets, Land—to the Peasants, Factories and Plants—to the Workers," with which we, the young people, the Komsomol, will go into the elections, which we must attain in order for every inhabitant of the republic to feel practical changes in his life.

Already today together we must take into account the mistakes and blunders of the spring elections and go into the first democratic elections to the supreme organ of power of our republic more solid and prepared. We do not have the right to lose time today because this will turn into losses in the election. We cannot wait for instructions from above, and for this reason our "Voters Association" of the city of Shakhrikhan is bringing for your discussion proposals for an election platform of the republic's young people and Komsomol. We hope that, after the discussion, we will have a precise and concrete program of action. We will be ready to support the candidates to people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR, whose ideas and thinking are harmonious with ours.

But at first—about what, in our view, must be provided for in the Uzbek SSR Law on Elections. This is, first of all, universal, direct and equal elections of the Soviets of all levels in secret voting on an alternative basis, the chairmen of the Soviets are elected through direct elections on an alternative basis. Elections on the basis of territorial and national-territorial districts without direct representation public organizations of any sort (there were different opinions on this point). Repudiation of district election meetings. The free nomination of candidatures through submission of a protocol with a certain number of signatures to the election commission. The possibility of the monitoring of all stages of the election procedure by citizens and public organizations.

This is what, in our view, as well as the nation-wide discussion of the draft of the Law, will help to create a well-composed system of elections, insured against the influence of the command-administrative apparatus. Now, in fact, about the platform.

Waging a struggle for the further democratization of society and taking into account that there is more socialism where there is less centralized state authority and more democracy, we advocate:

- an economy in which the means of production in the republic are owned and commanded by those—in the city and in the village, who work;
- the dependence of the incomes of workers only on the efficiency of their work;
- the creation, in the republic, of a market economy, in which the producer, first of all, thinks about the demand of the consumers, as well as the adoption of a system of measures for economic prevention of an unjustified increase of prices;
- the adoption of a republic Law on the State Order, according to which the limit of the obligatory state order cannot exceed half of the production capacity of the enterprise, and the enterprise completely independently disposes of all the remaining production;
- the rejection of the kind of situation where the republic remains agrarian (80 percent of the inhabitants live in the village), the creation of production capacities with regard to geographic situation, which will secure an increase in the proportion of the local population in the composition of the republic's working class;
- the priority orientation in economic cooperation toward the countries of the Asiatic region.

It is necessary also to repudiate the expensive, irrational construction projects, to transfer the means and funds being freed to the construction and reconstruction of housing, medical institutions, schools, etc.

To introduce advantages for large families, paid maternity leave until the child reaches the age of three, with the leave counting toward length of service, to give families with 8 or more members the possibility of acquiring automobiles and minibuses at the state price.

To secure social protection for those who for objective reasons cannot actively participate in the work process and live normally on the basis of the results of their work.

To implement the practice of making available preferential credits to young families. To develop and implement programs to strengthen the health of children—ecologically pure nourishment, monitoring of the health of children in the schools and in pre-school institutions for children.

To establish an increment to the wages of kolkhoz workers in connection with difficult climatic working conditions.

To solve the question of the payment of an allowance for unemployment.

Understanding that these measures are impossible to implement without the solution of a whole series of other questions, we will fight for the introduction of a number of corrections and changes in the Uzbek SSR Constitution, in particular in Article 12, chapter 11, concerning

the fact that the earth and its mineral wealth are the property of the republic and the right to dispose of them belongs only to it. The local Soviets of Deputies must become the main leaseholders and masters of the natural resources on their territory. To strengthen the material and financial base of the local Soviets through deductions from taxation, lease and rent payments. It is necessary to adopt an Uzbek SSR Law on joint enterprises with foreign partners, to adopt a Uzbek SSR Law on the land and to introduce the concept of a "price for land." We stand up for the most rapid transition to full republic khozraschet.

On behalf and on the instructions of the "Voters Association"

A. Ibragimov, secretary of the primary city Komsomol organization at the place of work;

P. Akhunov, USSR people's deputy

Here are the proposals. It is clear that they contain contradictions, the harmoniousness which is necessary for a real platform does not yet exist. But, indeed, it is a beginning for it.

Armenian 'Gushamatyan' Society Goals Explained

90US0049B Yerevan KOMSOMOLES
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 22 Aug 89 p 3

[Article by S. Vartanyan, member of the board of directors of the Public Council of the Armenian Historical-Education Society "Gushamatyan": "Gushamatyan": Henceforth and Never"]

[Text] The new public organization—the Armenian Historical-Educational Society "Gushamatyan" [Memorial]—created recently in the republic, sets for itself the goal of uniting people with independent political convictions and free thinking for the purpose of resisting lawlessness and arbitrariness, with which repressive regimes, during long decades, oppressed our people. The initiative group, which was joined by writer and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, S. Khanzadyan; writer and military historian G. Ayrapetyan; doctor of philosophy S. Zolyan; artist V. Mushegyan, and others, addressed a letter to a number of scientific institutions, creative unions, and editorial boards with a request to become founder-members of the Gushamatyan Society, to which 14 organizations responded. Among them, the Institute of the History of the Party at the Armenian CP Central Committee, Yerevan State University, the republic Znaniye Society, the Union of Writers, the journal LITERATURNAYA ARMENIYA, and others.

At the present time, when our society has regained consciousness from political lethargy, in which it found itself having grown numb from the horror of the Stalinist terror; when it attempts to preserve and revive the remnants of human and national dignity, mercilessly tramped down by the ideologists of the Brezhnev social

stagnation; agonizing questions arise before all of us, which require answers that are not simple. Now, in the fifth year of restructuring, when a radical breaking of the public consciousness is taking place, it is difficult, at times impossible, to explain the reasons for the terrible submissiveness with which millions of people fell under the bullets of the NKVD, slowly perished in the camps, creating the industrial might of the state, and died of hunger during collectivization.

One of the tasks of Gushamatyan is to help society to liberate itself from the dogmatic chains of the social utopia of the mythical future happiness of the people fettering it, for the sake of which the lives of millions of people were ruined, and as a result of which the country fell into a deep economic and political depression.

Our conference took place during the days when the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh once again became exacerbated in connection with the arrival of the next high-level commission in this long-suffering territory. The forces which desire to bring the Armenian population of the oblast down from the path of the constitutional democratic solution of the Karabakh problem, spare no effort to provoke inter-nationality clashes. Attempts to inflame the situation to the limit are made even by part of the leadership of Azerbaijan, both the former and the present. Such a view is adhered to by a number of prominent political and public figures abroad. As an example, I will refer to the statement of the great American financier George Soros, who, in the article "The Conception of Gorbachev," published in the June issue of the journal ZNAMYA, in particular, notes: "Not so far removed from reality are the suggestions that the first Armenian pogroms in Azerbaijan were inspired by the local mafia, which was ruled by the former head of KGB of Azerbaijan, G.A. Aliyev, in order to create a losing situation for Gorbachev."

And now, when the new leadership of the country is trying to lead society from the heavy political crisis that has befallen it, the national problems, first here, then there, break through the decorative fabric of the alleged "Soviet internationalism" and lie like an enormous burden on the entire state system, rendered lifeless by the anti-human social experiments of the political adventurers of the type of Stalin, Zhdanov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Brezhnev, Suslov, and others. The new leadership is forced to bear the responsibility for all the deformations of the past, and this, evidently, is legitimate. It would be naive to suggest that the adherents of totalitarianism, who concentrated in their hands immense power, who created mafia structures that made it possible to plunder the state treasury with impunity, will leave the political arena without a struggle.

In the totalitarian state, naturally, an organized force could not arise, preventing the elevation of the political criminals, who turned the laws of the country, and, above all, the Constitution, into a paper fiction. But the process of the self-destruction of society could not continue endlessly.

Having exhausted the people in the swamp of submissiveness and servility, having become convinced of its painful social apathy, the lack of desire to change anything in their life, the only organized force of society—the Communist Party—was forced to begin a “revolution from above”—perestroika, in order to overcome the deeply rooted stagnation, to return the country to the path of freedom and democracy. For this it was necessary, above all, to weaken somewhat the chains of the repressive apparatus. And there and then all the ulcers and abscesses of the totalitarian regime were revealed. Under the ringing revolutionary phrase and poster slogans, with which the obscurantists of pseudo-Marxist ideology made fools of people for long decades, were concealed lawlessness, the trampling of human rights and the rights of nations, arbitrariness and violence.

The apotheosis of totalitarianism was the terror of the state against its own people, which reached its critical point in the 1930's, 1940's and the beginning of the 1950's. Executions, exiles, concentration camps, the extermination of the genofund of nations, the destruction of the culture and the national traditions of the Soviet peoples, and the dehumanization of society—all of this was carried out “in the name of the people.” Thereby, the executioners, as it were, shifted the lion's share of the blame for their bloody crimes on the people who had grown rigid with fear, for the sake of whose “welfare”, supposedly, those who were destroyed had the sinister ideological label of “enemies of the people” pinned on them.

I would like to give special emphasis to this circumstance. Our oppressed civic and national quality untied the criminals' hands and made it possible for them to create evil in our name. We must not allow a repetition of this nightmare in the future—henceforth and never! The last words have become the motto of Gushamatyan.

Henceforth and never will we permit anyone to oppress us ostensibly for our own “good”.

Henceforth and never will we allow anyone to concentrate in their hands absolute power and to stand above society.

Henceforth and never will we allow anyone to take upon himself the role of “father and leader [vozhd] of the people” and to create lawlessness in our name.

Henceforth and never will we allow anyone to decide for us, how we are to live, in what to believe, and how to educate our children.

Henceforth and never will we allow anyone to humiliate our human dignity and to foist his will on us.

Henceforth and never!

I am deeply convinced that until a radical turning-point occurs in our consciousness, until we free ourselves from ideological mysticism, which compels us to bow before implanted dogmas and, in particular, to the first persons

in the state, our society will not become free and democratic. The process of the emancipation of the consciousness will last for years, but it must be maintained.

For our people, which a year and a half ago, in the historic February of 1988, rose to fight for the restoration of its national dignity, for the reunification of the single Armenian nation which was divided during the years of repression, difficult times have begun. But we should not despair and sprinkle our head with ashes, endlessly bemoaning our bitter historical fate. It is impossible to retreat only into grief, to burst into tears, because this paralyzes our will, our aspiration to revival. This thought, it seems to me, is especially topical after we lived through the destructive earthquake in December of the past year, which took tens of thousands of our compatriots. The revival of Armenia will be the best monument to these victims, but for this incredible efforts from all of us are necessary.

In organizing its activity, the Gushamatyan Historical-Education Society will cooperate with state institutions, public, political, and religious organizations and democratic movements in the USSR, as well as foreign and Armenian organizations, funds, and individual persons, whose activity does not contradict the principles of the Society.

Our goal is to promote the creation of a rule-of-law state, in which the rights of every member of society will be reliably defended by law. In connection with this, Gushamatyan takes upon itself the defense of the legal interests of the persons who suffered from the repressions, both in the past and in the present. The questions of the state sovereignty of the union republics, local self-government, and regional khozraschet have become especially acute and urgent today. The system of state organization which took shape in the years of Stalinism persistently impedes the development of the country and every republic which goes to make up the Union. The aspiration to unification and the creation of the so-called “new historical community of the Soviet people” has given rise to the criminal disregard of the national interests of the peoples that populate our country. In actual fact, unification signified assimilation, it actually encouraged chauvinism and nationality nihilism. Add to this the social intolerance expressed in the deeply reactionary theory of the aggravation of the class struggle in proportion to the progress to socialism, which has brought so much misfortune and suffering to our peoples, to understand what kind of a society we have to restructure. And to be slow in this is impossible. For no one besides us will start to rake away all these obstructions in the sphere of politics and economics left by the brutal and murderous favorites. Today they call our system an administrative-command system, but in essence what has taken shape in our country is a neo-feudal society with a “socialist” lining. Only in this way, in my view, can one characterize a society in which a person is deprived of political choice and many other natural human rights.

The monopoly of all and everything—this is what we must get rid of. I remember one joke that used to be current. "In the Soviet Union, everything belongs to all; consequently, each taken separately does not have anything"—even today there is quite a bit of bitter truth in it. For even in our time, Soviet people in their absolute majority continue to remain, as it were, hired instruments of production.

The deprivation of economic rights places people into political dependence on those who conferred the monopoly right to determine the character of our economy, to decide what economy is socialist in terms of structure, and which one is not. And in order to correct the situation one does not have to wait for regular political or social cataclysms. The shocks and uncontrollable phenomena are advantageous for those who today are shouting about "the purity of socialist ideals" and want to be more Catholic than the Pope of Rome. As a matter of fact, they defend their right to state sinecure. These people may disguise themselves in the "toga" of perestroyschiki [supporters of restructuring], zealous defenders of the interests of the Armenian people, while their interests are purely corporative—to keep themselves afloat and, if possible, to return everything to their circles. They, with the psychology of the prerevolutionary tanuter (Armenian village elder), successfully implanted in the people a feeling of nihilism in regard to their statehood, in order for it to be easier to create improper affairs, to bleed attachment of family life, protectionism, and bribe-taking. As a rule, these are aggressive mediocrities which do not want to know what is done beyond their own nose.

A striking example of such an aggressive, militant mediocrity is the former first secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee, Karen Demirchyan, who inflicted irreparable damage on our republic and the people and, together with his viziers, bears moral responsibility for all the negative phenomena which were bred during the years of his rule.

The servility of this man to Moscow did not have any limits, which gave rise to a feeling of muffled protest in the people and, as a consequence, hostility to Moscow as the focus of our misfortunes. Meanwhile, Moscow, as we have become recently convinced in the Congress, is not uniform. There the influence of progressive forces is expanding, forces which advocate radical changes in our society, supporters of the consistent democratization of the country, and the limitation of the power of the party-state plutocracy.

As is well known, at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the republic's Communist Party, Suren Arutyunyan, proposed a very interesting conception of Armenia's way out from the situation that has taken shape, expressed in the creation of a free economic zone in our republic. This is a radical way of overcoming the administrative-command system, which will certainly be conducive to the eradication of authoritarian thinking.

Gushamatyan will pay special attention to the investigation of the economic policy of the totalitarian regime, which transformed people into executors, without rights, of senseless ideas. Here is concealed the root of many evils, although not the only one. The work that lies ahead is very difficult and responsible. And the best reward for all of us will be a free and democratic country, in which the people will feel that it is, in actual fact, the sovereign master, and not a servant in state corvée.

Informal Uzbek Group Said To Consider Draft Boycott

*90UM0060A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Oct 89 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Lt Col V. Kosarev: "Conjectures and Reality"]

[Text] In the Kremlin, in the hall of sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and in the "Moscow" Hotel where the parliamentary members live, one can often meet people's deputies who are not members of the Supreme Soviet. Including deputies who are service members. What brings them here? Is it only the desire, the need, to take part in the work of the session, in the activity of the standing commissions and committees?

I asked many deputies this question and heard a great variety of answers. Some came to Moscow especially to discuss legislation being debated in the parliament, others to carry out the mandates of their voters, to resolve urgent problems in ministries and departments. For example, here is what people's deputy of the USSR Maj. R. Zolotukhin from Tashkent said in answer to my question:

"By the nature of my deputy work, I often have to meet with voters, to speak at meetings that have become a regular phenomenon in our republic, and at discussion clubs. And one of the subjects worrying the people that has constantly been discussed recently has to do with the alleged numerous cases of death of Uzbek service members in their period of service in the Armed Forces. Leaders and activists of the informal organization "Barlik", which enjoys rather great popularity among some portion of the Uzbek-speaking population, particularly harp on this subject. All sorts of rumors and conjectures are spread. At the initiative of the "informals", a sort of campaign has actually begun, demanding a boycott of the draft, and they are seeking to create national formations on the territory of the republic, an Uzbek army. These calls are spread in leaflets and in articles in the local press.

Naturally, as a people's deputy of the USSR from Uzbekistan, and as a military man, I cannot overlook these incidents, and I decided to look closely into the whole story. I went for assistance to the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy...

Did you make a deputy's request?

Considering the importance of the matter, I appealed directly to General of the Army A. D. Lizichev, that he see me and assist.

We had a meeting. I found full support and participation, and obtained access to all the necessary documents and statistics. And now I am involved in studying them. Perhaps I will have to visit some units. I will do everything to look into it all deeply and objectively. I will convey the results of my work to the voters, since this question greatly concerns the public.

"Of course, the final conclusions are yet to be made. But still, what do the statistics that you have learned indicate?"

"Overall the state of traumatic injury in the Army and Navy, including those involving deaths, is alarming. Nevertheless, the numbers indicate that there are hardly grounds for the conclusion of which individual hotheads among the 'informals' are convinced. But you know, we need to prove it with specific facts."

Major V. Zolotukhin recounted a specific case, when the father of a service member who had died in the Turkistan Military District came to him. This soldier had left his post with his weapon in hand, had put up armed resistance, and then killed himself. But the father conducted his own investigation and claimed that it was murder. The people's deputy took this matter to the district procuracy, and insisted that another investigation be done.

But here another problem arises, Zolotukhin said. It is impossible to show a true picture without making public the statistics of accidents in the Armed Forces.

In the opinion of the people's deputy, this is long overdue. He cited experience of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which at regular briefings reports all the figures reflecting the general state of crime and deaths of persons in the country. All sorts of innuendoes lead to all sorts of rumors and gossip. This is not in the interest of the Armed Forces.

Effect of Nationalism on Interethnic Marriages

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Second Edition p 2

[Article by V. Shirokov: "To Marry..."]

[Text] At the other end of the telephone line, a woman was crying. She was crying bitterly and as though she was doomed. I must admit that I lost control of myself, inasmuch as I understood that consoling words like "you'll learn to like it" are absolutely inappropriate. The incident was so out of the ordinary, so unexpected, that in my rather considerable journalistic career I had never encountered anything like it. And such a thing could not even have happened, at least until recently...

At that time I was working as a regular newspaper correspondent in one of the Baltic republics. Slightly more than two years previously, the life-giving shower of

the restructuring of political life had brought to life the headlong growth of new public movements—ones which, for the most part, were healthy and progressive. But simultaneously, like mushrooms after a radioactive shower, there also sprang up all kinds of extremist, separatist, and nationalistic groupings. They spread their poisonous spores of national intolerance and interethnic enmity, and furiously rocked the "ship" of the stability of society.

The husband of the woman speaking to me on the telephone had fallen under the influence of one of these groups. He himself belonged to the indigenous nationality, and she was Russian. Prior to this time, they had lived 12 years together harmoniously, and had brought up a son and a daughter. Now, all of a sudden, a nervous, strained situation had begun developing in their family. Using words that were obviously borrowed, he began reproaching her for the fact that her countrymen were "occupying forces" and "migrants," that the Russians had seized his republic, and that, in general, they did not have any good reason for being there.

The wife did not consider herself to be an "aggressor," if only because she had been born in the early 1950's, and her national dignity had also been awakened. In a word, the home had been converted into a debating club where, during the arguments, neither side was too respectful of the other side's opinions.

And so it had now come down to divorce... A divorce for political reasons. You will agree that that has an unusual sound to it. And yet it had happened...

The woman asked me to intercede with her husband on her behalf. But I realized that in this situation I would be the "third man out." It was too delicate a situation. The only thing that I could advise was to be more tolerant, more restrained, wiser, and, perhaps, also most compliant when the discussion in the family touched upon national feelings...

I do not know how this dramatic situation ended. I would like very much to hope that the passage of time allowed the passionate heat of the discord to abate and the flareup of aggravated national opposition in this family to die down. But today, when time has passed, I asked myself, to which unexpected consequences can the political awakening of society lead, what unforeseen result can occur when it overtakes each of our families? Because today—whether directly or indirectly—perestroika has entered each home, and the political debates in the kitchen sometimes are so heated that they surpass parliamentary debates. How cautious we must be when the discussion comes around to the nationality of the person with whom we are living...

Recently I happened to get my hands on a USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] report, entitled "Interethnic Marriages in 1988," and, properly speaking, it was that report that forced me to recall the situation with the divorce "for national reasons." Curious observations could be discerned between the

rather dry percentages given in the report. Last year, for example, 16 percent of Russian men married women of another nationality. Among Ukrainians and Belorussians that indicator is even higher—respectively, 33.4 and 38.6 percent. Approximately the same figures are observed among women marrying men of another nationality.

The statistical percentage of choosing a spouse of another nationality is noticeably lower among Uzbeks (6.6 among men, 5 among women); Kirghiz (6.9 and 6.1); and Turkmen (9.0 and 3.9). Incidentally the crux of the matter here, probably, is not only the nationality, but also the religious convictions—for many years I worked in the Central Asian republics, and I myself was a witness to the fact that parents who were Muslim believers sometimes categorically refused to agree to a marriage between their son or daughter to a person of another religion. Although I do know of a rather large number of instances when the attitude taken to such a marriage was a completely tolerant one. There was a rather large number of such examples among my comrades and friends.

The information cited in this report pertains to the situation in the country as a whole. Figures that are even more striking are the figures pertaining to interethnic marriages as subdivided among the union republics. For example, last year 57.2 percent of the Russian men living in the Ukraine married girls of another nationality; in Belorussia, 74.5 percent; in Georgia, 39.6 percent; in Lithuania, 56.5 percent; and in Moldavia, 61.9 percent. Almost the same situation is demonstrated by the statistics pertaining to Russian women who married persons of another nationality: in Belorussia, 73.4 percent; in Georgia, 53.2; in Azerbaijan, 40.3; in Moldavia, 59.9; and in Armenia, 70.6 percent.

I ask the reader to forgive me for what might appear at first glance to be a tiresome list of figures. However, the figures are those details that go to make up the machinery of life, and a detail, as I think it was Chekhov who said it, is as "eloquent as a fly in sour cream." Therefore I shall not restrain myself, but shall cite a few more statistics that are food for thought.

This time I shall limit myself only to the data pertaining to men. They attest to the fact that people living outside the confines of their national-territorial formations are more "open" to marriages with partners of another nationality. Thus, whereas, for the country as a whole, 11.5 percent of Azerbaijanis married women of another nationality, in Azerbaijan itself only 2.8 percent did so; among Moldavians, the percentages were, respectively, 28.2 and 14.4; among Armenians, 20.2 and 2.3; among Latvians, 25.3 and 19.7... Incidentally, among women, as a rule, the difference in this relationship is even greater. But what we are dealing with here is, rather, not the concern for "purity of the race," although, of course, I am not precluding that consideration, but the fact that, in one's one national environment, it is simpler to find a partner with the same "blood" as yours.

However that may be, the statistics were for me a kind of revelation: an astonishingly large number of men and women choose their spouses from representatives of another nationality. Incidentally, there is no reason to be surprised—since ancient times, mixed marriages have not been any kind of rare exception. We might recall that the Kievan princes married the daughters of the Polovetsian khans, and Kazakhs had no objection to abducting Turkish girls from beyond the Black Sea. In Tallinn a tour guide, pointing to the building where Gannibal, Pushkin's great-grandfather, had lived, mentioned his wife, a Swedish woman who, not exactly fluent in Russian, used to say, "This miserable type keeps producing these miserable babies from me!" The descendant of those "miserable babies" became the great Russian poet, and the mingling of different blood streams did not hinder the formation of his Russian national character and talent. Or could it have been just the reverse, that the genes of his ancestors who had been of different nationalities had helped to mold his outstanding genius?...

Modern civilization inevitably causes the migration of the population, and that migration has its pluses and minuses. The excessive influx of population speaking another language into union republics that are small in territory, for example, led to the undesirable demographic distortions that today have caused acute interethnic tensions. But without the exchange of specialists it is impossible to develop modern industrial production or to erect various kinds of construction projects. So the first enthusiasm for "closing the borders," for receding into one's own national "shell," can lead only to regression. Therefore, obviously, both the national "independence" and the process of migration must be in some kind of optimal combination. Precisely what that combination is will have to be determined by the republics themselves, by the planning agencies, by the sociologists and other specialists. It is important for that combination to be an intelligent one.

Today's champions of national purity, inciting the fervor of interethnic passions and attempting to use various means to evict forcibly from their territories everyone who they consider to be outsiders, do not want to admit the irreversibility of modern life. This can lead, and indeed is already leading, to human tragedies, to the breaking up of families, to the splitting of fates. Is this the right path?

I want so much to hope that that the woman to whom I spoke and whom I mentioned at the beginning of this article will telephone me and say, "Well, my husband and I have worked everything out and everything is going well in our family now..."

July Roundtable Discusses Interethnic Relations

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[Report by A.I. Doronchenkov, M.M. Morozova, E.N. Ozheganov, and G.Ye. Trapeznikov, associates at CPSU

Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, and editorial staff members O.B. Belyakov, V.I. Glotov, Yu.V. Pankov, R.N. Sokolov, and Yu.V. Tyurin on roundtable discussion in Institute of Marxism-Leninism on 4-6 July 1989: "Sociopolitical Aspects of Inter-Ethnic Relations in the USSR: Past and Present"]

[Text] This was the topic of a roundtable discussion held from 4 to 6 July in the Institute of Marxism-Leninism (IML) of the CPSU Central Committee. It was attended by around 400 people—people's deputies of the USSR, academics, party personnel, and representatives of social movements from union and autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts and okrugs. The discussion began with an introductory speech by A.S. Kapto, head of the Ideological Department of the CPSU Central Committee. Reports by Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet R.N. Mishanov on "The Improvement of Inter-Ethnic Relations—an Important Factor in the Intensification of Perestroika," by Academician G.L. Smirnov, director of the IML, on "The Formation of the USSR—the Embodiment of Lenin's Idea of a Federation of Free Nationalities," and by Professor E.A. Bagramov, doctor of philosophical sciences and sector head at the IML, on "Conflicts in the Sphere of Inter-Ethnic Relations and the Methods of Resolving Them" were presented at the plenary meeting (the introductory speech and the reports at the plenary meeting served as the basis for the articles in *POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE*, 1989, No 12).

The issues raised in the introductory speech and the reports aroused debate even at the plenary meeting, although the original plan called for the discussion of these topics in discussion groups.

All of the statements made at the plenary meeting and in the discussion groups revealed concern and anxiety over the complication of inter-ethnic relations in the country. The speakers agreed that the protracted influence of the authoritarian system, the violations of the Leninist principles of the right of nationalities to self-determination, socialist federalism, and ethnic equality during the years of the cult of personality and stagnation, and the repression of whole ethnic groups as a result of the cult of personality had extremely negative consequences which must be dealt with today.

The speakers also agreed that the new thinking must be applied to inter-ethnic relations today. They expressed the hope that this thinking would lie at the basis of the documents of the upcoming CPSU Central Committee plenum on inter-ethnic relations and would also be reflected in the CPSU Program.

As for the causes and nature of specific problems, especially the conflicts arising in various parts of the country, their discussion revealed a broad range of opinions and aroused arguments, which were sometimes quite heated and took the form of mutual accusations. Some of the comrades who spoke at the plenary meeting later took an active part in the discussions in separate

groups, clarifying and supplementing the statements they had made at the plenary meeting.

Although several relevant theoretical questions were raised in the reports, many of the speakers' statements were ignored during the subsequent discussion at the plenary meeting and in the discussion groups, and no opinions were expressed on them. In general, the theoretical aspects of the roundtable subject matter did not occupy a prominent place in discussions, and only a few speakers made references to them.

Professor F.T. Konstantinov, doctor of philosophical sciences (Moscow), for example, addressed the problems of social justice in inter-ethnic relations at length and reminded his listeners that the issue of nationality is secondary to social issues. Recently, he went on to say, the issue of nationality has become more significant precisely in connection with the deviations from the principles of social justice and the disregard for the vested interests of many nationalities and ethnic groups and communities.

Although this statement is correct in principle, there are situations in which the factor of nationality could be of primary significance, even if these are situations caused by violations of the principles of social justice. In situations of this kind, attempts to resolve conflicts in inter-ethnic relations with the aid of exclusively economic and social measures are frequently ineffective. Furthermore, it appears that the assignment of absolute value to the theoretically correct statement of the founders of Marxism-Leninism regarding the secondary nature of the issue of nationality in relation to social issues has become one of the reasons for the underestimation of real ethnic problems.

In his speech, F.T. Konstantinov spoke of the prospects for the existence of nationalities and classes. Recalling the well-known statement that nationalities have a longer lifespan than classes, the speaker said that this fact dictates the need for heightened responsibility on the part of all party, soviet, economic, and social organizations for the development of each nationality.

Candidate of Historical Sciences K.S. Khallik, people's deputy of the USSR and lead scientific associate at the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law of the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences, asked whether the inter-ethnic conflicts in our country could be the result solely of errors committed in the past. To some extent they are, she said, but after all, Romania and Yugoslavia are also experiencing difficulties in inter-ethnic relations. Does this not suggest, K.S. Khallik went on to speculate, that the very nature of our society in general precludes the democratic resolution of the issue of nationality? K.S. Khallik's subsequent remarks suggested that she denies the socialist nature of the society established in the USSR.

K.S. Khallik also wondered who might be capable of taking responsibility for the current perestroika and of propelling the development of society along the path of

progress and securing the effective resolution of production and social problems. Our ideology, she said, came into being as a working-class philosophy, but can the working class be the sole or principal participant in this process if it does not even have a mechanism for the protection of its own economic interests?

As for the party, according to K.S. Khallik, republic party organizations were put in a position in which they had to defend central interests in the republic rather than nationwide interests. Given the monopoly status of the party, this could have continued indefinitely, but now the political situation is changing. In Estonia, for example, there is the Popular Front, the International Movement, the United Labor Council, the Estonian National Independence Party, and more than 20 societies and groups promoting the Estonian culture. The speaker described several organizations, particularly the International Movement and the ULC, as alternatives to the central committee of the republic Communist Party. In her opinion, they are trying to split the CP of Estonia along ethnic lines, and this position should not be called internationalist.

To retain its leading role, K.S. Khallik said in conclusion, the party must organize its own search for constructive ways of resolving the issue of nationality and state its position in defense of ethnic interests. Otherwise, in her opinion, other movements will play the leading role in the defense of these interests.

Professor L.Ya. Zile, doctor of historical sciences and director of the Party History Institute of the Central Committee of the CP of Latvia, said that the reason for the party's delay in investigating many aspects of inter-ethnic relations was the continuation of the inflexible centralization of intra-party affairs. She said that the relationship between republic party organizations and central party organs should not be overdramatized. In her opinion, the place and role of republic party organizations in the CPSU should be examined from a new vantage point.

Candidate of Historical Sciences Ye.A. Gayer, people's deputy of the USSR and scientific associate at the History, Archaeology and Ethnography Institute of the Far Eastern Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, discussed the chances for the survival of small indigenous nationalities in the country's eastern regions. They are, in her words, on the verge of extinction along with their traditional crafts, cultures, and languages. Their problems must be solved as quickly as possible.

She went on to say that rural soviets and party committees can and should do much to educate the younger generation with the use of ethnic traditions and organize the training of youth. More of their members should be the members of small indigenous nationalities and Russians and others concerned about our future. There are many such people, but there are also certain ministries and departments which are indifferent to the distinctive lifestyle of the small ethnic communities.

We have our own experience in the struggle for self-preservation, Ye.A. Gayer said in conclusion. It must be studied and used more extensively in all of our work today.

Professor M.I. Gioyev, doctor of historical sciences and department head at the North Osetian State University, said that the party should have its own theory, strategy, and tactics in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations. One important consideration, he said, is that the nationalities in our country usually cannot conceive of existence outside the USSR, but as members of the union, they should be given every opportunity for their own self-preservation, survival, and development. The need for this kind of discussion is dictated, in the speaker's opinion, by the fact that in Stalin's time, Lenin's policy on nationality was replaced by a policy of forced assimilation, as a result of which these nationalities lost most of their faith in socialist ideals. To revive the Leninist spirit in the resolution of ethnic problems, the perestroika of inter-ethnic relations must be based on the restoration of the equality of all nationalities and mutual respect.

M.I. Gioyev spoke of the importance of the timely generalization of experience and the need to learn lessons from the realities of everyday life in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations.

Professor K.N. Sanukov, doctor of historical sciences and department head at the Mari State University, expressed dissatisfaction with the work of specialists in the field of inter-ethnic relations. In his opinion, the reports at the plenary meeting contained little that was new. For example, they did not reveal the contemporary implications of Lenin's statement that signs of local nationalism are usually a reaction to signs of great-power chauvinism.

First Secretary of the Gudatskiy Raykom of the Communist Party of Georgia K.K. Ozgan reported on the situation in the Abkhaz ASSR and mentioned some of the problems of the national-state territory. Back in December 1922, he recalled, the party officially rejected Stalin's idea of "autonomization." Lenin's idea of an equal union of equal nationalities was approved, but Stalin did carry out his own plan later.

I am convinced, the speaker went on to say, that the division of republics into union and autonomous entities is part of the Stalinist legacy. The principle of the equality of nationalities demands the elimination of this distinction. For this reason, I propose that all national-state territories become equal members of a single union for the sake of the further reinforcement and improvement of the Soviet federation. This equal status should be recorded in a new Constitution of the USSR. First of all, this will settle several inter-ethnic conflicts and difficulties. Second, it will make our union a genuine union of nationalities, and not of national-state territories. If we do not solve this problem today, it will come up again tomorrow.

Each nationality is unique. The culture, language, and consciousness of each ethnic group, even the smallest,

are of immutable value to all humanity. The culture of any nationality is the property of all people. Unless we acknowledge this fact, we cannot build a unified multinational state.

I also believe that the protection of the interests of small indigenous nationalities and their representation in the supreme soviets of the USSR and of union and autonomous republics should be secured in a new law on elections.

The consideration of the economic interests of national-state territories and the country as a whole is an important factor in the resolution of problems of a political nature and problems in inter-ethnic relations.

The existing system of economic management is based on the authoritarian chain of command and pressure from above. I believe, K.K. Ozgan continued, that this is one of the main causes of inter-ethnic difficulties today.

The authoritarian system the bureaucrats want is essentially indifferent to ethnic interests and values. Bureaucrats always place departmental interests above ethnic ones. Unresolved economic problems cause friction in inter-ethnic relations, and various extremist, antisocialist, and anti-Soviet elements are taking advantage of this.

There is only one solution—the move to self-management and self-funding. Each republic should design its own economic model with maximum consideration for its own capabilities and then act in accordance with this design. Unfortunately, in our autonomous republic there are still no clear economic instructions on the transfer of the republic to complete self-management and self-funding.

The issues of republic and regional economic accountability are now the topic of heated debates. Many controversial and ambiguous opinions are being expressed. In particular, regional economic accountability is being associated with the complete self-sufficiency of a republic and is being viewed exclusively as a means of satisfying ethnic interests. This seems unrealistic to me.

It is quite a different matter when regional economic accountability is viewed as a means of intensifying economic integration, entailing the broader use of traditional forms of economic management and the development of the national economic complex on the basis of specialization and concentration, with an emphasis on participation by autonomous republics in unionwide division of labor. The speaker also discussed other issues connected with the organization of regional economic accountability.

Doctor of Historical Sciences F.B. Iskhakov, department administrator at the Tashkent Higher Party School, suggested that more attention be paid to serious existing problems in the socioeconomic sphere during the critical analysis of the experience in resolving the issue of nationality. The organization of regular and objective intra-union reports on events in the republics will also be necessary.

Doctor of Philological Sciences M.V. Dyachkov, department head at the Moscow Oblast Pedagogical Institute imeni N.K. Krupskaya, listed several causes of social friction, including the fact that tens of millions of people who live outside the boundaries of their national-state territories display no interest in the language, culture, and traditions of their neighbors and frequently isolate themselves in their own linguistic and cultural communities. The deliberate non-acknowledgement of the language and culture of indigenous nationalities evokes their protests, causes the separation of the two linguistic communities, and results in social friction in the region. It will be necessary to mold public opinion against this cause of friction.

Secretary U.D. Dzhaniybekov of the Central Committee of the CP of Kazakhstan listed the priorities of the Ideological Commission of the republic CP Central Committee in the study of inter-ethnic relations. He stressed that the roots of many of today's problems go back to the Stalin years, when the concept of internationalism was deformed and the very term "national" was distorted. In spite of this, Kazakhstan earned the title of "laboratory of inter-ethnic friendship" on the level of purely human relations. Everyone had a common bond—they were victimized and oppressed by the authoritarian system. People helped and supported each other in their common troubles. In subsequent years, however, there were stronger signs of national egotism, and the republic party organization made an effort to surmount these in many spheres of life in the republic.

There was also another problem. Several nationalities, particularly those which settled in Kazakhstan as a result of Stalin's repression, now want to restore their own national states, but decisions on these matters are beyond the capabilities and jurisdiction of the republic.

Candidate of Historical Sciences Yu.I. Mkrtumyan, party committee secretary at Yerevan State University, sees the reasons for the exacerbation of inter-ethnic relations primarily in the spheres of administration, ideology, and policy on nationalities. He feels it would be wrong to describe the demand for the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to Armenia as a sign of nationalism.

The speaker warned against excessive haste in the study of current problems and against the kind of judgments in which all of their complex details are reduced to the actions of "extremists," "nationalists," etc.

Yu.I. Mkrtumyan proposed a new approach to several concepts, such as "nationalism." In the speaker's opinion, nationalism is nothing other than a desire to defend the national dignity and national interests of people.

It does seem, however, that the desire to defend the national dignity and national interests of people has nothing in common with nationalism, although the term "nationalism" is frequently used in this sense in foreign literature. It hardly seems necessary to change the meaning of a term which has been used in our literature

for such a long time to signify overt propaganda or action in support of the ideas of national superiority and exclusivity.

G.S. Aliyev, senior instructor at the Azerbaijan State University imeni S.M. Kirov, commented on some of the statements in support of granting autonomous entities the same rights as union republics and questioned the expediency of this move. He said that decisions on autonomy should remain within the jurisdiction of union republics.

Doctor of Historical Sciences R.G. Simonenko, department head at the History Institute of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, directed attention to the need for a more thorough and comprehensive analysis of the Leninist ideological legacy regarding the issue of nationality. He suggested the compilation of a special work in which the Leninist principles of party policy on nationality and party statements and conclusions with regard to nationality would be analyzed from the current vantage point.

In a discussion of the difficulties in several parts of the country, R.G. Simonenko mentioned the serious omissions in the work of party organizations responsible for the constant analysis of the situation and the prediction of possible developments.

Questions connected with the state regulation of inter-ethnic relations were discussed at length by Professor M.M. Bekizhev, doctor of historical sciences and director of the Karachayevo-Cherkess Scientific Research Institute of History, Philology and Economics. In his opinion, the assignment of new functions to the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet will not guarantee the completion of all the work connected with these matters. He proposed the creation of a special organ of the USSR Council of Ministers to take charge of these matters. He also proposed the organization of a bicameral Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and the publication of a journal for the discussion of problems in inter-ethnic relations.

He then went on to discuss problems in the regulation of the interrelations of autonomous oblasts and okrugs with the krais in which they are located. The speaker recalled that in the 1920's, for example, the autonomous oblast could suspend a krayispolkom order by appealing it in the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. He also stated the need to eliminate inequities between autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts in several spheres. At this time, for example, per capita allocations for sociocultural development are much lower in the latter than in the autonomous republics.

M.M. Bekizhev went on to discuss problems in the training of national personnel in autonomous oblasts, the implementation of personnel policy, and the development of national languages. In this connection, he spoke of the need to reinforce the material base for the use of these languages, the need to restore autonomous publishing houses in all of the autonomous oblasts, and several other cultural issues.

Other speakers at the plenary meeting were Professor V.F. Panibudlaska, doctor of historical sciences and department head at the Kiev Construction Engineering Institute; Professor A.I. Goryacheva, doctor of historical sciences (Tallinn); and several other comrades.

The roundtable continued its work in discussion groups. The topic of one was "The Improvement of the National-State Structure: Past and Present."

Many of the people in this discussion group supported the opinions expressed by speakers at the plenary meeting regarding the significance of Lenin's ideas about the federated structure of the socialist multinational state. They also agreed that these ideas were radically deformed by Stalin, who was ultimately able to carry out his "autonomization" plan. Some speakers said that there have been no significant changes in policy on nationality even in the post-Stalin years. Central agencies have had a strong negative effect on the sovereignty of union republics, and this has led to the further deformation of intra-union relations. All of this dictates the need for fundamentally new approaches to problems in inter-ethnic relations.

During the discussion of prospects for national-state construction, however, significant differences of opinion were revealed. They concerned the bases of the structure of the multinational state. Most speakers defended the need for a state structure based on federal principles, but some felt that a confederation would be preferable.

In this connection, it is significant that, on the one hand, several of the criteria of the federated or confederated structure have not been analyzed sufficiently yet and, on the other, that many researchers admit that although the federal structure of the USSR is proclaimed in many documents, unitarian principles were actually substituted for federal ones. This is why the further analysis of these matters is necessary, particularly in order to free the term "federation" from various distortions which have discredited the idea of the socialist federation.

Different opinions were also expressed with regard to the structure of the country's government. Some proposed that it be left unchanged, others insisted that all national-state territories should have direct access to the center, and a third group felt that the number of such territories should be reduced, viewing the present quantity as one of the causes of inter-ethnic conflicts.

Several speakers asked questions about the status of the Russian nationality and the legal-state status of the RSFSR and mentioned the need for correspondence between the structures of state organs and social organizations in the RSFSR and similar structures in other union republics.

Speakers touched upon a broad range of issues in the history of national-state construction, its present state, and ways of improving it with a view to present requirements.

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences A.A. Pavlenko, senior scientific associate at the IML of the CPSU Central Committee, examined several issues connected with the definition of the nationality in this context. He said that Stalin's well-known definition of nationality cannot satisfy us today. In addition to the four characteristics of nationality everyone knows, there could be three more: a common history, a national consciousness, and the existence of common national interests. Listing the existence of a state as a characteristic of nationality would be wrong, in the speaker's opinion, because this would deprive many groups of people in our country and abroad of the right to call themselves nationalities.

A.A. Pavlenko spoke of the impermissibility of biased and tendentious coverage of problems in inter-ethnic relations in the news media, when the elevation of the national consciousness is sometimes associated with nationalism and extremism, when nothing is said about the actual inequality of nationalities in various spheres of life, etc.

Academician M.T. Baymakhanov of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, director of the Philosophy and Law Institute of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, discussed the need to institute a group of sociopolitical and legal measures to guarantee the genuine sovereignty of union republics. He advocated more effective participation by enterprises of union jurisdiction in the accumulation of the budget revenues of union republics and said that republic organs should have broader jurisdiction over these enterprises, including jurisdiction in the spheres of short- and long-range planning, material and technical supply, personnel training, etc.

He went on to say that republic constitutions are as alike as twins and do not take the distinctive features of republics fully into account.

According to M.T. Baymakhanov, in view of the sovereign nature of republics, their supreme government bodies should have to authorize any broad-scale undertaking on their territory, military as well as economic and sociocultural. He also suggested the compilation of a long-range comprehensive program for the improvement of national-state construction up to 2010-2015 and the quicker creation of a union organ in charge of the affairs of nationalities and inter-ethnic relations, similar to the People's Commissariat for Nationalities which was part of the government during the first years of the Soviet regime.

Professor F.M. Rudich, doctor of philosophical sciences and director of the Party History Institute of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian SSR CP, expressed concern about the intensification of nationalist extremism in some parts of the country and spoke of the need for effective means of counteracting this tendency. In a brief discussion of policy on languages, he suggested that the Russian language and national languages be the working languages everywhere.

The speaker expressed his disagreement with the proposals made in some locations with regard to the reorganization of the party on a federated basis.

N.M. Bachiyevev, senior scientific associate at the Scientific Research Institute of the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR Council of Ministers, touched upon some aspects of the socioeconomic and cultural development of the Balkar nationality, which became a victim of Stalin's repression. In his opinion, the legal rights of this nationality have not been reinstated in full, including the rights of representation in the autonomous republic's government and administrative organs, the right to develop a social infrastructure in population centers, etc. He suggested the creation of a legal and political mechanism to secure the satisfaction of the interests of each nationality, regardless of its size.

Academician M.K. Kozybayev of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, director of the History, Archaeology and Ethnography Institute of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, made some specific suggestions, connected in part with the elimination of the after-effects of Stalin's repression on some nationalities, the planning of a scientifically sound demographic policy, the publication of a series of scientific works on the history of the peoples of the USSR, where their history would be portrayed as part of USSR and world history, etc.

Docent A.L. Papaskiri from the Abkhaz State University described the relationship between the Abkhaz and Georgian populations in the autonomous republic. In his opinion, union republics should not be entrusted with the future of small nationalities. Only equals can be friends. For this reason, all union and autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts and okrugs should have equal rights in the federation. The Leninist approach to the organization of a federated multinational socialist state consists precisely in this, the speaker said.

Several problems in national-state construction in connection with the situation taking shape in Lithuania were discussed by Professor K.Z. Surblis, doctor of historical sciences and deputy director of the Party History Institute of the Central Committee of the CP of Lithuania. In particular, he said that real economic power in the country is still concentrated in the hands of a "strong center"—a few dozen union ministries and departments. In Lithuania, for example, more than 85 percent of the fixed productive capital is under the jurisdiction of union organs.

The nationalities of the country, however, are not represented in the necessary proportions in central organs of state and social organizations. In the speaker's opinion, this is the reason that national organizations and unions want to withdraw from unionwide associations, which have not reorganized their work with a view to present requirements.

In connection with the fact that the official state language has become an acute problem in several republics, the speaker said that the possible restriction of the interests of the foreign population, which has been the subject of so much discussion recently, does not depend on whether or not the language of the native nationality

is given official state status. Everything depends on the consistency with which party and soviet organs pursue an internationalist policy on the local level.

K.Z. Surblis explained the purpose of Sayudis, the popular movement for perestroyka in the republic, and said that it had quickly grown into an influential social force and had won support in all strata of the population, mainly among people of the Lithuanian nationality. This is attested to by the results of elections of people's deputies. As a rule, the candidate supported by Sayudis won the election. Its documents declare support for the policy line of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference and the aim of affirming the equality and sovereignty of Soviet Lithuania in the Soviet Union. Sayudis has concentrated on Lithuanian national revival and the elevation of the Lithuanian national consciousness.

As for the CP of Lithuania, the speaker said that it is striving to work with the movements on the side of socialism and perestroyka. The Communists object to the extremist nature of some movements and are opposed to their mutual confrontation because this will impede the consolidation of national forces for the attainment of the common goal of social renewal.

Candidate of Juridical Sciences L.S. Boltenkova, docent at the All-Union Law Correspondence Institute, made some concrete suggestions about the creation and status of national-state entities such as national rayons and rural soviets.

Corresponding member I.K. Apina of the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences expressed worries about the state of theoretical investigations of inter-ethnic relations. Today, she said, we should be striving for their perestroyka rather than their improvement.

The talk about the consolidation of centralized administration sounds ridiculous now that the need for its decentralization is being discussed. According to the speaker, the term "Soviet nationality" should also be reconsidered. The two conflicting tendencies in the multinational Soviet society—centrifugal and centripetal—cannot be balanced until existing deformities in ethnic relations and the policy on nationality have been corrected.

Inter-ethnic relations in Soviet republics have followed different patterns of evolution, depending on the specific features of their historical development. The Baltic republics, for example, became part of the USSR in 1940, and their people did not share the positive experience in the socialist development of the USSR in the 1920's and had no knowledge of the New Economic Policy or the plurality of opinions in those years. They do, however, have memories of the multiple-party system and parliamentary procedure in a bourgeois republic.

The history connected with barracks socialism, however, is associated in the public mind with, in I.K. Apina's words, the horrors of deportation and repression and is

viewed as the loss of independence by nationalities. This could not fail to influence the specific ways in which the national consciousness manifested itself when it was revived in the atmosphere of perestroyka, and it also influenced the activities and programs of popular fronts and other social movements. Communist parties will have to bear this in mind when they choose their approach to ethnic issues.

Secretary A.A. Say of the party organization of the State Inspection Center at the Prompribor Plant in Tartu expressed his opinion of the situation in the republic. He feels that the republic news media, published and maintained with party and state funds, have taken less than a year and a half to accomplish something that foreign intelligence agencies have been dreaming of for decades—they have been able to undermine the Soviet society from within and start fights between the different nationalities.

It is understandable that much is being said and written in the republic about the crimes and dire consequences of Stalinism. There is still no definition of Stalinism as an ideology, however. I think, the speaker continued, that it was essentially an escalation of fear for the attainment of dubious goals.

Today the specter of Stalinism rules Estonia. The Estonian population is being intimidated with threats about the disappearance of their native language, culture, and nationality. Why is this being done today, now that perestroyka has paved the way for the development of nationalities, but they are being poisoned with memories of the past and are seeking "enemies of the people" instead of friends in the present? The Estonians are being intimidated with references to "dissidence" (the International Movement, the ULC, the "migrants," etc.) and "disloyalty" to the Popular Front and its ideals. Things have reached the point at which Academician G.I. Naan, the renowned scholar, and People's Deputy of the USSR V.I. Yarovyy, chairman of the ULC, are being threatened in the press and at rallies. I have also been threatened, the speaker said, because I am a member of the International Movement of Estonia. The Russian-speaking members of the working public in Estonia are frightened by the prospect of the passage and enforcement of laws on language, elections, immigration, and citizenship.

From the very beginning of its existence, the International Movement in Support of Perestroyka, which has expressed the worries of Russian-speaking workers about the situation in the republic, has been unjustifiably categorized as an extremist reactionary organization. Here, at the plenary meeting, K.S. Khalik described the International Movement and ULC as alternatives to the CP of Estonia. I feel, A.A. Say, that this is another attempt to discredit those who are striving to defend the internationalist, socialist principles of perestroyka in line with the decisions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference and to conduct a dialogue with the Popular Front and examine its views from this standpoint.

The speaker proposed that the official state language of the USSR be Russian and that the state language in the union republics be the language of the nationality for whom the republic was named. He also proposed the addition of the following statement to Article 72 of the Constitution of the USSR: "Each union republic reserves the right to withdraw freely from the USSR if at least 75 percent of the population votes for withdrawal in a referendum and on the condition that the republic reimburse the union for the funds invested in the creation of its entire socioeconomic infrastructure." The speaker advocated the institution of bicameral supreme soviets in republics inhabited by different nationalities and the restoration of national schools in locations densely populated by Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians in Siberia, the Far East, the Caucasus, etc.

Doctor of Historical Sciences V.Ye. Melnichenko, sector head in the Ideological Department of the CPSU Central Committee, recalled a number of incidents connected with the history of the formation of the USSR and with the criticism of Stalin's idea of "autonomization" by Lenin and some other Bolsheviks. In particular, he mentioned the opinion of Kh.G. Rakovskiy, who apparently foresaw the possible consequences of Stalin's views on the issue of nationality and insisted that the Soviet republics should be guaranteed more rights, more resources, and more initiative and that the excessive ambitions of central agencies should be restrained.¹

Chairman S.G. Petinov of the Executive Committee of the Estonian SSR ULC, said that when the new federal relationships are being established, it will be necessary to take common human priorities into account and guarantee the protection of the rights of all citizens, regardless of their nationality. Any disregard for the rights and interests of the non-native segment of the republic population will aggravate inter-ethnic relations. This is the situation in Estonia today, the speaker said. He proposed the legal affirmation of the status of nationalities living outside the boundaries of their national-state territories.

Candidate of Philosophical Sciences S.D. Khatsiyev, docent at the Chechen-Ingush Pedagogical Institute, discussed the legal guarantees of the equality of nationalities. This principle, the speaker said, should extend to all spheres of life and be reflected in the equality of languages, cultures, and everything implied by the term "nationality." No one has the right to decide matters of vital importance to a nationality but the people of that nationality.

After Lenin's death, the right of nationalities to self-determination could not be exercised at all, and it still cannot be exercised today. Without this, however, the voluntary creation and maintenance of the union would be inconceivable.

The present process of the perestroika and renewal of ethnic relations, the speaker went on to say, must be viewed within the concrete historical context of each

region, republic, and nationality, with the assignment of priority to local public opinion, and not to orders issued from above or the opinions of outsiders. The unity of all sides in these relations is important. This means that economic and territorial issues must be borne in mind as well as problems of language, culture, customs, traditions, etc. The need for an understanding of the economic bases of inter-ethnic relations is more pronounced at a time of economic reform. In the union and autonomous republics and the autonomous oblasts and okrugs, responsibility for the final results of economic activity is assigned primarily to the indigenous population, and those who have moved to a certain place for purely mercenary reasons and who are willing to move anywhere just to live high on the hog cannot make up the nucleus of perestroika. This is why the most important requisites in the management of inter-ethnic relations are the molding of the national consciousness to cultivate a sense of responsibility for the success of perestroika and the consolidation of the strength of the local population around the native nationality (rather than setting one against the other) for the resolution of all existing problems.

The only reasonable way to end the impasse in territorial disputes today, S.D. Khatsiyev said in conclusion, is the creation of federated unions of republics and other national-state entities with claims to the same territory.

Candidate of Historical Sciences K.I. Kulikov, director of the Udmurt Institute of History, Language and Literature of the Ural Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, made several suggestions regarding the constitutional status of autonomous republics, their representation in the government organs of union republics, and their guarantees of economic and cultural development.

In particular, he proposed the passage of laws to require all enterprises to contribute to the budget of the autonomous republic, regardless of their departmental jurisdiction. The speaker also said that the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR should be bicameral, and that one chamber—the Chamber of Nationalities—should represent the interests of the different ethnic groups living in the RSFSR.

K.I. Kulikov spoke of the need to establish an Institute of the Peoples of Russia in the RSFSR and to publish a journal or newspaper entitled *NARODY ROSSII* and made several other suggestions, including some pertaining to the development of public education and the publishing trade in autonomous republics, etc. All of them warrant serious consideration.

He also addressed problems in the assignment of official status to national languages. In particular, he proposed that the constitutions of autonomous republics recognize the languages of the native population as official state languages along with Russian.

Because this topic was discussed by so many of the speakers, it is worth mentioning that neither dogmatism nor clichés are permissible in the expression of views on

the official state language. These matters can only be settled with a view to the distinctive features of each union or autonomous republic. Whereas in some situations it will be preferable to assign official status to the language of the people whose name has been given to the republic, in other cases this status could be conferred upon several languages, and in still others it might be best not to have an official state language at all.

Candidate of Philosophical Sciences P.S. Maksimov, senior scientific associate at the Yakutsk Institute of Language, Literature and History of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, also discussed the relations between the RSFSR and the national autonomous entities. In his opinion, it would be best to record Russia's status as the national state of the Russian people, with all of the plenipotentiary organs corresponding to the status of a union republic, and as the state of the Russian nationality, Russia should become part of an equitable union with the ASSR's and other national-state entities for the purpose of creating a new RSFSR in the form of a federated state of equal nationalities.

Specific matters connected with the status of autonomous republics were also mentioned in the speeches by Chairman R.G. Galimov of "Tugan Tel," a society of Tatars living in Moscow, and by Doctor of Historical Sciences K.N. Sanukov (Yoshkar-Ola). Besides this, R.G. Galimov spoke of the need to combine the principles of the territorial and extraterritorial existence of nationalities in order to secure their complete and harmonious development. K.N. Sanukov directed attention to the need for the decisions of supreme government bodies to be carried out on the local level with a view to regional peculiarities.

Candidate of Philosophical Sciences G.G. Kotozhekov, editor of *LENIN CHOLY*, the Khakass Autonomous Oblast newspaper, discussed the status of the autonomous oblast. In his opinion, the autonomous oblast should also be a direct part of the union republic (the autonomous oblasts of the RSFSR, as we know, are part of the krais in which they are located).

The speaker went on to suggest the elaboration of the criteria and legal mechanism for the transition of autonomous territories from one form of state structure to another. The Khakass Autonomous Oblast, for example, ranks highest among the country's autonomous oblasts today in terms of population size and socioeconomic potential. It is ahead of six autonomous republics and ten separate oblasts of the Russian Federation in terms of production volume. According to economists, it is capable of making the transition to full regional cost-accounting. Its political and economic potential is such that its national-state status could be changed and it could become an autonomous republic.

Candidate of Historical Sciences A.A. Sarkisyan, sector head in the Party History Institute of the Central Committee of the CP of Armenia, disagreed with the opinion that changing the borders between republics would have

"unpredictable consequences." Is it valid, he asked, to talk about unpredictable consequences when this is a way of solving problems fairly and in line with the Leninist policy on nationalities? As for the tragic events that have occurred on national soil, they are the result of deviations from Lenin's policy on nationalities, and not the result of its implementation.

Besides this, we should not forget that in the history of Soviet national-state construction there have been several cases in which part of the territory of one republic has become part of another. In 1954, for example, Crimean Oblast, which had been part of the RSFSR, was turned over to the Ukraine. There are known cases of territorial transfers between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Tajikistan, and Belorussia and Lithuania. There are also cases in which national-autonomous entities have moved from one union republic into another.

For example, the Kara-Kalpak ASSR changed its republic affiliation. These territorial changes were not viewed as the "alteration" of borders and did not evoke bloody excesses. They made friendship and cooperation stronger, and not weaker.

Experience has shown that resolute action must be taken against groundless attempts to instigate false national-territorial claims and deliberately misrepresent the just demands of the people. Furthermore, we feel it is complete impermissible, A.A. Sarkisyan went on to say, when the fundamental principle of Lenin's policy on nationalities—the right of nationalities to self-determination—is replaced with the economic factor. Could anyone really believe that the economic factor can explain why a particular territory is part of a particular state? After all, this argument could be used to justify any territorial seizure or annexation.

Candidate of Philosophical Sciences R.B. Absattarov, head of the sector on inter-ethnic relations of the Party History Institute of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee, reviewed some aspects of the development of the Soviet people's internationalist consciousness.

The program for the perestroika of public opinion, including the national consciousness as one of its elements, he said, represents the fulfillment of Lenin's instructions. The further development of the internationalist consciousness as the norm in our life is on the agenda today.

The improvement of bilingualism, socialist competition, the economic, scientific, technical, and cultural ties between fraternal republics, and ecology will occupy an exceptionally important place in the development of the national and internationalist consciousness of the Soviet people. Although all of these matters have been investigated thoroughly in the past, they now require new analyses and coordination with the practices and ideals of the revolutionary perestroika.

An important element of the internationalist consciousness is the complete rejection of nationalist views and struggle against them. The events in Alma-Ata in December 1986, the tragedies in Fergana Oblast and Sumgait, the situation in Nagornyy Karabakh and in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the complicated processes taking place in Novyy Uzen, the Baltic republics, Georgia, and other parts of the country have clearly shown how dangerous any kind of nationalist fervor can be.

The speaker said that protectionism, corruption, and the private-ownership mentality had deformed the national and internationalist consciousness of the laboring public in Kazakhstan. Public opinion here was also affected by the nepotism, regional biases, favoritism, obsequiousness, and clannish arrogance that were part of personnel policy here in the recent past. These and other negative practices were sternly criticized at recent plenums of the Central Committee of the CP of Kazakhstan.

Candidate of Historical Sciences R.G. Grigoryan, docent at Tartu University, said that a system is defective if all decisions on the life of nationalities and on ethnic relations are made only at the top, without any consideration for the wishes of the people themselves, and are then implemented through coercion or pressure. This, in his opinion, is the principal flaw in the political resolution of the issue of nationality in our country.

A federation, he went on to say, is a union of republics, a union demanding unanimous consent. It is possible only among sovereign republics. Only a republic with complete jurisdiction over its territory, and with all rights to the effective management of the economy, the cultural sphere, etc., can be called sovereign. The rights in republics are exercised by the people living within their territory.

A sovereign state is not granted rights by anyone else. A republic can deliberately give up part of its rights to the center, but not at the command of the center. Ignoring the sovereignty of a republic is essentially the same as denying the national state.

The right of nationalities to self-determination is a method of asserting sovereignty, but what is the mechanism for the exercise of this right? We have no such mechanism. We need one today.

In order to democratize the Soviet federation, it will probably be necessary, R.G. Grigoryan said, to draft and approve a new union treaty to regulate contemporary relations between republics. Because the USSR is an open union of sovereign and equal republics, when we create the legal union we must define the terms of membership in the union and withdrawal from it. It would also be best to define the exact spheres of jurisdiction of union and autonomous republics and transfer union republics to economic accountability, viewing this as the economic basis of sovereignty.

R.G. Grigoryan disagreed with the statements made by A.A. Say and S.G. Petinov about the situation in

Estonia. In essence, he said, the International Movement and the ULC are trying to defend centralist tendencies and deny the sovereign rights of the republic, and they are escalating tension in order to substantiate the need for a "single and indivisible" center. The Central Committee of the CP of Estonia published the draft platform of the republic Communist Party on inter-ethnic relations. Many Communists who belong to the ULC and the International Movement, however, have taken a confrontational stance instead of discussing the draft and making constructive suggestions.

It seems to me, R.G. Grigoryan stressed, that this is a way of splitting the party along ethnic lines. It is a dangerous and irresponsible course of action which will escalate conflicts and could have unpredictable consequences. This is an attempt to destabilize the political situation in the republic, and as the draft "Platform of the United Labor Council of the Estonian SSR for the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on Inter-Ethnic Relations" says, "under these conditions, it is clearly natural to request the USSR Supreme Soviet to institute a special form of government in the republic until the conflict has been resolved or to form one's own government and the necessary administrative organs." The speaker asked all of the people concerned to assume responsibility for the current difficulties.

Candidate of Historical Sciences A.N. Arinin, lecturer in the Ideological Department of the Bashkir CPSU Obkom, examined several aspects of world experience in the development of federations. This experience tells us, he said, that the right of nationalities to self-determination does not necessarily mean the withdrawal of sovereign administrative-state entities from the federation.

There have only been isolated cases of this in history. Historical experience has proved that economic, and not political, factors play the main and deciding role in the development of federations, just as in other kinds of states. They generate energy for the unification of various administrative-state entities, but this occurs only on the condition that all of the entities have equal rights.

World experience also tells us that the creation of states according to the "one nationality—one state" principle has virtually never taken place in history. Now the absolute majority of nationalities live in multinational states. Today there are just over 200 states for 3,000-4,000 nationalities. Consequently, the right of nationalities to sovereignty generally implies "shared sovereignty," and the self-determination and self-government of nationalities do not necessarily presuppose the establishment of state borders along the borders of ethnic territories. These are the facts.

Candidate of Philosophical Sciences S.A. Butorova, senior scientific associate at the Central Lenin Museum, analyzed some of the ideas of foreign Sovietologists about inter-ethnic relations in the USSR.

Professor R.A. Nurullin, doctor of historical sciences and deputy director of the Party History Institute of the

Central Committee of the CP of Uzbekistan, recalled the successful resolution of problems in national-state construction during the first years of Soviet rule, pointed out the importance of using positive historical experience under present conditions, and spoke of the negative influence of the diktat of central agencies on the efforts to solve many economic problems. This diktat had extremely serious consequences in the economy and in other spheres of life in the republic. He discussed the specific problems of the Crimean Tatars at length.

Professor G.L. Sanzhiyev, doctor of historical sciences and department head at the Buryat Institute of Social Sciences of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, observed that the talk about the federated nature of our state is inconsistent with the real state of affairs because the status of autonomous entities has not been established, the rights of nationalities have not been defined, and their legal interests are quite frequently ignored.

In reference to the situation in the autonomous territories of Siberia, the speaker pointed out the fact that the indigenous nationalities, which are frequently minority groups there, are not adequately involved in modern production and are not adequately represented in local party and state organs. All of these matters require thorough investigation.

Z.M. Kasumov, deputy head of the Constitutional Law Department of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee, said that the agreement on the creation of the USSR gave union republics extensive rights. The 1924 Constitution of the USSR, however, already contained a statement about the "limited sovereignty" of the republics, and later their rights were constantly diminished. He also addressed several aspects of the history of the formation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.

Candidate of Historical Sciences V.D. Danilov, docent at the Chuvash State University imeni I.N. Ulyanov, advocated the conclusion of a new union agreement by the republics to serve as the basis for a genuinely federal system of inter-republic relations. The principles of economic accountability could be used extensively in the economic sphere.

Professor L.G. Dribin, doctor of historical sciences and sector head in the Party History Institute of the Latvian CP Central Committee, said that scientific precision is needed in determining the exact rights of the union republics. After all, they are the ones that delegate rights to the center. If, however, most of these rights are concentrated in the center, the state is of a unitarian nature and cannot be a federation.

The speaker described the social structure of the population of Latvia and analyzed the emerging disparities here.

Candidate of Historical Sciences Ya.A. Pustogachev, director of the Scientific Research Institute of History, Language and Literature in the Gorno-Altay Autonomous Oblast, raised several issues in his speech,

including the need for more regular media coverage of events in the country's autonomous territories.

Professor A.I. Goryacheva, doctor of philosophical sciences (Tallinn), addressed two aspects of the topic. First of all, she denied the need to conclude a new union treaty and disagreed with the suggestions that the USSR be turned into a confederation. In her opinion, this would be a step backward. Second, she criticized some of the statements in the draft platform of the Central Committee of the CP of Estonia for the CPSU Central Committee plenum on inter-ethnic relations. She acknowledged the presence of constructive proposals in the document (on the appointment of a CPSU Central Committee secretary in charge of policy on nationality, on the creation of a special department of the CPSU Central Committee, staffed by representatives of union republic communist parties, and others), but she also said that some of the approaches suggested in the draft seem impermissible. In particular, she could not agree with the attempt to view only nationalities, and not the classes and social groups making them up, as the participants in social life, or to view indigenous nationalities, and not republics and other legal-state entities, as the members of the Soviet federation. In the speaker's opinion, this attempt is made in the document. She also disagreed with the assertion that republic laws should take precedence over union laws and with the separation of republic socialist property from union property.

Professor A.I. Doronchenkov, doctor of philosophical sciences and senior scientific associate at the IML of the CPSU Central Committee, also made some comments on the draft platform of the Estonian CP Central Committee for the CPSU Central Committee plenum. In particular, he said that the drafters of the platform feel that republic, kray, and oblast party organizations should be granted "complete independence" in the choice of tactics. This is absolutely contrary to the statement in the same point about the Estonian CP denial of the federal principle of party construction. In reality, in A.I. Doronchenkov's opinion, the CPSU is thereby being advised to give up its functions and turn into some kind of "chief persuader," into an advisory body with no assigned responsibilities.

At this point it must be said that all of these matters certainly require serious analysis. We need more vigorous efforts on the part of specialists, particularly experts on party construction, to find the optimal solution to problems connected with the autonomy of republic and local party organizations and the correct combination of the internationalist principles of party construction with independent action by party organizations on the local level. Of course, there can be no universal recipe for all regions and all stages of the development of society and the party. It will take constant creative inquiry to find solutions meeting the requirements of the historical and political situation in the country and in a particular republic.

Some of the other matters on which diverging opinions were expressed in the discussion group were the issue of republic citizenship in the form in which it is proposed in the official drafts of the Baltic republics, the inter-republic customs network, and the issuance of national currencies. The idea of granting foreign nationalities displaying high population density in certain locations of republics the right of self-determination, right up to the creation of their own administrative-territorial units, and the right to transfer their territories to other republics evoked a variety of reactions.

In spite of this broad range of opinions, the discussion group was able nevertheless to address several proposals to the CPSU Central Committee plenum and the legislators—people's deputies of the USSR and members of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

One specific proposal concerned the exact definition of the status of union republics and other national-state territories within the framework of the union and the recording of this status in a new Constitution of the USSR and in republic constitutions. Participants in the discussion said that state acts should pay special attention to the legal connotations of the terms "union," "federation," "national sovereignty," "republic sovereignty," and "union sovereignty," because the nature of decisions made by the party and the state will depend on the comprehension of their true meaning.

Several comrades proposed the legal affirmation of the status of the foreign population of republics as equal to the indigenous population.

Speakers underscored the importance of investigating the national-state structure of small nationalities, including the ethnic groups of the northern regions and the Far East.

Many of the comrades who took part in the discussion advocated the legal affirmation of state demographic and ecological policy and a specialized unionwide publication covering events in the lives of the Soviet nationalities.

The history, causes, and means of settling inter-ethnic conflicts in regions with a particularly diversified ethnic composition were the topic of another discussion group.

In this group, speakers analyzed the causes and nature of inter-ethnic conflicts and tried to elaborate scientific recommendations to aid in the preparation of the necessary political solutions and in organizing practical steps to surmount conflicts of this kind.

An introductory speech was presented by the leader of the discussion group, CPSU Central Committee member A.I. Volskiy, chairman of the Special Administrative Committee on the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. He expressed serious concern about the situation in inter-ethnic relations in several parts of the country. Will inter-ethnic conflicts, he asked, be the reef on which perestroika will run aground and be demolished? There is more than enough reason for this anxiety. It appears

that we are still refusing to call a spade a spade and to admit how serious the situation is. The conflicts arising in different regions usually have underlying socioeconomic causes. When the situation is complicated by the absence of a high level of political sophistication among the masses, however, events take a dangerous turn, especially when local soviet organs reconcile themselves to encroachments on the social order and public safety.

The believers in national exclusivity want to return to the days of stagnation. This would give them a chance to satisfy their regionalist ambitions. State institutions, on the other hand, frequently turn out to be defenseless in the legal sense and in many other respects.

In our opinion, A.I. Volskiy went on to say, the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet should act as the court of arbitration in the settlement of inter-ethnic disputes, while disputes between autonomous entities and republics should be the prerogative of the Congress of People's Deputies.

I am not questioning the principles of Lenin's policy on nationality as a whole, A.I. Volskiy said, but I believe they require a new interpretation. This also applies to the right of nationalities to self-determination. It is usually given a fairly primitive interpretation—only as the right of the republic to withdraw from the union. I think this idea should be given a much broader interpretation. In this context, the possibility of the dynamic transformation of various forms of national government should be recorded in the constitution.

Further on in his speech, A.I. Volskiy analyzed the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. One of the points he underscored was the diametrically opposed interpretation of the same events in the history of the autonomous oblast by Azeri and Armenian scholars. The arguments over these events are one of the causes of friction.

The speaker said that the efforts made to date have not satisfied either side in the inter-ethnic conflict. He explained some possible ways of resolving the crisis, observing that the whole matter still needs to be analyzed in depth. The speaker related the negative effects of the deprecation of socialist standards and values and the distortion of the fundamental principles of the socialist state. The full extent of the political degradation of party and state structures has still not been acknowledged. A.I. Volskiy answered many questions about the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and possible ways of settling the crisis.

The situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was the subject of fierce arguments between representatives from Armenia and Azerbaijan. These issues were also addressed in statements by Academician A.F. Dashdarmirov of the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences, head of the Constitutional Law Department of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan CP; Academician G.A. Galoyan of the Armenian SSR Academy of

Sciences, secretary of the Central Committee of the Armenian CP; Doctor of Historical Sciences D.P. Guliyev, director of the Party History Institute of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan CP; and Doctor of Historical Sciences A.N. Karapetyan, senior scientific associate at the Party History Institute of the Central Committee of the Armenian CP.

Speakers acknowledged the existence of objective causes for the events in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and associated the conflict with many unsolved problems in the socioeconomic and spiritual development of the autonomous oblast. The opinions of representatives from Armenia and Azerbaijan were diametrically opposed, however, during the discussion of the concrete causes of the conflict and the historical factors contributing in some way to its escalation. Their views on possible ways of settling the conflict were also mutually exclusive.

In the heat of the argument, strongly worded mutual accusations were made, and these went far beyond the confines of the problems in the autonomous oblast and extended to other "sore spots" in the relations between the two republics.

Of course, the dramatic nature of the situation in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast could not fail to affect the statements made in the discussion group by representatives from Armenia and Azerbaijan. Obviously, there was no reason to expect the discussion to tie up all the loose ends, but the unpromising stance of the people from the two republics is extremely regrettable. This proves once again that the journey out of the crisis will be long and hard and will require considerable effort, patience, and wisdom. Nevertheless, the events in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast have already taught us many lessons. One of them concerns the need for the timely resolution of accumulated problems in inter-ethnic relations and the impossibility of hiding them.

Other issues connected with inter-ethnic conflicts in different parts of the country were also addressed at the meetings of the discussion group. A representative of the Mtskheta Turks, F.I. Pepinov, reviewed the history of his people and all of the oppression and deprivation they had to endure when they were driven out of their native territories during the years of the Stalin cult of personality. He pointed out the fact that until recently the Mtskheta Turks even had difficulty visiting the graves of their ancestors because the entire zone they once inhabited was declared a border region and was covered by special border regulations. The return to their native territories has become the main objective of the Mtskheta Turks.

According to the speaker, the state should assume responsibility for the damages incurred by deported citizens and their heirs, lift border restrictions in the places previously populated by the Mtskheta Turks, and pay for the cost of their repatriation with funds from the Georgian SSR budget.

Other speakers also addressed these problems. According to participants in the discussion, the causes of the events in Fergana Oblast included the inadequate political awareness of the population, the tenacity of many outdated beliefs, and the situation in which real sociopolitical inequities between nationalities do exist. The passive attitudes displayed by some party committees during the conflict were also criticized.

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences G.A. Yugay (VASKhNIL [All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V.I. Lenin]) observed that the nationalist extremism in the treatment of the Mtskheta Turks indicates the presence of negative attitudes in the public mind with regard to the nationalities subjected to repression during the years of Stalinism. This means that the appropriate actions will have to be taken to surmount these attitudes.

Candidate of Historical Sciences S.Z. Lakoba (Sukhumi) spoke at length about the grave consequences of the policy of discrimination against the Abkhaz nationality pursued by Stalin and Beriia. The speaker also criticized the attempts of some news media and unofficial associations in Georgia to suggest that the Abkhaz people are "newcomers" in the territory.

Candidate of Philosophical Sciences O.I. Griniv, docent at the Lvov Polytechnical Institute, said that 3.5 million Ukrainians live outside the Ukrainian SSR but there is not one Ukrainian school in the places where they have settled. This is certainly not fair. Candidate of Historical Sciences Ye.Ye. Alekseyev (Yakutsk) suggested a more objective approach to the assessment of the events which took place in the autonomous republic a few years ago.

In essence, most of the comrades who spoke in the discussion group listed similar reasons for the escalation of conflicts in inter-ethnic relations: historical, economic, ecological, social, and administrative factors and, on the level of the mass consciousness, the prevalence of emotion over reason. Attempts were also made to identify the forces provoking ethnic conflicts and ethnic extremism, but these were unsuccessful. First of all, some of these attempts were so submerged in abstract theory that they precluded the analysis of the situation on the level of the political behavior and attitudes of conflicting groups and, second, the academics' own ethnocentric attitudes perceptibly diminished their ability to conduct this kind of analysis.

Of course, some of the statements of a general theoretical nature were quite interesting. These included, for example, the speech by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences M.V. Iordan (Philosophy Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences), who tried to analyze the nature of inter-ethnic conflicts in the socialist society by relating these conflicts to the philosophical interpretation of the essence of contradictions and the need to consider the basic contradiction of socialism. The same issues were addressed by Professor N.I. Khmara, doctor of philosophical sciences and sector head at the IML of the CPSU Central Committee.

Some of the comrades who addressed the discussion group, including Professor R.Ya. Mirskiy, doctor of philosophical sciences from the Lvov Polytechnical Institute, and Doctor of Philosophical Sciences R. Achylova, rector at the Kirghiz Women's Pedagogical Institute, admitted that the social sciences and the research of social scientists were not keeping up with the issues of the present day.

In most cases, however, the analysis of the causes of conflicts in inter-ethnic relations was highly speculative and essentially added nothing new to the views already expressed in the news media of the republics concerned. Many speakers admitted that the conceptual grounds and empirical basis for the study of inter-ethnic conflicts fall far short of present requirements.

Even in the statements by representatives of republic branches of the IML of the CPSU Central Committee, the scientific approach was barely discernible. The content of the discussion was largely dominated by the regrettable preoccupation of historians from different republics with the "squaring of historical accounts" and the explanation of so-called "historical rights" to certain territories.

In many cases, the level of scientific debate was low, reflecting the prevalence of emotions related to ethnic considerations and the absence of logical scientific arguments. The shortage of positive ideas capable of leading conflicting groups out of the maze of contradictions was most apparent.

All of this had a definite effect on the content of the proposals submitted for discussion at the upcoming CPSU Central Committee plenum on inter-ethnic relations. The most constructive proposals concerned the legal regulation of inter-ethnic conflicts and the development of a legal mechanism for the settlement of conflicts. Proposals regarding the definition of the exact status of union republics and other national-state territories also belong in this category.

In the political sphere, the constructive proposals concerned the restoration of the national-state structures of the nationalities that were illegally repressed at the time of Stalin's authoritarian regime, the formulation of the demographic policy of the Soviet State, and others. In the social sphere, they concerned the regulation of migration, aid to refugees, the protection of the national languages and cultures of small nationalities, and others.

The discussion group gave participants a better understanding of one another's views and of the content and style of debate on issues giving rise to conflicts or even outright confrontation. The need for a general program of action, concentrating on the future rather than the past, became obvious.

The problems of nationalities with no national state were reviewed in the third discussion group. Some regional problems were also discussed.

The group was addressed by the deputy head of the subdepartment on inter-ethnic relations of the CPSU

Central Committee, A.A. Sazonov. He commented on the considerable effort expended by the sector on the theory of nationalities and ethnic relations of the IML of the CPSU Central Committee for the organization of the roundtable and on the validity and importance of the discussion, for the first time in many years, of the problems of nationalities without a national state, with the enthusiastic participation of representatives of many nationalities in the discussion. This, he went on to say, could include the discussion of historical, theoretical, socioeconomic, constitutional-legal, cultural, organizational, personnel, and other issues.

The speaker said that people in the subdepartment of the CPSU Central Committee are aware of these problems and sympathize with them. He also supported the idea of publishing a journal something like *ZHIZN NATSION-ALNOSTEY*, which was once published by the People's Commissariat for Nationalities.

Candidate of Historical Sciences G.Ye. Trapeznikov, senior scientific associate at the IML of the CPSU Central Committee, declared that the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia already proclaimed the right of the ethnic minorities and small ethnic communities in Russia to free development. This was one of the basic premises of the activity of the first Soviet Government, headed by V.I. Lenin.

Even in the first years of the existence of the Nation of Soviets, the practice of Soviet construction demonstrated the need for a broader interpretation of the term "national autonomy," including the application of this term to small nationalities, the guarantee of the genuine equality of all nationalities, and the determination of effective ways of correcting the underdevelopment of many outlying districts populated by ethnic minorities. The ethnic policy of the Bolshevik Party differed in principle from the theories of nationality adopted at that time by socialist and social-democratic parties in several other countries.

Lenin's ideas about the self-determination of nationalities and the principles of the socialist federal structure, however, were severely distorted by Stalin. G.Ye. Trapeznikov went on to say. While the "father of the people" pretended to conduct Lenin's policy on nationality, he was actually pursuing a policy of diktat and repression against certain ethnic groups in our country.

The requirements of perestroika dictate the need for the immediate and complete repudiation of the charges, brought publicly or behind closed doors during the years of Stalinism, against the Koreans, the Germans, the Greeks, the Kurds, the Crimean Tatars, the Mtskhet Turks, and all of the repressed nationalities. The continued existence of these indictments is tantamount to admitting that Stalin's repression was fair and, in essence, to completely ignoring the real needs of nationalities.

The speaker concluded by saying that the center will be strong when each nationality in the multinational family, regardless of its size, is also made strong by its genuine

equality. There is no question that this will reinforce the USSR as a federation of equals.

Some aspects of the theory and practice of inter-ethnic relations were discussed by Doctor of Historical Sciences L.V. Malinovskiy (Barnaul), who remarked that the return to democracy in our society will entail not only the restoration of Lenin's truly internationalist views and the determination of the appropriate standards of state and party life, but also the further investigation of the history and theory of the ethnic development of nationalities in the Soviet Union. In the first years of the Soviet regime, the ideas of socialist federalism were developed further by the creation of numerous national okrugs, rayons, and rural soviets in addition to the union and autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts. This was a natural process because the right of national self-government could not extend to each individual and to each rural community, where most of the small nationalities were concentrated, on the republic level.

When local self-government was being eliminated and the process of administrative centralization was in full swing in the 1930's, however, the system of national self-government at the lowest levels was eviscerated and liquidated, the speaker went on to say. National rayons and rural soviets ceased to exist. Even when the principle of the self-government of nationalities was observed, it stopped at the republic level. Theory and official science were modified to conform to these undemocratic practices.

The experience of the 1920's must be studied, the speaker said, and the democratic approach to ethnic problems on the local level must be revived and developed. This should be reflected specifically in heightened concern for the "scale models" of the national state, for small ethnic communities.

The same issues were also addressed by Doctor of Historical Sciences S.N. Gorokhov and Candidate of Economic Sciences F.S. Donskoy (both from Yakutsk), Candidate of Philosophical Sciences A.V. Balitskiy (Khabarovsk), and Secretary of the Khanty-Mansiysk CPSU Okruzhkom V.V. Kiyenya. They cited specific examples to illustrate the faulty practices of several central agencies, which have ignored the rights of nationalities inhabiting certain territories when they have made decisions on the economic development of these territories. They also pointed out the fact that local party and soviet organs in autonomous okrugs, and also in other territorial units, effectively have no way of opposing these practices.

Harmony in inter-ethnic relations, said Corresponding Member M.Ya. Sushanlo of the Kirghiz SSR Academy of Sciences, presupposes the harmony of ethnic interests. We must begin with the problems which are visible and do not arouse any kind of debate. For example, conditions should be established for the thorough development of small nationalities and ethnic groups without national-territorial entities. Their cultural and educational needs must be met and they must be provided with the necessary consumer-service and public health facilities, etc.

It would be expedient to establish an institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences with subdepartments on the

local level, the speaker said, to conduct research into all of the diverse interests of nationalities and ethnic groups and communities and to conduct comprehensive analyses of problems in inter-ethnic relations. The implementation of the proposals and projects suggested by scientists for the harmonization of ethnic interests and inter-ethnic relations could be the responsibility of a government body created specifically for this purpose. In the speaker's opinion, the absence of constitutional provisions with regard to nationalities and the lack of a mechanism to guarantee their unconditional observance are among the main causes of inter-ethnic friction and conflicts today.

Professor V.I. Rabinovich, doctor of historical sciences from the Moscow Institute of Architecture, said that the nationalities in our country without a state include not only small ethnic communities, but also extremely large ones—Germans, Poles, Greeks, Koreans, Kurds, and others. He said that part of the reason is that we have been "wedged in" by Stalin's work "Marxism and the Issue of Nationality," which presents only a static definition of nationality. The true dialectics of the issue of nationality are revealed in V.I. Lenin's classic work "Critical Comments on the Question of Nationality." The speaker underscored the need to criticize nationalism, which is impeding the resolution of the issue of nationality.

Similarities in the historical experience and present status of many ethnic minorities were enumerated by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences G.V. Kan, docent at the Alma-Ata Higher Party School, and by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences D.V. Men, senior scientific associate at the Party History Institute of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee. At different times but for almost the same reasons, these groups found themselves outside the native lands of their ancestors and were later moved out of the locations where they had made up compact ethnic communities.

The problems of ethnic minorities in Kazakhstan are particularly relevant, the speakers said, because it was to this region that most people were exiled in the 1930's and 1940's. Germans, Uighurs, Koreans, and Dungans alone make up more than 8 percent of the population here. As a result of unwarranted mass persecution, these people found themselves in unfamiliar economic, geographic, and sociocultural surroundings. Whereas they were able to preserve their material culture, although it may have been deformed to some extent, their spiritual cultures suffered serious injuries.

Several nationalities effectively found themselves, the speaker went on, on the periphery of sociopolitical life, and this gave rise to a peculiar form of self-castigation on ethnic grounds and an inferiority complex stemming from ethnic origins.

The current perestroika has allowed these nationalities to enter a new stage in their development, distinguished by the establishment of the prerequisites for the realization of

ethnic interests in the spheres of education, culture, language, customs, etc. For example, radio programs in Korean are being broadcast in the republic, and German departments have been established in several VUZ's for the training of German specialists in their native language and literature, history, and journalism. An Institute of Uighur Studies has been established as part of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, and an Uighur Department of Teachers Education has been opened in the Kazakh Pedagogical Institute. German, Jewish, Uighur, and Korean cultural centers have sprung up in Alma-Ata.

Speakers listed some of the most urgent current problems. They include the need to correct deformities, revive the Leninist approach to inter-ethnic problems, restore or create national rayons and rural, village, and other soviets in locations densely populated by ethnic minorities and their cultural centers and associations, establish close contact between ethnic minorities and their original native land, especially in the spheres of culture, education, and language, write authentic histories of ethnic minorities, restore their national traditions, customs, and holidays, etc.

Many speakers addressed the specific problems of their own nationalities.

In the 4 years of perestroika, completely new approaches to the issue of nationality have been elaborated, and we, judging by all indications, are on the threshold of great decisions, said G.G. Vormsbekher, editor of the German-language sociopolitical journal HEIMATLICHE WEITEN. One of these decisions is expected to restore the state entity of the Soviet Germans. The need for this, he said, is dictated not only by political and legal considerations, but also by the economic interests of our country. After losing much of their knowledge of their native language and national culture over a long period of time, the Soviet Germans are realizing that they have almost no chance of retaining their identity as a separate nationality under these conditions. This is the reason for the increasing number of Germans leaving the USSR.

The speaker discussed several issues connected with the possible restoration of the national-state territory of the Soviet Germans. The structure of its economy, he said, should probably consist of labor-intensive branches requiring high intellectual and professional potential: electronics and precision mechanics. The development of light industry and the production of fine clothing and footwear should also be considered. In general, an experiment could be conducted in establishing a special economic zone with participation by firms in the GDR and FRG. It would be pointless to refuse this kind of assistance, which would benefit the entire Nation of Soviets. Above all, this would entail the incorporation of high labor standards and progressive technology.

G.G. Vormsbekher and several other German comrades who addressed the group underscored the importance of reviving the national culture and language. These issues

were also discussed by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences I. Kronevald, docent, member of the Union of Journalists of the USSR, and member of the Presidium of the Revival Society, and Professor G.N. Klassen from the Bashkir State Pedagogical Institute. The history of the Soviet Germans, including their struggle for the restoration of their state, was the subject addressed by K. Erlikh, editor of the German-language newspaper of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee, FREUND-SCHAFT, and member of the Union of Writers of the USSR, G. Grout, chairman of the Unity Committee of Soviet Germans, and several other speakers.

The need to create a Greek national-territorial autonomous unit was declared by Kh.G. Politidis, instructor in the Organizational Department of the Abkhaz ASSR Council of Ministers. Perestroika and glasnost, and then the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR aroused the hope of this in the 400,000-member community of Pontic Greeks, he said, but this matter was not discussed at the congress.

At one time, the speaker said, the establishment of the Soviet regime dramatically raised the status of the Pontic Greeks, who became equal participants in socialist construction. In the first 20 years of the Soviet regime the Pontic Greeks in the Black Sea region reached a definite level of success in their development. They had their own schools, pedagogical institutes, printing firms, news media, including radio programs, theaters, etc. In 1938 all of these were liquidated. Many writers, poets, dramatists, and other representatives of the emerging national intelligentsia were exterminated. Tens of thousands of common people were repressed. The Soviet community of Pontic Greeks lost all of its civil and national rights and became an innocent victim of compulsory deportation to remote and undeveloped regions in the Asian part of the country (from the Crimea after the Great Patriotic War and from the Transcaucasus and Northern Caucasus in 1949), where thousands of people, especially children and the elderly, died because they could not adapt to the severe continental climate and because they had no winter clothing or food.

At the end of the 1950's, the speaker went on, after the partial rehabilitation, people made their way back to their native territories and tried to put their lives back in order. It must be said that much is being done in the Abkhaz ASSR and in the Georgian SSR in general to revive some of the elements of the Greek culture, but this cannot be said about the RSFSR and, to some extent, the Ukraine.

The speaker said that some form of national state must be created for the Pontic Greeks but admitted that there could be several different ways of resolving this issue.

The same opinions and suggestions were voiced in speeches by writer P.P. Sindropulo, Honored Teacher of the Adzhar ASSR N.A. Areopulo, director of Dagva Secondary School No 2 in Kobuletskiy Rayon, and several other comrades. All of them advocated the complete reinstatement of the Greek language—i.e., instruction in the native language in all subjects in Greek

schools and pre-school establishments and the organization of radio and television broadcasts in the Greek language.

A.A. Mamedov, department head of a Kurdish-language newspaper published in Yerevan, RIA-TAZA, and Professor Sh.Kh. Mgoi, doctor of historical sciences and department head at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences, recalled the history of the Soviet Kurds.

The Kurdistan district, with its center in Lachina, existed from 1923 to 1929 in a part of the Azerbaijan SSR where many Kurds lived. At one time, the newspaper SOVETSKIY KURDISTAN was published there, radio programs were broadcast, children were taught in their native language, and textbooks and a variety of literature were published. Lenin once took a great interest in the laborers of Kurdistan.² Later the district was liquidated, many Kurds were moved to Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics, and the identification papers of the remaining Kurds listed their nationality as Azeri.

The speakers who addressed this issue spoke of the need to restore the status of the Kurdish language and culture and organize instruction for children in their native language. They advocated the restoration of the autonomous territory of the Kurds, which would, in their opinion, play an important role in strengthening inter-ethnic relations in the USSR and would have positive repercussions in the international arena.

The experience of the Soviet Koreans, who were the first to be subjected to unwarranted repression in 1937 when Stalin deported them from their home of many years to the Far East, was related by Candidate of Historical Sciences S.A. Han and Candidate of Historical Sciences S.G. Nam (both from Moscow).

The Koreans, the speakers said, fought in the ranks of the Red Army in the Civil War. After the end of this war, they joined all other workers in peaceful construction, the Korean culture began to be revived, schools and clubs for Koreans came into being, and two pedagogical tekhnikums and a pedagogical institute were opened. A school of Korean studies was opened in the Far Eastern University and Korean departments were established in the Soviet party schools in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk. There was a Korean dramatic theater in Vladivostok and Korean singing, folk dancing, and amateur art groups. Korean-language radio programs were broadcast in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk, and newspapers, journals, textbooks, and works of fiction were published in Korean.

In 1937 the wave of repression first struck party, soviet, and trade-union officials, the command and political personnel of the Red Army, and the intelligentsia. Under these conditions, all of the Koreans were quickly resettled in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, mostly in the desert and in desolate and almost uninhabitable regions. The Koreans were plagued by the severe

climate, diseases, cold, hunger, and unsanitary conditions. They died by the score. Under these conditions, the preservation, not to mention the development, of the Korean national culture was inconceivable, and it effectively ceased to exist.

Speakers proposed the organization of a national autonomous unit, the guaranteed return of Koreans to their previous homes, housing assistance and job placement services, and measures to promote the effective functioning of the Korean language.

A.I. Kurkchi, senior scientific associate at the Institute of the History and Theory of Architecture, reported to the discussion group on the proceedings of a meeting of the Soviet Sociological Association's section on the sociology of national-political relations to discuss "The Future of the Crimean National Territory and the Issue of the Crimean Tatars." The proceedings of the meeting relate the history of the Crimean Tatar community, examine various aspects of the resettlement of the Crimean Tatars in Crimea and the restoration of their autonomy, and propose a list of political, legal, and economic measures to secure the dynamic development of the Crimean Tatar community and the correction of the adverse consequences of its arbitrary treatment in the past.

The issue of the autonomy of the Siberian Tatars was raised by B.V. Suleymanov on behalf of the Committee for the National Revival of the Siberian Tatars. Relating the history of his national group, he stressed its uniqueness and said that the Siberian Tatars must have a national state which will allow them to revive their culture and language and give the people political rights.

Several problems in the life of the Adyge population which was not part of the Adyge Autonomous Oblast in 1922 and in the preservation of its ethnic identity were examined in a speech by Candidate of Historical Sciences Kh.I. Naguchev, consultant to the Ideological Department of the Adyge CPSU Obkom.

Looking back into the history of the Baluchi ethnic group living in the Turkmen SSR, Candidate of Historical Sciences R.M. Karryyeva, senior scientific associate at the Party History Institute of the Central Committee of the CP of Turkmenistan, said that it is lagging behind other nationalities in the republic in the economic and cultural spheres and that this lag would have to be corrected. Among other issues, she discussed the organization of instruction in schools in the Baluchi language for children. The speaker recalled that there were Baluchi schools and a Baluchi intelligentsia in the 1920's and early 1930's. All of this came to an end, however, in 1937 and 1938.

Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Z.I. Strogalschikova (Petrozavodsk) listed the problems encountered by the Vepsy ethnic community. Just as in many other cases, the best way of solving them, in her opinion, would consist in the creation of an autonomous territory for this national group and in the organization of the study of its language, history, and culture.

The small Dungan national group was described by M.Ya. Sushanlo. The tragedy of 1937-38 did not bypass these people. Almost all of the outstanding members of the first generation of the Dungan intelligentsia, party and military personnel, and journalists were killed. All of them were completely vindicated after the 20th CPSU Congress.

The Dungan written language was revived after an interval of almost 20 years, and textbooks and works of fiction began to be published. The Dungan language and literature began to be taught in schools again in 1957, and an inter-republic newspaper in the Dungan language, SHYYUEDI CHI ("Banner of October") is published in Frunze. All of this, however, has been accompanied by great difficulties.

The lawlessness of the years of the cult of personality and stagnation also affected the lives of Central Asian Jews, said Docent D.I. Niyazov, candidate of philological sciences and senior scientific associate at the Philosophy and Law Institute of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences. Native-language newspapers and books could not be published, and schools and theaters were closed.

The section of Bukharan Jewish writers has been reinstated as part of the Union of Writers of Uzbekistan, books are being published in the national language, and the preparations are being made for the creation of the State Bukharan Jewish Singing and Dancing Company and the Bukharan Jewish National-Cultural Society. The speaker suggested specific ways of reinforcing these positive processes.

The problems of the northern nationalities were the subject of a speech by V.B. Kozlov, candidate of philosophical sciences and senior scientific associate at the IML of the CPSU Central Committee. Many of them, he said, have their own national-administrative territories—autonomous okrugs. Besides this, there were many national rayons and national rural soviets in the 1930's, but all of them virtually disappeared when the 1936 Constitution was ratified.

The percentages of native and non-native inhabitants began changing dramatically when the development of the northern regions began and when many new settlers arrived in the area, the speaker went on to say. According to the all-union census of 1979, 92 percent of the population in the northern autonomous okrugs was already non-indigenous. This led to corresponding changes in representation in local government and administrative organs, but the main thing was that the autonomous okrug ceased to be a real form of national state of the northern nationalities. It was more like a territorial-administrative unit.

The depletion of biological and zoological resources in connection with the extraction of minerals, oil, and gas on a massive scale in the north hurt the environment. This was accompanied by the degradation of the traditional branches of the economy of northern nationalities—hunting, reindeer breeding, fishing, and trapping—

which represented the basis of the national and cultural self-sufficiency of these nationalities. All of this diminished the value of labor in the traditional branches and developed parasitical attitudes, which were promoted by the paternalistic approach of the local administration to the problems of the northern ethnic groups. This also had an adverse effect on the family and on the sociodemographic situation in general and contributed to the spread of alcohol abuse and alcoholism.

It appears, the speaker said in conclusion, that the situation might be mastered in the following ways: the restoration of the status of the national rayon and national settlement; the creation of a committee to take charge of the affairs of northern ethnic groups, with the right of legislative initiative on the union level; the organization of an extra-departmental scientific appraisal of the effects of large-scale production in the northern regions; a move from the extensive to the intensive type of development; the organization of strictly professional psychological and medical examinations of newcomers looking for jobs in the north; the preservation and reconstruction of the traditional branches of the northern economy on a new technical and technological basis. He also suggested several other measures.

The problems of national groups in the north, Siberia, and the Far East were also the subject of speeches by Ch.M. Taksami, doctor of historical sciences and sector head in the Leningrad branch of the Ethnography Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V.A. Robbek, candidate of philological sciences and senior scientific associate at the Institute of Language, Literature and History of the Yakutsk branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Siberian Department; U.A. Vinokurova, candidate of psychological sciences and senior scientific associate at the same institute; D.P. Karavye, head of the Northern Nationalities Department of the Magadan Oblispolkom; and other comrades. Recommendations were made on these matters.

A meeting of the discussion group on problems in inter-ethnic relations among youth was held in the Higher Komsomol School of the Komsomol Central Committee under the supervision of Professors E.A. Bagramov (Moscow) and Ya.S. Brolish (Riga), both doctors of philosophical sciences. The meeting was called to order by Komsomol Central Committee Secretary N.I. Paltsev. He described the "package" of proposals the Komsomol Central Committee had prepared and sent to the CPSU Central Committee for the Central Committee plenum on problems in inter-ethnic relations in the USSR.

The proposed measures include steps to improve the Soviet multinational federation, to satisfy the sociopolitical and national-cultural needs of citizens of the USSR, to provide a scientific foundation for the perestroika of inter-ethnic relations, to provide an ideological foundation for the patriotic and internationalist education of the working public, including youth, and to improve media coverage of these problems.

In particular, the organization of a scientific research center for comprehensive studies of current problems in inter-ethnic relations was proposed. Besides this, sociological offices should be opened in the zonal, republic, kray, and oblast schools of the Komsomol aktiv for the scientific analysis and prediction of inter-ethnic relations among youth and the activity of Komsomol organizations.

Proposals in the sphere of education included the revision of curricula and teaching aids for academic institutions and the choice of new textbooks, on a competitive basis, with objective accounts of the history of the USSR and the national groups in our country; the planning and institution of special classes in contemporary policy on nationality for higher and secondary specialized academic institutions, including the Higher Komsomol School of the Komsomol Central Committee; broader instruction in ethnology in higher and secondary specialized pedagogical institutions.

The speaker also focused attention on the need for authentic accounts of the origin and development of Komsomol organizations in union and autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts and okrugs, and the role of their leaders, many of whom were repressed during the years of the cult of personality.

It is essential that the national-cultural needs of young people of all national groups be met in any part of the country, especially in the case of young people living outside their state-territorial units. A network of national and international clubs and cultural centers could be developed in large cities. This has been done, for example, by the Moscow Komsomol Gorkom, which supports the efforts of young people of various national groups to develop their own languages and satisfy their national-cultural needs.

The overall balance of the interests of young people in a particular region must be observed carefully, the speaker said, so that it does not reach the critical point. Appeals and slogans will be not be enough here. All of the work of Komsomol committees under the new qualitative conditions requires serious investigation, and the broadest possible dialogue with young people on all of their concerns will be necessary.

In general, when the independence of Komsomol organizations is enhanced, it would be best to seek ways of optimizing intra-league relations on the basis of unity and responsibility. The perestroika of the Komsomol as part of the process of improving the Soviet federation's political system will require thorough and balanced analyses and extensive debate because it will concern fundamental questions about the structure of the federated state and the institution of the principles of self-government on a broader scale throughout the country.

During this meeting, participants discussed a broad range of topics connected with the exacerbation of inter-ethnic relations among youth, problems in the internationalist education of youth, and the role and place of the Komsomol in sociopolitical affairs.

Changes in the content of the internationalist education of youth aroused debate, and participants mentioned the need to mobilize the entire society and its entire political system for the education of youth in the spirit of perestroika. Priority was assigned to the disclosure and resolution of the real problems which have accumulated in each republic and each region and to the clarification of the functions of central and local organs and guarantees of independent decisionmaking. In connection with this, the elaboration of a new mechanism for the formation of the center was proposed.

Several acute problems in the protection of internationalism from a perceptible process of erosion were addressed. This was the main thesis of E.A. Bagramov's speech. He stressed that the concept of internationalism which we have always carried in our hearts and minds must not be vulgarized or forgotten. We are discussing difficult and unresolved ethnic problems, but we must not forget that the accurate assessment of any national development can only be made from an internationalist standpoint. The entire world is moving toward integration. We halted our democratic process of development in the 1930's. Now we have to democratize the country and build a truly internationalist, truly socialist edifice on a democratic foundation. Otherwise, we will doom our cause to degeneration.

Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences Ya.S. Umanskiy, head of the School of Komsomol Construction of the Personnel Training Institute of the Komsomol Central Committee in Uzbekistan, said that the erosion of socialist ideals in many members of the younger generation has caused young people to misinterpret many events in social life. The result has been the assignment of absolute value to the issue of nationality and the dismantling of internationalist concepts.

Participants in this discussion group assigned great importance to the discovery of the causes of the involvement of youth in inter-ethnic conflicts. For example, R.N. Musabekov, head of the laboratory for the study of inter-ethnic problems and the internationalist education of youth in the Scientific Research Center of the Higher Komsomol School of the Komsomol Central Committee, directed attention to the fact that the progressive deterioration of the young person's social identity makes him more receptive to nationalist ideas. Young people who are preoccupied with questioning the meaning of life and seeking their own place in society have an extremely disturbing reaction to the diminishing appeal of the communist ideal. The consequent ideological vacuum is filled by other ideological values, and this must be vigorously resisted by offering young people updated social ideals combining national, socialist, and common human elements.

Doctor of Historical Sciences S.N. Gorokhov, head of the School of the History of Northern Nationalities at the Yakutsk State University, and Ya.S. Brolish underscored the present need for thorough studies of the behavior of youth in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations.

They substantiated the proposal on the establishment of departments dealing with this subject matter in higher academic institutions.

Professor V.P. Moshnyaga, doctor of historical sciences and vice-chancellor of the Higher Komsomol School of the Komsomol Central Committee, said that in some countries, both socialist and capitalist, considerable experience has been accumulated in the regulation of inter-ethnic relations and that the discerning but interested study of this experience could be quite useful in the resolution of our problems. He and Candidate of Historical Sciences A.P. Dyakova, senior instructor at the University of Friendship Among Peoples imeni P. Lumumba, said that more attention should be paid to students from other cities and foreign students, who sometimes become the targets of isolated nationalist and racist attacks.

Ethnic conflicts have recently become a serious problem in many large VUZ centers. We have no right to overlook this problem and do nothing about it.

The organization of regional student exchanges, student brigades, tourist exchanges, and the study of the history and culture of neighboring nationalities are some of the practical measures that might have a positive effect at this time.

The second group of problems which aroused the most interest and discussion was connected with internationalist education and the relationship between internationalist or patriotic education and what the comrades called national education. Some of the people who took part in the discussion and expressed and substantiated their points of view were Secretary G.B. Geldyyeva of the Komsomol Central Committee in Turkmenistan; Professor M.I. Gioyev, doctor of historical sciences; Z.K. Shnekendorf, candidate of historical sciences and docent at the Moscow Oblast Pedagogical Institute imeni N.I. Krupskaya; N.I. Yegorov, senior scientific associate at the Institute of Language, Literature, History and Economics of the Chuvash ASSR Council of Ministers; V.S. Inashvili, candidate of philosophical sciences and senior scientific associate at the research institute of general education of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences; Yu.M. Khalimbetov, candidate of philosophical sciences and docent at the Samarkand Medical Institute; and others. The speakers noted that there is no scientifically sound system of internationalist education at this time. It must be rebuilt on a realistic basis, with a view to on going socioeconomic and political changes. The establishment of a new system of internationalist education at this time, however, will require the consideration of regional and ethnic distinctions, interests, and needs and the specific sociohistorical and cultural features of these regions and the ethnic groups inhabiting them. The general principles of humanism must lie at the basis of internationalism along with class principles.

The democratization of social and ethnic relations presupposes democracy in internationalist education. The new type of this education must be based on respect for the national dignity, rights, and liberties of each individual.

Candidate of Philosophical Sciences A.K. Kurbanov (Ashkhabad) discussed aspects of socialist national education. The earlier, Stalinist system of internationalist-patriotic education presented a deformed definition of internationalism, stemming from the priority of centralism and the denigration of national and specific features. For this reason, as some comrades suggested, the concept of "socialist national education" will presuppose the acknowledgement of one's national roots, culture, language, and history.

Candidate of Philosophical Sciences V.N. Kirillina, senior instructor at the Higher Komsomol School of the Komsomol Central Committee, suggested that when the Komsomol Program is being drafted, more attention should be focused on the role of the young national intelligentsia and on its protection, so that it will have the ability and the necessary conditions to direct national principles toward the development of common human principles during the period of the evolution of the national identity.

The role and place of the Komsomol in the perestroika of inter-ethnic relations among youth were deliberated at length in the discussion group. This was the topic of speeches by G.B. Geldyyeva, First Secretary V.D. Lunegov of the Komi-Permyak Komsomol Okruzhkom, lecturer Yu.V. Yerugin from the School of CPSU History at the Kuybyshev Aviation Institute, and others.

The interrelations of Komsomol organizations with independent youth associations promoting the preservation of ethnicity were examined in detail.

It is no coincidence, V.N. Kirillina stressed, that the unofficial youth organizations which took shape in many locations under the influence of the rapid elevation of the national consciousness for the study of the history and cultural values of their own nationalities came as a surprise to Komsomol committees. In this context, the tendency toward the development of independent youth leagues with their own programs and by-laws is a positive one. The main thing here is to avoid confrontations, give up the Komsomol's monopoly in the youth movement, master the political methods of influencing youth, and relate the activities of local Komsomol organizations to regional concerns.

The organizational structure of the Komsomol, federalism in the Komsomol, and the inter-ethnic problems connected with this were also reviewed. The results of the Lithuanian Komsomol Congress aroused debate, particularly the restoration of the independent Lithuanian League of Youth. The participants in the discussion concluded that further steps to democratize Komsomol affairs, heighten independence, and limit the jurisdiction of superior organs will be needed. All of this could be reflected in the Komsomol Charter and Program and in the programs of its regional organizations. Confrontations between young people of different nationalities must be averted. When Komsomol organizations are given more independence, this must be accompanied by a search for ways of

optimizing intra-league relations on the basis of unity and responsibility for the future of the Komsomol.

Candidate of Historical Sciences A.I. Buymister and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences K.Ye. Luskalova, instructors at the Higher Komsomol School of the Komsomol Central Committee, believe that when profound changes in the Soviet federation are being considered, it is logical and valid to consider the transformation of the Komsomol into a federation of republic leagues. The Komsomol should have a single charter and program, listing the general aims, functions, strategy of league development, and standards and principles of intra-league affairs. Each republic youth league will draw up its own program with a view to the specific features of the region. We must recognize the right of republic Komsomol organizations to withdraw from the All-Union Komsomol and to be completely independent if this is demanded by the majority of oblast and rayon Komsomol organizations. In these cases, a system of inter-relations with the All-Union Komsomol and with other republic organizations can be established on the basis of agreements. The speakers said that more Komsomol organizations should not be created within the republic youth leagues, because this will split the Komsomol along ethnic lines and lead to confrontations between members of the league.

In contrast to this, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences S.S. Safarov, senior scientific associate in the Philosophy Department of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences, believes that the Komsomol can influence the optimization of inter-ethnic relations only if it preserves the organizational unity of its ranks and does not divide its organizations into ethnic factions. The creation of national sections, proposed by some comrades, is theoretically invalid and could have negative consequences. It would be more correct, in his opinion, for the Komsomol to support and unite groups of youth defending the interests of various nationalities and ethnic groups (ethnic associations and national-cultural centers) and seek ways of achieving their coexistence and their consolidation on a single socialist platform. The Komsomol Program should contain a section on nationalities and inter-ethnic relations and should resolutely oppose encroachments on the interests of ethnic minorities in the union or in separate republics.

First Secretary A.N. Krivan of the Kirovskiy Komsomol Raykom in Riga, said that people are leaving the Komsomol in droves in the republic (700 people in June). He believes that the Komsomol does not exist in Latvia as a political organization. He feels that the problem can be solved by developing a popular young communist movement, which could surmount dissension by taking a reasonable view of the situation. To this end, a joint plenum of the Central Committee of the republic Communist Party and Komsomol should be convened to define the objectives of young forces.

The urgent need for perestroika in the work with youth, said Candidate of Philosophical Sciences R.A. Yavchunovskaya, scientific associate at the Philosophy Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, assigns priority

to the establishment of the necessary prerequisites and conditions for the young person's definition of his own place in society, the development of his thinking, and the improvement of forms of communication, including inter-ethnic communication. Then he will not be receptive to nationalist ideas and extremist aims.

The objective reordering of priorities in favor of national considerations in the activity of Komsomol committees is natural under present conditions. They will have to seek new forms and methods of work, especially in multinational groups, rayons, and regions, and the competent and logically substantiated internationalist education of youth will become one of the principal functions of the Komsomol.

Many of the issues raised in this discussion group require thorough investigation, but it is obvious that problems in work with young people and their internationalist education must be given much more attention than in the past. New procedures, forms, and methods of this work must be developed. Some specific proposals on this score were formulated in the recommendations adopted by the group.

"Religion and Nationality" was the topic of a special discussion group. This subject matter is relevant not only in connection with the complication of inter-ethnic relations, but also in connection with the current vigorous search for ways of harmonizing relations between the state and the church and between believers and non-believers. Candidate of Historical Sciences A.A. Nurullayev, the senior scientific associate at the IML of the CPSU Central Committee who presided over the meetings of this group, said that the most diverse groups of people, sometimes with completely opposite interests, turn to religion at turning points in history. This is a natural process because religion is based on certain fundamental principles which can unite and divide ethnic communities.

Participants in this group said that the deviations from the Leninist principles of the treatment of religion, the church, and believers, which went on for decades, and the flagrant violations of the rights of believers offended the religious and the national consciousness of large groups of people.

Today a new attitude toward religion must be considered. Although we will remain Marxists, speakers stressed, we must realize that some people have a real need for religion. We must give up our utopian view of this complex social phenomenon. Religion cannot be eliminated by a specific deadline on the orders of directive agencies. We are not denying the need to surmount the influence of religion, but this will take many generations. Above all, it is important to create more humane structures in the society to fill the vacancy religion fills in some people's life. We must also decide which elements of religious doctrine might be used for the good of society.

Participants also said that whereas we once completely denied the existence of common human principles in

religion, now the pendulum is swinging in the opposite direction: There is a clear tendency to treat religion as almost the only repository of the immutable values of the national culture and national well-being. There has been a noticeable shift in the news media toward the idealization of religion and its values. Scientific-atheistic articles, on the other hand, are frequently not accepted for publication.

Several specific problems connected with the interaction of ethnic and religious factors were examined during the discussion. At this point in our society's development, distinguished by the rapid elevation of the national consciousness, the absence of a modern system of internationalist and atheistic education is leading to a situation in which the national consciousness is being filled with a largely religious content.

It is true that religion armed itself with the traditional moral precepts of national groups. The comrades addressing the discussion group spoke of the need to return to the national roots of education and appeal more frequently to the historical memory of the people. Although we must give religion credit for its role in shaping the spiritual culture and spiritual values of the national group, it would be wrong to confine ourselves to this approach. Speakers pointed out the need to see all of the sources of the cultural progress of each nationality and take a dialectical approach to the assessment of religion's role, avoiding cases in which the traditions of one ethnic group are contrasted to the traditions of another. In exactly the same way, we must acknowledge religion's contribution to the development of moral values, but we cannot give religious organizations complete control of moral education.

Speakers commented that the position taken by progressive religious leaders, who have repeatedly issued appeals for the cessation of hostile actions whenever inter-ethnic conflicts have broken out, warrants approval. Nevertheless, although these appeals have had some positive influence, they did not have the necessary effect even on believers.

According to several participants in the discussion group, the perestroika in the relations between the state and religious organizations to date has justified primarily the expectations of members of the Russian Orthodox religion. There are still many problems, however, in the registration of a significant number of Muslim religious associations, contradictory opinions have been expressed with regard to the registration of the Greek Catholic Church in the Ukraine, etc. This is seen as one of the reasons for the aggravation of the situation in several regions where Islam has traditionally been the common religion (Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus) and in the western oblasts of the Ukraine.

There is a stronger tendency to combine religious extremism with nationalism. Religious slogans have already been used in several inter-ethnic conflicts, including those in Sumgait and Fergana Oblast. Using

the pretext of ethnic revival, Islamic extremists, for example, are instructing the population to follow the Koran's instructions on the seclusion of women and the self-isolation of Muslims from other segments of the population. They sometimes interpret perestroika as an Islamic revolution. In the Baltic republics, extremists are spreading rumors that civilized contact with the people of Europe will only be possible on the basis of "Christian democracy."

All of this testifies that religion is being used to achieve political aims and that this has already led to the creation of various unofficial pseudo-religious organizations. Sometimes the outlines of nationalist aims can be discerned in their eclectic theoretical platforms, and this is a matter of serious concern.

Unfortunately, the dialogue between Communists and believers is still quite sluggish, and no work at all is being done to organize a dialogue between the believers in different religious traditions on opposite sides in the conflicts.

Speakers also commented on several other issues, including the impermissibility of the authoritarianism which still exists in matters connected with national holidays and traditional rituals. They mentioned the insufficient impact of atheistic education. Some speakers pointed out the fact that laws on religious cults are worded in such a way that they apply primarily to the Russian Orthodox Church and are difficult to apply to other religions.

Several recommendations were drafted with regard to the scientific investigation of this subject matter and the specific steps which must be taken in the near future.

There were two more discussion groups. The topic of one was "Ecology and Nationality," and the other group discussed the role and place of publishing and the book trade in inter-ethnic relations.

Reports on the results of the work in discussion groups and on the specific proposals submitted by participants in the discussion were presented at the final plenary meeting.

Academician G.L. Smirnov made some concluding remarks at the meeting.

In a certain sense, he said, this roundtable exceeded our expectations—the number of people, their enthusiasm, the insightful judgments, and the objectivity with which topics were suggested for discussion. Of course, the passage of time will make more profound and more balanced judgments possible.

We will be able to use the proceedings of these debates as the basis for proposals to submit to the party Central Committee. Many of the reports will be published. This is almost the entire program of the Sector on Ethnic Relations of the IML of the CPSU Central Committee.

Nevertheless, I have the feeling that our analysis lacks depth. You might say that those who presented the reports set the example. I can agree with this, but only in part, because we raised several issues of a fundamental nature in the reports which were regrettably ignored by the round-table. The discussion of current economic, political, social, and ecological problems took the place of theoretical deliberations. In my opinion, this did not happen because the people gathered here are incapable of discussing theoretical matters, but because these disturbing, controversial, and burning issues of vital importance took the forefront "of their own volition" and kept us from taking a deeper look into the theoretical essence of these problems, disclosing their distinctive features, and drafting recommendations for science and practice on this basis.

I was personally amazed by the inflexibility and heated confrontations I saw in the discussion group on inter-ethnic conflicts in regions with a diversified ethnic composition. I think that E.N. Ozheganov, one of the leaders of this group, presented a fundamentally accurate description of the methodological and theoretical weakness of the scholars from several union republics who refused to consider one another's points of view. And this occurred in spite of the fact that several of M.S. Gorbachev's recent speeches have underscored the importance of the convergence of ethnic groups, cooperation, and the avoidance of ideological confrontations. Stereotypes based on the mindset of suspicion and enmity are still alive in our minds. The time for this mindset has passed or is passing, or it might be better and more correct to say that it must pass, and that all of us must work persistently toward this end.

Some historians, instead of doing positive work, are displaying too much emotion in deciding, for example, which religious current owns one of the oldest churches in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. After all, it is a good thing to have such a fine old monument. Let the scholars try to prove who built it, but why should the people's emotions be stirred up over this? What I heard astounded me. If these are the people who head ideological establishments, how are they educating their own people? We cannot wait until the end of the century for peace in this region!

As a Soviet individual, I want the inter-ethnic conflicts to come to an end so that we can help these people return to the peaceful life they were living for centuries. We must do everything within our power to help people work toward unification. If we are incapable of doing this, let us give up our place to others. This is how things stand.

Many speakers suggested the creation of a strong scientific organization to deal with the issue of nationality. This is so long overdue and we are so far behind the civilized world that no amount of criticism will help here. After all, we have many subdivisions dealing with the issues of inter-ethnic relations in the branches of our institute, but we still get our information from newspapers and personal impressions. We still have no genuinely scientific studies based on advanced methodology. Until we do, it does not matter how

much we criticize the social scientists, it is useless to ask them for this kind of research.

The attempts to question the ethnic affiliations of various groups in the regions with a diversified ethnic composition—Mtskheta Turks, Armenians, Azeris, Abkhaz, and others—were called impermissible in some discussion groups. It is all the more impermissible to try to base policy on nationalities on the restriction of their rights in these regions. Comrades believe that this should be repudiated. I think we should also reveal the groundlessness of the idea of the "priority of the exclusive rights of the Korean nationality." We do, however, share the concern of small nationalities about the difficulties they are experiencing as a result of technocratic expansion in their regions and as a result of the prevalence of the Russian language. These are the facts, this is life, and we must give the matter thorough consideration and decide whether the republics did the right thing when they defined several priority rights for the local population and limited some rights, including election rights, for those who arrived in the republic just recently.

You remember that K.S. Khallik made a statement in the most resolute tones at the plenary meeting. She believes that the political system in our country and other socialist countries is incapable of resolving the issue of nationality. Unfortunately, her statement was discussed at length only in the first discussion group. Several of the documents of sociopolitical movements also say that the CPSU is unable, is in no position, to direct perestroika and the improvement of inter-ethnic relations and that they must be directed by the nation. This seems groundless. Of course, the nation can direct perestroika, but why is it impossible for this to be done by, for instance, a class?

The important thing here is not that the nation is being substituted for the class, but that attempts are being made to substitute other political organizations for the CPSU. Theories of this kind have been coming to us from the West for a long time, and there is no reason to take offense when we describe these assertions as the ideological position which has been the norm for years in Western Sovietological examinations of the state of affairs in the Soviet Union.

We are looking at Western Sovietologists from a different vantage point today. We know that they know more about us in many respects than we know about ourselves. One Sovietologist who has been extremely dependable in his treatment of us is Stephen Cohen, whom I know quite well. His books on the 1920's and on Bukharin are the kind of thing we simply have never had, and we now have to either study Bukharin through his own works, which is not easy to do because we have so few of his books, or use the works of Stephen Cohen for this purpose.

We cannot say, however, that all of the scientific goods produced in the West have a beneficial effect. We believed and still believe that the party began perestroika, the party is conducting perestroika, the party heads perestroika, and the party has no intention of relinquishing control of it.

I do not want to oversimplify the matter. Everything I have said could be disputed, and people could argue with me, but I do have the right to state my own point of view.

After all, things have now even reached the point at which some people are no longer happy with the concept of "the new historical community of the Soviet national group." No serious scholar has ever regarded the Soviet people as an ethnic community. This simply means that the Soviet people are a political community and, to some extent, a historical and social community. This never sounded odd to anyone before. The Soviet national group exists. This is a fact. But when some people go so far as to say that we do not even have a common history, I am always amazed. Was there no October Revolution for the different nationalities in our country? Was there no Civil War, was there no construction of socialism, was there no Great Patriotic War, was there no cult of personality which hurt all of us? This is what we have in common, this is our common history. All of us must work together to learn all of the details of this history.

When we are working in this field, we should not discard all of the concepts that came into being and entered our

minds as scientific terms. We must not think that everything we created is so bad and evil. M.S. Gorbachev has repeatedly referred to the historic role of the Soviet regime. It was within its framework that the peoples of our country traveled the long road of economic, social, and cultural development. There were many difficulties along this road. Today, while we are working toward the objectives of perestroika, we must resolutely get rid of everything that led us into crisis situations and that gave rise to numerous problems in the structure of government, in the economy, in the social sphere, and in inter-ethnic relations, but we also have something of value. We must, G.L. Smirnov said in conclusion, value our own history and we must value the collective achievements of people of different nationalities in our country.

Footnotes

1. V.Ye. Melnichenko, "Was Kh.G. Rakovskiy a Confederalist?", VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, 1989, No 7.
2. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 54, p 22.

Estonian People's Front Leaders Quoted in Armenian Press*90UN00344 Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
7 Sep 89 p 3*

[Article by S. Arutyunyan: "Estonia and Restructuring: Indivisible Concepts"]

[Text] Yes, Estonia and restructuring—today it is impossible to separate these concepts. Armenia and restructuring—unfortunately, can be separated, although in Armenia, also, restructuring has stirred more than a few hopes, and has awakened the intrinsic forces of the people. It is because of this that we follow the events in the Northwest of our united federation so intently. And even though the information that is accessible to the majority comes to us exclusively through the central channels, and only in a form that is convenient for the central mass information media, this cannot hide the essence of what is occurring. First of all, because in the long run, the essence and core of the processes of restructuring are unalterable, regardless of the geographical latitude and the number of sunny days in the year. And second, because the experience of the "Armenian restructuring," begun by the people in February of last year, allows us to orient ourselves flawlessly in the current political situation, to guess where the underwater currents are, to read between the lines, and, finally, to see behind all of this the contours of a general policy. An Armenian, regardless of differences in temperament, will understand an Estonian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Moldavian, without extra words and explanations—even if they must converse in gestures. And mutual understanding, mutual interest—is the basis of bases for any union, any federation. Moreover, it is a guarantee of the irreversibility of the revolutionary processes of our society's reeducation, of a rejection of stale ideological dogmas and hierarchical command structures in favor of flexible democratic mechanisms of administration and public self-regulation. In the sphere of inter-nationality relations, as well. Today we talk of sovereignty, of regional economic accounting at the tops of our voices... Unfortunately, for now it is only talk.

The general program of the Estonian People's Front [NFE] was adopted at the People's Front's Founding Congress in October, 1988. Almost a year has passed, and soon the second Congress of the NFE will meet. What are the preliminary results? How are the processes developing in the republic? What kind of mutual relations are there with the party leadership? This circle of questions was touched upon in conversations with NFE Council representative members artist Paul Allik; Sulev Valner, editor of the newspaper BABA MAA (FREE LAND, organ of the NFE); and Kal Niydusaar, deputy to the chief power specialist at the Dvigatel factory.

[Paul Allik] The prerequisites for the renovation of Estonian society are contained in the democratic parliamentary traditions of our people's past, in the elimination of serfdom a half-century earlier than in the other

provinces of the Russian Empire, in the experience of the bourgeois democracy of the 20s through the 40s. We remember all of this perfectly, and we are attempting to reactivate the best of this experience today. The closeness of Finland has played a large role, too, as a supplementary independent channel of information about events taking place in the world, as well as a connection with Estonian emigrés, who have helped us to understand that democracy and economic well-being are bound indissolubly together. And more about traditions—Estonians have never been outstanding for heightened emotionality, and have been more patient in their relations with others. This has always aided us. The European democratic tradition assumes a preference for intellectual strength to the strength of the fist and the exaltation of the emotions. This means, on the basis of general interests, joining together and acting in accordance with people who do not think as we do in every way. He who is not with us is against us—does this not find the sorest scar here in our consciousness, left by years of fear and stagnation? Political culture means the ability to carry on with one's opponents a dignified, courageous dialogue. This should aid us in the current situation, when life has become politicized to an extreme. For example, why have I, an artist, become involved in politics? Because not long ago, I unexpectedly got the feeling that I could realize myself in this sphere. Yes, and in my opinion, not only I. Many of us were not professional politicians, and, in one way, this is pleasant and fresh, as these people are free of political clichés.

The process of becoming aware of one's political interests is peculiar to the entire society and to various social groups. But if a year and a half ago, when the idea of the People's Front had just been born, it seized, almost without argument, everyone, then today the present differentiation of processes—the many parallel movements and various groups, which in the spirit of pluralism announce themselves at the tops of their voices, are defending their views and their way in politics. This is the Estonian "Greens" movement, the Estonian Society for Preserving the Monuments of Antiquity, the Party for National Independence and many others, some of which have radical aims, and attempt to force the logical flow of processes, do not admit compromises, believe that sovereignty is possible only within the framework of an independent state, and reproach the People's Front for cooperating with party and Soviet organs. In this situation the most important thing is a clear-cut balance of actions, and maintaining an equilibrium and stability in the inter-relations between the political forces operating in the society. If we do not have sufficient wisdom, this matter could come to open conflict. And this we cannot permit, because conflict—is a lever for a different species of political manipulations in the hands of the conservative forces, and it is also an excellent excuse for interference in our affairs from the outside...

And what kinds of levers do we have in our hands? They are, first of all, the successful work of our deputies at the

Congress, where many of our ideas gained not only an all-union audience, but support, as well. We are often asked the question: how did Moscow let you do this? The answer is, that we would have done it anyway—and Moscow knows it. Now it is just easier for us.

A little on the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. This was a natural step, with all the consequences that flowed from it. It is worthy of note that not long ago, V. Falin announced on television that the secret documents do exist, but that the problem is, how they will be interpreted and presented to the [Soviet] Union's public opinion. At first glance, this is a local question, concerning only the Baltic republics and giving nothing to, say, Georgia or Armenia. However, one may count on solving each of these local questions within the framework of the Union only under conditions of a consolidation of progressive forces, and the presence of close deputy ties, regulating the tactics of actions.

[Sulev Valner] Our newspaper BABA MAA has been coming out since March of this year, once a week. For some, this could be a surprise, since the People's Front was founded significantly earlier. But at the same time, we felt no acute need for our own paid organ, since from the beginning many periodical publications supported the NFE, many highly visible journalists entered the NFE's administration, and there were practically no problems with the publication of speeches, petitions or other NFE documents. Incidentally, in Lithuania, where the official press was closed for Sayudis, there is a very strong newspaper called SOGLASIYE [Agreement]. We were in a worse situation, because we get too little attention. I think that this is in some sense due to our being so close at hand, because at some moment the official press could close its doors to the NFE, replace kindness with anger—and what then? Where could we publish our materials? We have all of four staff workers (this is too few, we simply cannot keep up) and a circulation of 15,000, although the demand is much greater. There are great difficulties with paper. These problems are fairly easy to solve on the level of the People's Front administration. We must simply attend to them with all seriousness. Not long ago, we received permission to increase our circulation to 50,000 (there is just nowhere to print a larger circulation). But this was not the end, either. So, our second issue, of March 23, where we presented the NFE candidates at the elections for people's deputies, came out with a circulation of 90,000. This, indubitably, had a certain influence on the results of the voting.

Our main goal was and is to serve as a reliable support for the People's Front. With what are we heading to our second Congress? With a more clear program and better defined goals. So, if for the First Congress the principle of sovereignty was only outlined, then today it flows into concrete draft laws—in particular, the Draft Law on Elections to Local Soviets of Deputies. The next step is the Law on the Referendum, as the brightest expression of the people's will. The NFE has taken a course towards a referendum on questions of self-determination. This,

in principle, is in the tactical arguments plan. A different opinion is held by, let us say, the Independence Party, which, appealing to an international right, brings, as its main argument, the Tartu Peace Agreement of 1920 between Soviet Russia and Estonia. Until now, no one has annulled it, and this means, according to legal logic, that what occurred in 1940 is known as nothing other than occupation and annexation. In other words, there is the opinion that we do not need to create a new state, or raise the question of secession from the USSR (it works out that we never entered it)—we need step by step to insist on the admission of historical facts.

The People's Front does not share this position, it considers it to be self-deception. There is no realistic way to prove one's case this way, since international rights simply do not function under our conditions.

How are relations with the Estonian CP, and with the government? What evoked the large-scale organizational changes in the higher echelons of party authority last year and this year? Of course, the development of the movement in support of restructuring, the NFE's activities, and the activization of progressive public forces. There was a moment of crisis when we had to decide: this—or that. June 16 of last year the first secretary of the Estonian CP Central Committee was removed, and on June 17 the first big meeting under the aegis of the NFE was held, which the former first secretary had intended to break up. In its turn, the 11th Plenum of the Estonian CP Central Committee decided with complete responsibility to go with the people and to be guided by their consciousness, by their interests.

And I still cannot help saying that, regardless of its defense of the leading positions in words, the party is slow in its actions, and does not always follow through with them. The party is still not completely open to the people, it is carrying a lot of ballast, and in order to make claim to the leading role, to return its authority and receive the support of the majority, it must enter a competitive battle with other political forces. This is reality, which you will never get away from. As Mikk Titma, our new Central Committee secretary of Ideology, said in one of his speeches, the political future of Estonia is a multi-party system. And this is a more sober approach to the present situation.

[Kalyu Niydusaar] I am the representative of the People's Front group at the Dvigatel factory. So that you can imagine the complexity of the situation at this factory, I will say that this is an enterprise under all-union command, with a basically Russian-speaking work population. Its director is V.I. Yarovoy, USSR people's deputy, one of the organizers and inspirers of Interdvizheniye [Intermovement]. And so, I can observe the workings of the "mechanism" from within, and I can announce with complete responsibility that the whole idea of Interdvizheniye is aimed at negation. But negation has never been a principle of development, or movement. I remember how our group began its work with an attempt to organize courses in the Estonian language at the

factory. At that time a strange incident occurred: the teachers of Estonian were not allowed onto the territory of the factory, even though people were waiting for them. This was followed by a call to the director's office, and the announcement of an ultimatum that if we were going to continue to agitate in the style of the Estonian CP's political line, than the NFE support group would not be held at the factory. If I were to disobey him, I would find myself outside the gates. At the group meeting, I asked: "Do we continue?" They answered me: "We do!" More than once I have watched certain official persons of a defined type sowing distrust towards Estonians among the workers, confusing the Russian-speaking population. This is a tactic, because all actions of Interfront—be it the Congress held on March 5, or meetings—that in the end led to an escalation of strain and purposefully pushed the Russian-speaking population out of equilibrium. The leaders of Interdvizheniya, of the United Council of Labor Collectives, of the section of Veterans of the Armed Forces and Soldiers-Internationalists want to present themselves as the sole defenders of the interests of Estonia's Russian-speaking population. They speak out against the Law on Language, the Law on Elections to Local Soviets, against qualification based on way of life, against IME, against the concept of "citizenship." Supported by all-union forces, opposing democratization, organized political strikes and lockouts, they want to make the granting of economic independence to Estonia and its implementation impossible. All of this allows one to speak of the formation of an antidemocratic front. So, the United Council of Labor Collectives, gathering under its wing the enterprises under all-union command, is attempting to concentrate large sums of money in its hands, and to gain a monopoly on administration. They are planning to create an alternative program as a counter-balance to an economically accountable Estonia. To this end, they are attempting to frighten and convince people that the bad Estonians want to do something that is not good with the non-Estonians. But if things are good for the Estonians on their land, then things will be good for everyone else here, too.

You will agree that it is difficult not to agree with this argument. However, the enemies of the NFE have their own arguments, many of which TsT [Central Television] has effectively adopted in its latest daily reports from the Baltic. It is a blessing that the times of the monopoly on information have remained in the past. For this reason, I will conclude with the words of Estonian Supreme Soviet Deputy T. Kork: "...To fight for Estonia does not mean to fight against whomever there is, including Russia. This is a battle for the Russian people's attempt to have a normal life, as well. I ask you...to think about what we want. Do we want to live humanely in the future, or, like before, to enter the eightieth percentile of countries rated by standard of living, finding ourselves still further from freedom? Let us think about this in the name of our children..."

Uzbek CP Approves Changes in Republic Periodicals

90US0061A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
17 Sep 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Uzbek CP Central Committee"]

[Text] The question of the revival of the publication of a number of rayon newspapers, the change of names, volumes, and the periodicity, and the duplication in other languages of individual local publications and publications published in large editions.

In connection with the transfer of part of the territory of Samarkand Oblast into the composition of Bukhara Oblast and the revival of the activity of a number of party committees, as well as taking into account the proposals of party obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms concerning changing the names of newspapers, their volumes, the periodicity, and the duplication of already existing publications into other languages, the Uzbek CP Central Committee, in a resolution adopted on this question, instructed the Uzbek SSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing, Plants and the Book Trade and the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Communications to carry out the transfer of the printing and distribution of part of the edition of oblast newspapers for the transferred territory from Samarkand Oblast to Bukhara Oblast, in accordance with the ukase of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet of 16 May 1989.

Adopted were the proposals of the Andizhan, Bukhara, Namangan, Samarkand, and Fergana party obkoms concerning the revival, beginning on 1 January 1990, of the publication, in Uzbek, of the following rayon newspapers, with a volume of four type pages of half the format of PRAVDA, with a periodicity of four times a week and an initial edition of 3,000 copies each: BUZ KHAKIKATI (BOZKAYA PRAVDA) of Boz Raykom; YANGI KHAYET (NOVAYA ZHIZN) and MEKHNAT ZARBDORI (UDARNIK TRUDA) of Alat and Peshkunskiy raykoms; AVANGARD and CHARTAK KHAKIKATI (CHARTAKSKAYA PRAVDA) of the Narynskiy and Chartakskiy raykoms; KOSHRABAD of Koshrabad Raykom; MARKAZIY FARGONA (TSENTRALNAYA FERGANA) of Yazyavanskiy Raykom of the party and the rayon Soviets of People's Deputies.

Plans call for the organization, beginning on 1 January 1990, of the publication of the newspaper DUSTLIK BAYROGI (ZNAMYA DRUZHBY)—the organ of the Kuvasay Party Gorkom and the city Soviet of People's Deputies in Uzbek and Russian and the newspaper DOSTYK (DRUZHBA)—the organ of the Uchkudukskiy party raykom and the rayon Soviet of People's Deputies in Kazakh and Russian, with a volume of four type pages of half the format of the newspaper PRAVDA, with a periodicity of three issues a week, with an initial edition of 2,000 copies each. The party committees were given permission to independently establish the ratios for the languages in the newspaper issue.

It was decided to consider the newspapers KOMMUNIZM SARI and YANGIYUL the organs of the Dzhizak and Yangiyul party gorkoms and of the city and rayon Councils of People's Deputies, and the newspaper KOMMUNIZM BAYROGI of the Nukuskiy Party Raykom and the Rayon Council of People's Deputies, having abolished, as of 1 November 1989, the newspaper ZNAMYA KOMMUNIZMA in Russian.

It was acknowledged as expedient to agree with the proposals of the Samarkand, Fergana, and Kara-Kalpak party obkoms concerning the renaming, as of 1 October of this year, the newspaper KOLKHOZ KHAYETI (KOLKHOZNAYA ZHIZN) of Ishtykanskiy Rayon to OKTYABR YULIDAN (PO PUTI OKTYABRYA) and KOMMUNIZM YULI (PUT KOMMUNIZMA) of Kirovskiy Rayon to KOMMUNIST and TSELINNIIK KARAKALPAKII of the specialized Aralvodstroy Construction Association to GOLOS ARALA.

Satisfied was the request of the Bukhara, Namangan and Surkhan-Darya party obkoms in regard to the publication of one type page of the Bukhara, Chust, and Denau rayon newspapers LENIN BAYROGI, CHUST KHA-KIKATI, and GALABA UCHUN in Tajik, and KOMMUNISTIK ENBEK of Kanimekh Rayon—in Uzbek.

It was recommended to the Bukhara, Samarkand, and Tashkent party obkoms to publish the existing newspapers ANGRENSKAYA PRAVDA of the Angren, ALMALYK-SKIY RABOCHIIY of the Almalyk, SOTSIALISTICHESKIY CHIRCHIK of the Chirchik, ZARAFSHAN of the Kattakurgan and ZARAFSHANSKIY RABOCHIIY of the Zarafshan party gorkoms and the city Soviets of People's Deputies in Uzbek and Russian.

Adopted were the proposals of the Tashkent Party Obkom and Gorkom, as well as Uzbek SSR Ministry of Public Education:

—On the publication of the following existing large-circulation newspapers in Russian and Uzbek—TRAKTOROSTROITEL of the Tashkent Tractor Plant, FRUNZEVETS of the Uzbekselmash Production Association, UDARNIK of the Tashkent Aviation Production Association imeni Chkalov, ZAELETRIFIKATSIYU of the Sredazkabel Production Association, and SPUTNIK of the Mikond Plant;

—on the increase of the volume of the large-circulation newspapers TASHKENTSKIY UNIVERSITET of Tashkent State University imeni V.I. Lenin and SAMARKAND UNIVERSITETI of Samarkand State University imeni Alisher Navoiy to four type pages. To establish the circulation of TASHKENTSKIY UNIVERSITET at 5,000 copies;

—on the organization of the publication, in Uzbek, of the large-circulation newspapers ALGORITM and KIZIL BAYROK of the Tashkent Malika Knitted-Goods Production Association with a volume of four type pages of half the format of the newspaper PRAVDA, with a periodicity of two times a month

and the newspaper MONTAZHNIK of the Special Trust No 93 of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Installation and Special Construction Work in Russian, with a volume of two type pages of half the format of the newspaper PRAVDA, with a periodicity of four times a month and a circulation of 2,000 copies—within the limits of funds allocated to the enterprises for paper.

To organize, beginning on 1 November of this year, the publication, in Karakalpak and Russian, of the newspaper NOKIS KHKYYKATY (NUKUSSKAYA PRAVDA)—the organ of the Nukuskiy Party Gorkom and the city Soviet of People's Deputies—with a volume of four type pages of half the format of the newspaper PRAVDA, with a periodicity of three issues a week, with an initial circulation of 3,000 copies.

Proposals of the Syr-Darya Party Obkom and the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Culture were adopted concerning the publication, beginning in January 1990, of the weekly newspaper SYRDARE KINO KHAFTALIGI and KINO-NEDELYA SYRDARI in Uzbek and Russian, with a volume of four type pages of half of the format of the newspaper PRAVDA each.

The Uzbek State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade was ordered to take measures for the organization and timely publication of the indicated publications and the material-technical and financial provision of the editorial boards of the newspapers being newly created, to bring into line the staffs of the Samarkand and Bukhara oblast newspapers, as well as the city and rayon newspapers that are being duplicated.

The Uzbek SSR Ministry of Communications was instructed to introduce the corresponding changes in the catalogues of newspapers and journals of the Uzbek SSR, to inform the population and, where necessary, to organize additional subscription, taking into account the changes introduced by this decision.

The party obkoms, oblispolkoms and the Uzbek SSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade were obliged to bring up to strength the editorial boards of the newspapers with competent journalists, to organize the subscription to newspapers, and to improve the social and living conditions of journalists and polygraphic workers.

Information on AIDS Cases in Uzbek SSR Withheld from Press

90US0150A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 13 Oct 89 p 4

[Article by Sergey Svetlov: "We Will Frighten People: AIDS: An Attack on the USSR"]

[Text] From a report in the information bulletin published by the union-level Ministry of Health and entitled "AIDS in the USSR," the following has become patently clear: a carrier of the virus has been discovered in

Tashkent. He is not a foreigner, as has happened previously, but one of our own, a home-grown product.

For details we turned to the Tashkent Branch of the All-Union Institute of Immunology. There they confirmed the news as follows:

"Yes, the first virus-carrier in our republic has been discovered. Prior to this, positive tests for AIDS have turned up in seven persons, but they were all foreigners, and they have all been deported from the country. This one is an inhabitant of our republic."

"What can you tell us about him?"

"He is a young fellow, a Tashkenter, and a homosexual. He is now undergoing investigation in Moscow."

"Is anything known about his sexual partners: how many of them were there, and have they been found? Is there any danger of the disease spreading?"

"It would be better for you to direct these questions to the republic's Ministry of Health."

We telephoned the Ministry of Health and reached N.D. Dzhurayev, chief of the Epidemiology Division. The following dialogue ensued:

"What can you tell us..."

"Nothing."

"But why not?"

"We don't give out such information."

"What's the connection here?"

"Let's not frighten people. After the well-known case in Elista.... You understand, all information pertaining to AIDS we send on up, to the top persons in the republic. I can give you the facts regarding the foreigners. There are other interesting aspects to this problem.... Call us; we're always glad to oblige."

What a striking way of putting the matter! You want to write about AIDS—write about foreigners. It's as if the anatomy of a Soviet person were to be made up from other materials. Information is only for the republic's top persons. It's as if the top persons involved with this puzzle had a vaccine against the virus. And, on the other hand, there are other aspects of the problem....

It will be recalled that for many long years we have not been frightening people about catastrophes, epidemics, nor about drug addiction, prostitution, and crime. And now suddenly we have frightened them. So what? Has the world turned upside down?

But AIDS is another level of reality. We must speak about it more, as well as more often, and more honestly. That is what the medical people themselves think. For the only way to guard people against this disease up to now is, alas, to propagandize protective means and preventive work. In other words—information. And here it is suggested that we should play down the terrible news that AIDS has reached even our republic.

We will frighten people, and let's do so! It is necessary at this time. With regard to AIDS, fear is a necessary thing. A fear of promiscuously changing male and female sexual partners, a fear of not employing prophylactic means in sexual relations, a fear of sharing a single needle in a group of heroin addicts, a fear of placing a child under a dirty needle used by a careless nurse....

Newspaper people do not have free access to important information. It is as if public opinion and the people themselves are not supposed to know how great the danger is, whether it is localized to a group of possibly infected persons, and whether indeed this is the first virus-carrier. At the Epidemiology Division they obviously think that the newspaper is being excessively curious, that it is butting in to look for "strawberries." By no means! The newspaper considers it as its duty to warn its readers against the danger. AIDS is a direct danger, dammit, and it's no joking matter!

What we wanted, without giving his name nor occupation, nor even his age (that is not, after all, the main thing!) was to relate how this person was infected, and what life style led him to this terrible result. We wanted to tell our readers about the actions undertaken by various departments to prevent the spread of this disease, about how what happened has affected the relatives and close acquaintances of the virus-carrier—how it has affected their physical and moral health.... Our conviction is that in this matter we need the full, unstipulated, and exhaustive truth. Not for the sake of sensation, but for the sake of the lesson to be learned and as a warning to all of us.

...In connection with this, another issue has arisen which would seem to be far from the problems of AIDS. The 32nd point in the procedural work of the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet is the adoption of the Law on the Press. Certain deputies have expressed concern that matters might get as far as the 32nd point. This is cause for alarm. Glasnost remains in the clutches of the interests of ministries and departments; many of their attempts to conceal the actual state of affairs have been successful. Its price is the health, literacy, and tranquility of millions of people. Or their lives. This is no exaggeration.

Conservative Defense of Soviet History Sparks Debate

Defense of Soviet History

90US0082A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 Sep 89 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Letter to editors from Ignat Chebukin, CPSU member since May 1941 (Anapa, September 1989): "Letter from a Communist"]

[Text] Perestroyka in the party is being debated on an ever broader scale. Our newspaper has published an entire series of articles, letters, and interviews. They have evoked a steady flow of substantive, frank, and informative letters. Here is one of them....

It would be impossible to relate all of this in brief. The reason for my deep contemplation is a conversation I had at a meeting of the party commission of the Anapa CPSU Gorkom, of which I have been a member for more than 20 years now. It all began with a surprising remark by a close comrade with whom I had, as the saying goes, broken bread many times. We were talking about the country's difficulties and about the party's status in society.

"I am ashamed to be a member of the party," he suddenly exclaimed.

My reaction was instantaneous and blunt:

"Turn in your membership card and remove the cause of the 'shame'!"

He did not answer, but only gave me a guilty look.... Then he murmured an apology.

I was deeply stung by his remark. Was there really no good reason that I had belonged to the party for close to half a century, and had not only belonged to the party but cannot even conceive of life without it, without active and direct participation in its work? At the same meeting we recommended that the party gorkom bureau grant the request of two communists who wanted to leave the party. We read a statement by Aleksandr Ivanovich Litvinov, who had belonged to the party for 25 years.

"I am disillusioned and I no longer believe that I can do anything useful for perestroyka and for the party. More than a dozen of the acts, announcements, and appeals of the people's control group I headed could not break through the wall of indifference even here, in the gorkom."

We tried to convince him that he could not help perestroyka by leaving the party. We failed. He was preoccupied with his new interests—financial ones.

Statements are being made on noble pretexts and even in a self-condemnatory tone: "I have not lived up to the party's expectations" or "I do not deserve to be called a communist"....

Why all this self-castigation and all of these ruses? If you have lost faith in the party or do not want to take part of the blame (and it is partly yours) or if you do not want to make an effort to accomplish the massive tasks connected with perestroyka, just say so, without beating around the bush, say it like a man. Stop whining.

In comparison with these sly and pretentious individuals, the faces of the young and energetic workers and peasants and of people engaged in intellectual labor look even brighter and more noble and their statements sound more confident and assertive: "I want to belong to the party because I want to take an active part in perestroyka." When we ask them whether they are afraid to join the party, the answer is always a firm no. The leading milker from the Pervomayskiy Sovkhoz had a unique response:

"People who lie and steal should be ashamed, but I want to live a more honest life and do better work. I would like to see anyone else get the same milk yield."

No, not everyone can bear the heavy burden of the communist, but the party has the infinite support of the people and the deepest trust of all those who are used to living and thinking responsibly.

I think no other country and no other party has had a history as complex and dramatic as ours. They say that one fire in the home gives a family a century of problems, but what if there are several? The Bolsheviks took charge of a ravaged, hungry, and poverty-stricken Russia. Even before the war, in 1913, England and France had four times as much technical equipment as Russia, Germany had five times as much, and the United States had ten times as much. After escaping World War I, the country was plunged immediately into a particularly devastating civil war. The words of English writer Herbert Wells naturally come to mind: "It was not communism, but European imperialism that drew this huge tottering and bankrupt empire into 6 years of exhausting war. And it was not communism that tortured this suffering and nearly lifeless Russia, with outside help in the form of continuous attacks, invasions, and rebellions, and suffocated it with a monstrously brutal blockade."

"The vindictive French creditor and the obtuse English journalist are responsible for these death pangs."

In 1921, after making a colossal effort, the country was able to smelt only 128,000 tons of cast iron—the same amount as Russia had produced under Peter I—i.e., 200 years before. The wheat crisis, the threat of war, and Chamberlain's note...faced the country and the party with cardinal questions: What could they do, what should they do, what method should they employ to direct the development of the economy and the development of small-scale agriculture? The Prussian method or the American one? They chose collectivization.

The horrible events of the war were still alive in the people's memory. This is why the appeal "We must

surmount our underdevelopment in the next 10 years or we will be trampled!" was interpreted as the only chance of salvation. Emergency measures were set in motion, first on a temporary basis and then on a permanent one. Speed up and set the pace! It is useless to count on someone else or to expect help from anyone else.

The perversion of the methods and nature of collectivization was rationalized and minimized by the news media and was then mitigated by the general outburst of enthusiasm to join the "charge and assault" on underdevelopment and make Russia, the union, capable of producing everything and defending itself. And they succeeded. Despite all of the adversity, mistakes, and tragedies (of which the population at large was then almost unaware), by 1940 the country had risen from sixth to second place in the world and to first place in Europe in terms of its total industrial product.

The motherland was assaulted by 1,418 tragic days and nights of countless sacrifices, brutal destruction, and indescribable suffering. Nevertheless, the people bore all of this stoically and, in spite of everything, won a victory. The arsenal for it was established before the war—there is no need to prove this.

After all of the ordeals of war had come to an end, people thought that peace had arrived and they could finally heal their wounds, but this did not happen. In July 1946 a directive of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff already said: "We cannot allow the survival of a political system so antithetical to ours."

Then there were the later frank statements by Reagan and Weinberger about "effectively declaring economic and technical war on the Soviet Union by developing weapons with no Russian counterparts, forcing the Russians to make disproportionately high expenditures, establishing new fields of military competition, and seeing to the obsolescence of earlier Soviet capital investments."

And these statements were matched by actions. They surrounded the USSR with military bases and published maps depicting our territory pierced by the arrows of atomic strikes from these bases.

I think that this whole discussion is a necessary reminder of why our survival demanded that we tighten our belts once again. The economy was raped and overstrained to a horrifying degree for the achievement of military-strategic parity.

The enemies of socialism did not attain their main objective of destroying the Soviet regime. They did not destroy the USSR, but they did undermine our economy, caused it to detour from its true path of satisfying the material and cultural needs of the people to the maximum, pushed us into a ruinous arms race, and tried to discredit socialism in this way as a bankrupt social system and to demolish it from within. I am repeating well-known facts, but they are essential to an understanding of what is happening to us today.

Many people say that comparisons make everything clear, and then they cite the example of the United States' successes in economics and consumption. But could the confrontations with the economies of all developed capitalist states have been the wish or the fault of the Soviet economy? In this context, it is wrong, or even blasphemous, to compare the standards of living in the USSR and the United States.

Conditions in the United States were and are more favorable because of its frankly privileged position. It has the colossal wealth of the minerals the aggressive and ruthless conquistadors took away from the Indians, ideal natural and climatic conditions, and no potentially strong adversaries nearby. Not one enemy shell has fallen on the country for more than 120 years. When the wounded body of my motherland was being run over by the ruinous chariot of war and its blood was flowing, the U.S. economy was growing richer on military deliveries, and its losses in the war in the West and East were equivalent to only a fraction of the lives lost just in our Leningrad. This is not a matter of envy or regret that the United States was so lucky, but a mere statement of fact, of the realities of life, which must not be disregarded in any serious analysis of the situation.

It is just as wrong to varnish past achievements and to go into ecstasies over them as to indulge in the false and indiscriminate defamation of all past history. The outbursts of the emotional and ambitious celebrities who are burning everything good about the past out of our memory and are now rousing our passions to a white fury are immoral, and are therefore also unacceptable. This kind of false and irresponsible interpretation of the history of our own people cannot cultivate a love of mankind, respect, or mercy. Cruel thoughts give birth to cruel feelings and actions.

I am not saying we should disallow any criticism of the mistakes caused in the past by the distortion of socialism or of current shortcomings, but is this kind of careless denigration of our way of life and indiscriminate defamation of our history and the actions of our predecessors permissible? This kind of irresponsible attitude toward the past and the future will leave younger generations morally bankrupt and completely devoid of a history. It is being mangled and erased from memory. They have even made a "hole in the ozone," where black cockroaches race back and forth between gulags and jails, snatching and gobbling everything in their path. Their whiskered leader presides over this hell. Could delirium produce a more humiliating form of self-delusion and a more cynical form of self-destruction?! Obviously, people without a history are only a swarm of creatures. Even if despotism did exist in the past, could 2 million people with such a strong love of liberty turn themselves into brainless and submissive cattle?

No, the history of our country is much more complex and much richer.

Many people ask what we could have done. Stalin did whatever he wanted to do. How could socialism survive?...

It is amazing. All of us accept the postulate that history is created by the people. Even our life provides conclusive evidence of this. As soon as we start talking about history, however, the people, with their unshakable moral values, are disregarded and their constructive contribution to the historical process is completely ignored. It is a chameleon-like existence. The history of Russia was once related through biographies of the tsars, and now it is portrayed as the history of leaders, although the debt to the people should have been repaid long ago, in order to restore their honor and glory.

As a living witness of all the post-October years, I can say that the people built socialism. They built it on the ideals and instructions of Lenin. The exploitation of some people by others was eliminated, and the collectivist spirit and collective form of labor were established. The experience and achievements of some became the property and assets of others. A new form of human communication was created.

There is no question that Stalin distorted and deformed the method of building socialism and Lenin's view of socialism. The socialist cause suffered colossal damage as a result of authoritarian methods in the economy, the deformation of the humane essence of socialism in politics, repression and arbitrary decisions in the social sphere, and discrepancies between words and actions in the moral sphere. All of this certainly diminished the great potential of the new social order and kept it from displaying its full strength.

We must remember, however, that in spite of Stalin's omnipotence, he could not and did not divert us from the socialist path. The cause of socialism became the cause of the entire population.

The difficult situation was accompanied by arbitrary actions that caused many people to forget the real reasons for repression. Stalin's opponents abroad were "playing into his hands." Inside the country the NKVD was accused of failing to keep up with changes in the situation and was ordered to "make up for lost time." S.M. Kirov was assassinated. There were cases of sabotage, espionage, and subversive activity.... Stalin's own associates were repressed. One of the brothers of his loyal assistant Kaganovich was shot by a firing squad, and another of his brothers shot himself. Shvernik's son-in-law was executed. The wife of Kalinin, the union elder, was arrested and sent to a camp. Even the wife of Molotov, Stalin's "shadow," was arrested and imprisoned.

Many of those who were repressed compounded the problem. They slandered themselves and made up lies about their fellow party members and friends when they testified in court. And the people heard all of this on the radio, read it in the newspapers, and saw it in newsreels. They did not know that these people were trying to save themselves and their families by unjustly accusing and endangering others....

All of this created the real danger of subversive activity by the hostile capitalists surrounding us. Their secret agents were in our country.

A more or less complete understanding and objective judgment of those difficult years necessitates consideration for the concrete historical situation and a thorough analysis of intricately interwoven intergovernmental and international relations and the mental state of different social strata.

Take a look at the newsreels and documentary films of that time and you will see sincere expressions of emotion, genuine smiles, and exultant faces.... I was a young shepherd working for a kulak and knew nothing about what was happening there, at the top, but I will never forget the jaws of Cherkes, the dog the kulak Baranov sicked on me. And I do not try to tell people that the scar on my right leg is a war wound either.... I am fully aware that not all of them were brutes. There were hard-working men of integrity. There were those who did not agree with extreme penalties and there were the squealers who had been bought by the kulaks. In the heat of class agitation, they were all put in the same category and were repressed...and there is no excuse for this. Even then, however, I, and thousands or millions of people like me, felt and knew that the Soviet regime was our regime and that it had already given us a great deal. It had given the workers work and a certain degree of social protection. It had given the peasants land and literacy. Human beings who had not been treated as humans just yesterday were now watching movies, listening to the radio, watching plays.... They had been allowed to sample the arts and were being initiated into the mysteries of science. The people squared their shoulders and felt free for the first time. Now we know that this freedom was minimal, but, after all, some of the very best and noblest of our people never had any freedom at all. This is why Stakhanovs, Busygins, Khetagurovs, and Angelinas were born among us. We had all kinds—Papanin, Chelyuskin, Chkalov, Gromov, Polina Osipenko, Mariya Demchenko...and all of them were happy, fell in love, and got married.

A new human quality—Soviet pride—did not emerge from a vacuum. It was organically connected with the future of the motherland: "Let my native land live on...." This was the vital source and solid foundation of the mass heroism in the years of the Great Patriotic War. The lies of the fascist troubadours who announced that they had come to free our people from Bolshevism fooled only a negligible few. Even after all of the repression and lawlessness! The ideals of Lenin and the party withstood the most brutal tests. However tenacious the stereotypes of the grandeur of the generalissimus might have been, the party displayed a high level of political awareness and great civic courage by condemning the cult of personality and the actions of the "leader of the people" and by striving to correct all past mistakes.

The undeserved references to our generation as a pack of philistines and windbags are distressing and painful. This was the generation which saved the world from the brown plague and saved the Soviet people from extermination or bondage to the "thousand-year reich." This generation restored 1,700 cities that had been destroyed

by the enemy and rebuilt more than 70,000 burned villages. This generation led women and children out of cellars and dug-outs.

The indiscriminate defamation of the past and defilement of our history has only one clear purpose: to discredit October and the Communist Party. Several currents of the same type are moving in this direction.

The most venerable anticommunists, who conceal their nostalgia for the Russia of the gentry and the landowners, begin their attacks with pre-revolutionary days, with Lenin. After they have blamed October for the immoral seizure of power by the Bolsheviks and have depicted Lenin as an "exceptionally evil man," it is easier for them to build a bridge to Stalin and assert that he acted in exactly the same way as Lenin. They differ in caliber and weight, but they are united by their malicious anticommunism and are now attacking the party by taking advantage of our material and spiritual shortages, which were created largely with their help.

A second current stems directly from Stalin's repression. It unites those who were personally affected at that time, the friends and relatives of the victims of despotism, who are sincerely enraged by the completely unwarranted barbarism. Their genuine indignation is understandable, but it does not always justify emotional excesses, not to mention attempts to blame the entire party for the actions of a few individuals.

A third current, the most heterogeneous one, unites the loudest complainers, the most inveterate and intrusive opportunists, gutter extremists, blatant nationalists, and their criminal hangers-on. Their aims are different, but they all have the stench of anarchy in common. Some are riding the crest of the turbulent wave of emotions in the hope of earning political capital. They are opposing all types of authority and the institution of leadership but are simultaneously planning to direct the wave of spontaneous feelings and become leaders themselves. Others are prattling about the inexcusable lack of law and order so that they can use public discontent for their own selfish purposes. This heterogeneous mob has been joined by outright criminals, who hope to use this situation as a chance to create an atmosphere of complete permissiveness in the country and to organize muggings, robberies, and rapes in this bacchanalian atmosphere....

To win the reputation of ultra-principled and just people, they are aiming their poisoned arrows at the heart of the people—at my party. This is nothing new. The opponents and enemies of communism have used a variety of excuses to unite in the "righteous persecution of communism" ever since the publication of the "Communist Manifesto." Furthermore, those who were most obsessed with power and who were most rabid in their attempts to become leaders have been the loudest and fiercest of all in the castigation of leaders of any caliber. These less than clever tricks were cogently exposed by V.I. Lenin in his work "Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder."

Unfortunately, the news media, a powerful instrument created by the party, are often guilty of tendentious excesses themselves. The media played an important role in exposing the "blank spaces" and in developing an objective approach to the past, but why should the slogans of the plurality of opinions be used as a way of opening the floodgates for the indiscriminate defamation of party cadres and all communists by persistently putting the emphasis on largely imaginary benefits and privileges and by putting them all in the category of functionaries and bureaucrats? An outstanding production worker, a sensible, prudent, and intelligent man who is invited to join the party staff for the good of the cause, is immediately the target of repulsive epithets. A man of integrity who voluntarily joins the party and takes on additional responsibilities is immediately accused of every possible sin.

Today the materialistic consumer mentality is king: Give, give, give. But where will it all come from?

They point to the American abundance and deliberately say nothing about how hard the American works under the unblinking eye of the computer, about how efficiently he plans his work day. And his children, despite this abundance of goods (and perhaps this is why he has them), are not spoiled. They are taught to work hard from their earliest years, they learn to value the dollar, and they are trained to stay afloat in the harsh world of business. In our country, on the other hand, people lean over backwards to keep their offspring well-dressed and to justify their inactivity—"They are just getting used to things." And we keep letting them get used to things until they have to get used to a coffin, and it is as if they remain adolescents until they retire on a pension. It is time we remembered and observed the simple but wise saying that "the early bird gets the worm."

Are the complaints about the party fair? Yes, they are. Did it have flaws and make mistakes that inflicted considerable injury on the party itself and, consequently, on the people? Yes, it did. But the party was not afraid of suffering moral injury when it was the first to openly condemn the Stalin cult of personality, reveal its serious consequences, and reject the authoritarian method of leadership that had become an obstacle to development. It condemned the peace and harmony of the period of stagnation which fostered the lawlessness of the bureaucracy, the opportunism of the bootlickers, and the submission and apathy of the complacent.

The party followed Lenin's advice on shortcomings. "All of the revolutionary parties which perished in the past, perished because they became so conceited that they could not see their strengths and were afraid of admitting their weaknesses. We will not perish, because we are not afraid of admitting our weaknesses and we will learn to overcome our weaknesses."

When the party began the perestroika, the revolutionary renewal of society, it voluntarily put itself into the

custody of the people. Is this not a sign of the seriousness of the party and its policy?! And of its belief in its own strength?

Reality is already confirming this. Recent events in the Kuznetsk and Donetsk basins and in Fergana and other regions have made this clear. The miners who actively support perestroyka wanted to be free of the leadership of not communists in general, but of the specific individuals guilty of impeding it. It was no coincidence that more than 50 percent of the people elected to serve on strike committees were communists. The instigators of extremist demonstrations directed their attacks at party gorkoms and raykoms. People were seeking protection from the violence and brutality of the extremists, and they were seeking this protection from the party gorkoms and raykoms.

This made everything clear. It revealed the place and role of the party and its members in extreme situations.

When we look at current events in our country, we can still see so many violations and distortions of morality and ethics, mismanagement and irresponsibility, laziness and spineless indifference, arrogance and bureaucratism. But what if there were no party?! What kind of wretched excesses of permissiveness, disorder, arbitrary behavior and lawlessness might flourish then? Who would curb the pernicious vices of irresponsible bureaucrats?!

Today the people are less upset by the shortages of food and other goods than by the outrageously unfair behavior of callous bureaucratized party officials. They say there should be several parties, as there are "over there." I ask you, what is the difference between the "donkey" and the "elephant" in the United States or the 40-odd parties in other countries? Everything must be done for the good of the people, for the freedom of the people, they shout. No, the value of parties does not depend on their number. People in the United States ceased to expect anything from elections long ago. They are disillusioned. In 1988 only 50 percent of the voters cast their ballots in the presidential election. The President was elected by only 26.9 percent of the voters.

I am certain that what we need is not a multiple-party system, but alternative opinions in a single party, socialist pluralism in a single party and in our state. This is the only way of achieving genuine, and not formal, unity. This is the only way of involving the collective mind in making the best decisions and involving the public at large in carrying out these decisions.

The need to enhance the prestige of the party is certainly the main concern of the communists in party organs, but this should be the concern, in my opinion, of everyone who wants perestroyka to succeed, because the Communist Party is its initiator and its architect.

What role should party members play in this work?

I believe that the first thing they must do is revive the respectful and commendable opinion—"Well, after all, he is

a communist!"—and put an end to the disgraceful insult—"In addition to his other faults, he is a communist!"

How can this be done? It will entail the complete restoration of the qualities demanded by the CPSU Charter: honesty and discretion, exemplary and principled behavior, a lack of ostentation, intolerance for shortcomings in work, interpersonal relationships, and behavior, discipline and order, and a high level of ideological and political activity.

I am surprised and disturbed by arrogance. Some individuals quickly erect a "Great Wall of China" to separate themselves from others as soon as they sit down in the director's chair, before they have even had time to warm it up. One of these even advanced the theory that a person cannot retain his sense of leadership unless he keeps others at a distance. But after all, the great moralist L.N. Tolstoy said that simplicity is the main criterion of moral beauty. He always acted according to his own precepts, and I also strive to do this. Believe me, when people call me on the phone, come to see me, or write me letters, I feel a sense of incomparable joy. Of course, this is troublesome work, but it is so pleasant to know that people trust you and come to you with their problems, and to therefore know that people need you.

There are still so many cases, however, of habitual irresponsibility. Once when I presented a lecture in one of the divisions of the Sovkhoz imeni Lenin, I learned that there had been no bread for sale for more than a month, and that when there was bread, it was moldy. I asked why. They answered, "Everyone knows," and they pointed upward.

You see how simple things can be.... You do not have to do your work to live.

But after all, it is the job of the communist to know what people need and to sense the mood of the group and the atmosphere in the group. He must also know the best and most efficient way of correcting the situation and influencing the people's mood.

Party gorkoms and raykoms have a special role to play.

They have sufficiently strong levers of influence and power, but people also judge their authority by the actions and behavior of specific party officials, by their accessibility, and by their willingness to take the feelings and needs of people fully into consideration.

Unfortunately, party officials often make decisions without the help of the public at large, without the participation of those who will be affected by the decisions. This is followed by protests and causes friction.... Just consider, for example, how many emotions were stirred up in Anapa because of two interrelated matters: the construction of a new building for the party gorkom on land taken away from the Sanatorium imeni N.K. Krupskaya, and the expediency of having two executive committees—city and rayon ispolkoms—with a staff of over 140 people for a population of only 100,000. Oddly

enough, the heads of the party gorkom put up the strongest resistance. Public pressure continued to be exerted. Finally a solution worthy of Solomon was found. Instead of making staff reductions in the ispolkoms and moving the party gorkom onto the same premises, they simply stopped the construction of the new gorkom building. They left a time-bomb.

The issue of cadres is one of the party's main concerns. In my opinion, serious efforts to deal with this matter on the basis of maximum glasnost and democratic principles are long overdue. All elected offices in party organs and organizations should be filled only on an alternative basis. The privileges of a certain group of party officials must be eliminated unconditionally. The essential party officials should be nominated by work teams and party organizations. This will prevent the choice of cadres solely on the basis of personal affection or personal loyalty. This procedure will also obligate the leaders of groups to consider the opinion of group members, will enhance the prestige of the nominee, will give him social protection from unwarranted accusations and insulting labels, and will also increase his sense of personal responsibility for the group nominating him.

It would be best if he could remain accountable, when possible, to the party organization where he worked. He should report to the team nominating him at least once a year on his work and on the work of the party organ.

I think it would be best for active public spokesmen who like to work with people to be trained as party cadres in VUZ's. They should be taught the fundamentals of pedagogics, psychology, and logic and the basics of production and of forms and methods of ideological and party organizational work.

Instead of the discredited bureaucratic nucleus, it is time to have a cadre reserve for promotion to administrative positions, made up of communists and non-members. It should be formed not by administrators, but by work teams, and in open and democratic procedures. Gorkoms, raykoms, and primary organizations should work with them regularly.

Finally, we must realize that the people see everything, know everything, and judge the professional and personal worth of each individual by his actions. The people will not tolerate duplicity. We curse the authoritarian method of management but we are still using it everywhere. We criticize hasty decisions but we are constantly copying them. We are upset by rising prices but we are raising them everywhere.

Why have we not taken the time to seriously analyze the causes of the rapid growth of crime, prostitution, drug addiction, callousness, and violence?... Do we realize the pernicious effects of the indiscriminate defamation of past decades, the evil role of the lack of respect for the older generation and the vulgar stories about the immorality of fathers and mothers and of grandfathers and grandmothers? Now we are trying to teach our children and grandchildren to be kind and to love other people.

Hatred for the past cannot cultivate sincerity in the future. And we are constantly complicating this process. The video opium the people are swallowing is dulling their minds and senses with unrestricted portrayals of violence, murder, and immoral behavior. Money and profits.... Any means and any methods. Are these the idols we should worship?

We cannot unthinkingly agree with the theory of the "convergence" of the social systems, but we also cannot maintain our dogmatic stance and reject all new developments, interdependence, interpenetration, and mutual enrichment with experience and with forms and methods of development. Unfortunately, the concept of the socialist pluralism of forms of ownership has led some people to insist on the possibility of private ownership of the tools and means of production in the socialist society and to allow the hiring of manpower, which, in their opinion, does not represent the exploitation of some people by others. But is this not being done for the unimpeded acquisition of the products of surplus labor and sometimes even part of necessary labor? After all, who will hire scarce labor?! The surplus product they acquire will heighten social inequality and intensify the stratification of society in terms of property status, with all of the ensuing consequences.

It is only one step from here to the birth and justification of the egotism of the private owner, to the disregard of socialist values, to the denial of revolutionary traditions, to the deformation of moral precepts, and to a prevalence of permissiveness and a hunger for wealth.

This is why the poisoned arrows of hatred, hostility, and slander are being aimed primarily against those who oppose these treacherous plans, against the party and law enforcement agencies.

The existence of the many different types of so-called informal organizations reflects the different interests of their members. Democracy has provided opportunities for free self-expression. People have plunged headlong into the flood of glasnost, rushing to get ahead of everyone else and deafening others with their impatience. Unfortunately, some economic initiatives quickly led to different varieties of parasitism and found a common language with nationalist extremism, which was merged closely with the criminal mentality. It is so important for the party to occupy its rightful position in this atmosphere and to direct all of the many currents into constructive channels and involve them in the overall process of perestroika.

Human reasoning abilities are cultivated by the society on the basis of labor, combat, revolutionary, and historical traditions, become part of the individual's character, and are polished by his conscience during his lifetime. The best human qualities cannot be cultivated without good examples. For some reason, however, we are shamefully concealing all of the information about our glorious party members under the pressure of the muddy stream of slander—information about those who faced

death for the sake of the people's happiness in the struggle against tsarism and its satraps, and about those who were burned in the fire-boxes of locomotives. We are demanding their repudiation! During the years of the horrible ordeals of the Great Patriotic War, the fighting party lost half of its members in battle, but the great faith in its just cause doubled its membership, and the new members were those who proved their loyalty to the great ideals with their blood and their lives.

When you read requests for membership in the CPSU today, you see the same unquenchable faith in the party. After all, it is no secret that it takes courage to become a communist in the complex atmosphere of the present day. But people are becoming communists, and they are many in number. There is no question that they will lead the work of perestroika to the successful completion of the revolutionary transformation of our society.

Critique of Defense

90US0082B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Sep 89
Morning Edition p 6

[Article by Yuriy Makarov: "Confession of a Slanderer"]

[Text] Respected Departments! Dear Comrades! Citizen Chief!

I cannot remain silent any longer. Today, now that almost all forces for perestroika are feverishly searching for anti-perestroika forces..., now that questions like "How much?" or "Who was the last?" or "How much for each?" are being replaced everywhere with the unanimous question "Who is to blame?!"..., now that it seems that the upper levels want to do it and the lower levels can do it, and vice versa, but still..., in this atmosphere of the unionwide search for enemies of everything good, I have decided to make an important confession: I am the one.

I was the one, along with others like me (yes, yes, there is a whole conspiracy!), who has been using my professional standing and office supplies to describe our wonderful life tendentiously in the news media for 5 years, regardless of what might be, or of what might be lacking.

We are the ones who have given up our principles and are using the pages and screens of the media to incite our heroic people to stop feeling proud of not only each day they have lived, but also of some years or whole decades in our glorious history.

We are responsible for the reports on Chernobyl and drug addiction, Sumgait and inflation, Fergana and the black market. If it had not been for our tendency to frighten the people with these and other problems, no one would ever have heard of them. And we can assume that whatever no one has heard of does not exist.

After all, it would be so easy to arrange for a good life!

If there had been no Abuladze in the movie theaters, no Rybakov in journals, no Dudintsev in books, and no

Solzhenitsyn in the country, then people would ask: "Was there any repression?"

None at all!

If every newspaper reported the friendship among nationalities and if every picture portrayed children of different nationalities hugging each other and joyfully saluting the latest leader, then people would ask: "Are there any inter-ethnic problems?"

Not one!

If all we saw on the screen was portrayals of chewing and singing kolkhoz members alternating with scenes of dancing and snacking workers, then people would ask: "Are economic failures and social upheavals possible in our country?"

Never!

Until the slanderers penetrated the press, infiltrated the arts, and pushed their way into literature, everything in the country was wonderful. There was no cult of personality, there was no hunger, and there were no Crimean Tatars. Comrade Ignat Chebukin is right about what he says in his letter in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on 19 September:

"Take a look at the newsreels and documentary films of that time and you will see sincere expressions of emotion, genuine smiles, and exultant faces...."

I must admit, respected departments, dear comrades, and citizen chief, that I have been troubled for a long time by a guilty conscience and have felt pangs because my heart is filled with the poison of slander. What finally made me confess, however, was the modest letter from the rank-and-file communist in Anapa, which took up half of the first page and half of the second in a central newspaper.

During all the years of slander and defamation, this is only the second such letter in which a common citizen no one knows has been able to present his manifesto, sparing no enemies and no paper. By a lucky coincidence, both were printed in the same newspaper! We can only congratulate the subscribers to SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

The letter from Anapa once again put all of us in our place, not leaving the slightest opening for us indiscriminate defamers, or, as Comrade Chebukin put it so eloquently, "ambitious celebrities who are burning everything good about the past out of our memory and are now rousing our passions to a white fury."

Chebukin has perfect aim! While the defamers are torturing the people by digging up all sorts of problems in our economy and demanding its radical reform, he sternly announces that outside enemies are to blame for everything. Here is what really happened:

"The enemies of socialism did not attain their main objective of destroying the Soviet regime. They did not destroy the USSR, but they did undermine our economy, caused it to detour from its true path of satisfying the

material and cultural needs of the people to the maximum, pushed us into a ruinous arms race, and tried to discredit socialism in this way as a bankrupt social system and to demolish it from within. I am repeating well-known facts, but they are essential to an understanding of what is happening to us today."

It is true that an understanding of what is happening in our country today requires us to embrace these "well-known facts." The ration coupons for soap, the lines for vodka, the ceremonial awarding of buckwheat porridge to front-line soldiers, and the crops rotting in the fields are not our fault, but the fault of the imperialist world. Remember how Eisenhower "temporarily" raised the price of butter in our country? And how Kennedy tried to get us used to eating bread made of corn? Carter instituted wave-leveling and Reagan was the architect of stagnation. Now Bush has started doing some damned thing with notebooks.... And how can we forget Churchill, the man who imposed forced collectivization on us?

As soon as you find the real enemy, you can relax. Of course, it is upsetting that no matter how far we progress in perestroika, the imperialists are still spoiling everything for us and will not let us satisfy our people's needs. On the other hand, it makes things easier for us. We do not have to change anything at all in the economy as long as we know whose fault it all is. And if we find something wrong, let Truman take the blame....

Chebukin has finally cleared up the matter of enemies within. I am ashamed to admit that slanderers have been trying to tell people that these enemies were not really their enemies, and if they did have real enemies, these were the people who were trying to bury them—i.e., the generalissimus himself and the group of undertakers who were his comrades. Chebukin, however, has told us the truth:

"The difficult situation was accompanied by arbitrary actions that caused many people to forget the real reasons for repression.... Stalin's own associates were repressed. One of the brothers of his loyal assistant Kaganovich was shot by a firing squad, and another of his brothers shot himself. Shvernik's son-in-law was executed. The wife of Kalinin, the union elder, was arrested and sent to a camp. Even the wife of Molotov, Stalin's 'shadow,' was arrested and imprisoned."

Who was to blame for all of this? What bad person forced the leader's loyal friends to undergo such ordeals? Who created the situation "accompanied by arbitrary actions"? I will give you the answer in the exact words of the man from Anapa:

"Many of those who were repressed compounded the problem. They slandered themselves and made up lies about their fellow party members and friends when they testified in court. And the people heard all of this on the radio, read it in the newspapers, and saw it in newsreels. They did not know that these people were trying to save themselves and their families by unjustly accusing and endangering others...."

It is as if I. Chebukin is nailing the real perpetrators of repression to a post with these meaningful ellipses. Who was to blame? Stalin et al? Earlier in his letter, Comrade Chebukin instructs us that history is created only by people, and not by leaders. Could the people have created all of this? But our people are good! The answer is obvious: The perpetrators of the mass repression were...those who were repressed. For no good reason, they suddenly started telling lies and insidiously deceived both the people and the leader.

Here it is, the objective approach to history! It is not our approach, not the approach of those who "mangled it and erased it from memory. They have even made a 'hole in the ozone,' where black cockroaches race back and forth between gulags and jails, snatching and gobbling everything in their path...."

After reading something like this, you automatically beat your breast and ask why.

Why did we have to indulge in "this kind of careless denigration of our way of life and indiscriminate defamation of our history and the actions of our predecessors"?

Why did we allow "the slogans of the plurality of opinions be used as a way of opening the floodgates for the indiscriminate defamation of party cadres and all communists by persistently putting the emphasis on largely imaginary benefits and privileges"?

Why, finally, do we have to put up with this glasnost if it always leads to "indiscriminate defamation"?

All right, we will concede that history is a past issue, but where did today's problems come from? Can you guess? Think about it.... Here is the answer:

"Why have we not taken the time to seriously analyze the causes of the rapid growth of crime, prostitution, drug addiction, callousness, and violence?... Do we realize the pernicious effects of the indiscriminate defamation of past decades...?"

Respected departments! Dear Comrades! Citizen Chief!

I ask you to regard my confession of slander as the crowning proof of the existence of an organization of "Indiscriminate Defamers" in the country. All of our problems—political, economic, and social—are created by its agents on orders from the imperialist special services. The subversive purpose of this organization is simple to prove. All it would take is to prohibit the issuance of all newspapers and magazines and turn off all radio and television stations for a single day. I assure you that on that day, no one will hear anything about a new price increase, another traffic accident, or even any ideologically inspired gossip about the drunken escapades of a Supreme Soviet deputy.

Then the people will realize that everything is back in order. Movie theaters can spend the whole day showing

newsreels of those years—sincere expressions of emotion, genuine smiles, and exultant faces....

Response to Critique

90US0082C Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in
Russian 1 Oct 89 First Edition p 2

[Letter from Ignat Chebukin (Anapa): "Letter from a Communist to the Satirist"]

[Excerpts] It took me a while to decide to ask you, respected editors, to defend my honor and dignity. First I had to get over the injury and pain I felt when Yuriy Makarov's satirical article "Confession of a Slanderer" was printed in IZVESTIYA on 23 (Moscow edition) and 24 September. In fact, I might not have responded to this malicious attack if I had been the only one offended by it. As all of my comrades agreed, however, along with the Anapa Veterans Council, which discussed my "Letter from a Communist" (SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 19 September this year), the author of the satirical article and IZVESTIYA were setting their sights not just on the man named Ignat Chebukin, but at a much larger target—our entire generation and our Communist Party. Keeping silent in this kind of situation would be tantamount to a display of cowardice under pressure from the very forces that see nothing sacred or uplifting in the history of their own people and do not want an honest analysis of the state of affairs in the party and government.

I will remind you why I wrote to the editors of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. The increasing discussion in the newspaper of the party and its place and role in the revolutionary perestroika attracted my attention. I wanted to take part in it. The immediate reason was the withdrawal of two communists from our city party organization. As a member of the gorkom party commission, I had a long conversation with them and tried to learn and understand their reasons for taking this step. I then wrote a letter expressing all of the thoughts and feelings this conversation aroused and sent it to SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

[passage omitted] In my "Letter from a Communist," in which I tried to address those who were leaving the party, I wanted to share my ideas about what we should value and how we should conduct the perestroika in the party more energetically and successfully.

[passage omitted] This is why I was puzzled by the strange maneuvers of the satirist from IZVESTIYA. Furthermore, it is hard to decide what the satirist's main intention was—a display of overt cynicism or an attempt to sting his opponent as painfully as possible with a barrage of jeers and insults and with some kind of

infantile game of quoting statements out of context? This kind of ostentatious snobbery is amazing. The author's condescension is apparent just from his remark that the letter to the newspaper had been written by "a common citizen no one knows," as if he was saying: "How dare he? Could he really not know who the final authority is in matters of truth?..."

Let IZVESTIYA's well-known Yuriy Makarov be the guardian of the truth, but why should he pull sentence after sentence out of context and imply that his opponent was drawing conclusions that do not agree in any way with what he wrote? Did I say, for example, that "outside enemies are to blame" for all of our economic problems? Why should he simplify my ideas in this way and close his eyes to what I actually wrote? Although I am prepared to repeat what I said, and it is backed up by facts: Throughout all stages of post-October history, the enemies of socialism were striving and are still striving to undermine our economy. Anyone who wants to know about the colossal efforts they made in this area simply has to read A.N. Yakovlev's "Ot Trumena do Reygana" [From Truman to Reagan], a book which has, incidentally, been reprinted several times. The book is interesting because the author cites several hundred frank admissions by politicians in the largest capitalist power.... And there is certainly no shortage of other sources! And if you decide to discuss a topic, especially if you expect a readership of millions, please have the decency to learn the real situation and the real facts and bear them in mind.

[passage omitted] But now I will return to my own situation. It is humiliating for a man of my advanced years to feel like a little boy who needs a spanking. The only consolation is that people today are fully aware of who is attacking whom. Makarov's intentions are no mystery either. The telephone in my home has been ringing almost non-stop. My neighbors are trying to keep my spirits up by telling me that I am upholding a just cause and should stand firm. I received the first telegrams in support of the position I related in "Letter from a Communist" on the day of its publication from the city of Sovetsk in Kaliningrad Oblast and from Sakhalin. Now I also have a mountain of letters. Besides this, a speaker at the September plenum made the unequivocal statement that "if we see only mistakes and omissions in the past and do not see the realities that took shape over decades, can there be any discussion of serious policy?"

Obviously, this certainly does not mean that we should be meek and ignore these underhanded opponents. We cannot simply let them keep playing their games. This is not the first time that the issue of the proprieties of political debate has been raised, and I, just as any other citizen of our country, have the right to expect them.

USSR Supsov Subcommittee on Children Created

18002000 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Oct 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "New Subcommittee on Child and Youth Movement Created"]

[Text] A subcommittee on the child and youth movement has been created under the auspices of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Youth Affairs. USSR People's Deputy from the Komsomol Svetlana Batrachenko became head of the subcommittee.

The functions of the new subcommittee have not yet been determined. For the time being, the chairman of the subcommittee sees its main directive to be ensuring the legal guarantees of children's organizations.

Georgian Komsomol Head on Current Issues, Tasks

18130011 Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI in Georgian 21 Sep 89 p 14

[Interview with Georgian Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary Sesili Gogiberidze by correspondent Soso Correspondent: "The Extraordinary Congress of the Georgian Komsomol Must Be a Reflection of True Democracy!"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Sesili, the Seventh Georgian Komsomol Central Committee Plenum just ended after discussing issues that are extremely vital to our young people. Participants listened with great interest to your report concerning the Georgian Komsomol's position and tasks in the process of the political renewal that is underway in the republic.

Young people would especially like to hear what views you, as the leader [lider] of the Georgian Komsomol organization, have about the Plenum and about all the issues which evoked such serious and lively debate.

[Gogiberidze] Preparations for the Seventh Georgian Komsomol Plenum started several months ago. All that time, there was a lively debate in our organization about what path the republic Komsomol should take and what function and role it should play in the political life of Georgia. We decided that the Georgian Komsomol can carry out its task only if it has the chance to make independent decisions.

We have thought a great deal about what kind of relationship there should be between the Georgian CP and the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee [as printed]. In any case we think that we will have difficulty playing the role of an independent party, because we are the youth organization of the Georgian CP. For this reason, the Plenum defined our relationship with the CP as follows: We should stand together with it on a unified ideological platform and be organizationally independent from it. As far as serving in the role of opposition [opponenstva] to the party, in many cases we must have that right because the existence of an organized internal

opposition is acceptable for many parties and social organizations. As an example we can cite the All-Georgian Rustaveli Society.

The question of whether we will be in the All-Union Komsomol will be determined by the All-Union Komsomol's Extraordinary Congress. But even in the event that we remain in the All-Union Komsomol Organization, we should not be represented as a subdivision of the All-Union Komsomol but as an independent union. This union should exist on a parity footing with the Komsomols of the other republics. To do this, however, it will be necessary for a specifically Russian Komsomol to be created.

In the Plenum report and during the debates, attention was focused on vital issues around which today's political thinking revolves. They include: the work of the commissions in the Georgian Supreme Soviet, the introduction of amendments and changes in the Georgian SSR Constitution, the next election campaign, the status of young men called up from Georgia into the ranks of the Soviet Army, and others. The Plenum expressed its position on all these issues and decided that the Georgian Komsomol, which has a claim [pretenziya] to become an independent union, must utilize all its resources to help solve the republic's crucial problems (the right of legislative initiative, the right of legal entity [yuridicheskoye litso], financial base, and so on).

Most important, we must always bear in mind our national concerns and believe firmly that Georgia can exist as a sovereign entity only if the representatives of all the nations and ethnic groups living within Georgia can find a common language and try to resolve problems of interethnic relations by peaceful means.

[Correspondent] As we know, the election of the Georgian Komsomol Central Committee's second secretary at the Plenum took place on the basis of alternative candidates....

[Gogiberidze] We believe that the alternative election form is essential in order to carry out the current election campaign on a high level. To be sure, it was remarked at the Plenum that it is the democratically elected Central Committee that has the right to hold democratic elections, but it seems to us that these elections still serve as an example. You remember very well the first USSR Congress of People's Deputies, at which someone named Obolenskiy proposed his own candidacy as an alternative to Mikhail Gorbachev. He didn't win, of course, but as he himself stated later he was motivated by the desire to see the President of the Land of the Soviets have a rival at least once.

From this standpoint, our elections can also play a positive role. If nothing else, it constituted the first alternative election.

[Correspondent] It was noted at the Plenum that the Georgian Komsomol organization intends to convene an

extraordinary congress in February of next year. We really have in fact accumulated a number of urgent problems which the framework of the Komsomol Central Committee Plenum alone cannot accomodate. Could you elaborate on this matter?

[Gogiberidze] Yes, we do intend to convene an extraordinary congress, because in order for the Komsomol to effectively carry out the functions I spoke of earlier, it is essential that the Georgian Komsomol define its own official status, the main reflection of which would be the formulation of a new program and Charter.

[Correspondent] Our readers are aware that the construction of a youth center that meets international standards is planned on the territory of the Vake Student Housing Complex by the year 1993. For the construction of a 300-unit hotel alone the Soviet government has allocated 25 million dollars. But will this youth center be able to serve our young people, or will it be turned into a "vacation spot" for foreigners and the All-Union Komsomol?

[Gogiberidze] Let me say this about that: We have decided, in consultation with the Ivane Dzhavakhishvili Tbilisi State University administration, faculty, and concerned student body, that the territory should be turned over to the university in perpetuity. As far as the hotel is concerned, we are not going to let the opportunity to build it slip out of our hands. The hotel, which is to be built with the resources of a foreign firm, will be on the Georgian Komsomol's books [balans] and will be at the service of young people who visit us not only for vacation purposes but also in order to take part in symposiums, congresses, and scientific and cultural events. This will enable us to enrich the republic's foreign currency holdings [valyutnyy fond] even more.

[Correspondent] The proposal that a private university be created in the Komsomol's Boris Dzeladze Town has been published in the press....

[Gogiberidze] Komsomol Town is a place which should be brimming with the vital life of young people; the construction of it started over 10 years ago; the best representatives of a whole generation have put their efforts into it.

I personally don't have the right to make an individual decision on the matter. I have no doubt that the primary aim of the persons who organized the creation of the town was to build a hearth for the spiritual life of Georgia's young people. Let us not forget that at that time, youth and Komsomol were synonymous terms. So if Komsomol Town today no longer has the sense of the pulse of youth in the same way its creators conceived of it, that is our generation's fault. We must listen to the opinions of all of society, but we must especially heed those whose long years of labor are connected with the construction of Komsomol Town. I am certain that after broad discussion we will arrive at a decision that is maximally beneficial to our republic's young people, our future.

[Correspondent] Sesili, Georgia's young people see you as the organizer of changes and transformations in the Komsomol.

Would you please say a few words about your future plans, in particular because we believe that you were elevated to your high post of leadership primarily by the desire and, most important, the ability to do good things for Georgia, for our young people....

[Gogiberidze] Our future activities must be oriented toward creating a stable situation in Georgia, a situation which will enable us to shape a correct political opinion. The first steps to do this have already been taken. At this stage I see my own task in this regard to be that of supervising the work of preparing for the Georgian Komsomol's extraordinary congress, in order that the congress may serve as a reflection of true democracy.

Gagauz Students Study Turkology in Baku

18310040B Baku AZARBAYJAN MUALLIMI in Azeri
1 Sep 89 p 1

[Article by R. Khomenkov, TASS correspondent: "To Baku To Study"]

[Text] At the beginning of the academic year graduates of rural schools from the southern rayons of Moldavia will be sitting in the classrooms of the S.M. Kirov Azerbaijan State University. Six Gagauz men and women who have passed the admissions examinations have become students in the Oriental Department. They will study Turkic linguistics and philology.

The training of specialists in Turkic studies, including Gagauz studies, at this university began through the efforts of a number of scholars at the Moldavia SSR Academy of Sciences and with the help of the republic Ministry of Education. The young poetess Tudorka Arnaut will also be studying there.

She said: "I am glad that our small Gagauz community will be at Azerbaijan's university. From my own experience I am sure that we will be greeted with friendliness and sincerity. Our enthusiasm to establish close contacts with representatives of peoples which speak Turkic languages and to acquaint them with our Gagauz culture is great. Some of our writers' works have been published in Azeri. During the years of my education I have often been invited to speak on republic television and radio. I have participated in the traditional Nauruz holiday and given papers on Azeri-Gagauz literary relations at scientific conferences."

Sending Gagauz youths to Baku to study is one of the concrete steps in the implementation of the state's comprehensive program to guarantee the use of languages in the territory of the Moldavia SSR. In this program, which corresponds to planks in the CPSU platform on the party's nationality policy under contemporary conditions, the implementation of a number of measures in the years 1991-1995 is planned. As a result of these

measures the language of the Gagauz, which constitute 3.5 percent of the republic's population, will begin to be used in all sectors of life.

Mironenko on Measures To Improve Lot of Soviet Students

90UN0065A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Oct 89 p 1

[Article by Viktor Mironenko, All-Union Komsomol Central Committee first secretary and USSR People's Deputy: "Vanguard of the 21st Century"]

[Text] The painful process of comprehending the true state of affairs in the country is underway in our society.

We all are aware of the difficulties in the state's financial situation, which are exacerbating the market's imbalance, and the difficulties in supplying food and consumer goods. Therefore, it is doubly difficult today to think and talk about tomorrow. But talking about it is essential. Indeed, the society that economizes on its youth's education and indoctrination today will suffer even greater losses tomorrow, in both the material and moral spheres. However, taking practical steps in this direction is very difficult. And yet these are necessary.

According to sociologists' calculations, the average annual income of a student receiving a stipend is 472 rubles, and a fourth of the students receives no stipend at all. It is impossible to call this minimum adequate for living. As a result, 90 percent of the students and pupils stay on parental support, in whole or in part, during the entire period of their education, often through ages 23 to 26.

Many combine the obtaining of an education with a permanent or temporary job. However, it is not easy for a student to solve the problem of getting a job under existing circumstances. Therefore, we have undertaken the creation of jobs based on an incomplete workweek or an incomplete workday. This involves multiskilled student cooperatives, Komsomol enterprises, and Youth Scientific-Technical Creativity [NTTM] Centers, a job in which will provide a substantial and—what is most important—an earned supplement to the student budget.

However, the steps being taken by the USSR State Committee for Public Education [Gosobrazovaniye], the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee [TsK VLKSM], and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [VTsPS] to improve the students' financial condition are hardly noticeable at present. Constructive steps on the part of both the USSR Government and the union republic Councils of Ministers are required for substantial betterment of the situation.

These can encompass a wide range of problems. I shall touch upon some of them.

Student dormitories, frequently lacking in elementary conveniences, have been among the most acute of social problems for many years. Moreover, the dormitory shortage

amounts to 520,000 student accommodations in the higher educational institutions alone, and the degree of dormitory requirement satisfaction throughout the country as a whole is about 80 percent. Thus a substantial fraction of the students is compelled to live in private apartments. I need not say what a financial burden this imposes on the already inadequate student budget.

The degree of satisfaction of requirements for student athletic and health facilities is even worse. It amounts to 30 percent, and only a fifth of the students annually can make use of all the forms of treatment and recreation (counting the simplest ones).

These problems most acutely affect the interests of the married students, who constitute about 18 percent of the students, and, what is more, a tenth of the student families has children. The student and pupil youth's condition is aggravated by an unsatisfactory socioeconomic situation in the higher and secondary specialized schools.

There is a shortage of 18 million square meters of teaching and laboratory space for normal organization of the education and indoctrination process in the country's higher educational institutions.

Our failure to meet world standards in technical equipment is becoming truly threatening. The average expenditures for one engineer's training over his or her entire education period amount to about 10,000 rubles in the USSR, and to about 80,000 to 100,000 dollars in the USA.

If fundamental solutions are not undertaken in this area, we shall not succeed in narrowing the gap in intellectual and technological levels....

We need to show state concern today for both the student of 1989 and the student of the year 2000. We need new and up-to-date dormitory designs and we need unconditional execution of plans to construct facilities for social and customary purposes at the higher educational institution centers, so we need the union republic Councils of Ministers' genuine accountability and the USSR People's Deputies' control over the execution of capital construction plans for education's facilities, and we need priority status in the financing of public education, even under conditions of a worsening budget deficit.

On the basis of this analysis, the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee, jointly with the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the USSR State Committee for Public Education, and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Youth Affairs [sic], has developed proposals for radical improvement in student and pupil youth's financial condition, and has sent these to the USSR Government. Their expert analysis is now being completed in the ministries and departments, the USSR Supreme Soviet commissions and subcommissions, and the USSR Council of Ministers.

In what does the essence of our proposals lie?

First of all, the proposals concern stipends. We have proposed that stipendiary support be initiated for all

passing students of the higher educational institutions and all passing pupils of the secondary specialized educational institutions as of 1 September 1991, having set the basic stipend's minimum amount at 60 rubles per month for higher educational institution students and at 45 rubles per month for secondary specialized educational institution pupils, with payment of supplements at the rates of 25 and 50 percent for good and excellent study respectively, and, at the same time, we have proposed the abolition of income tax collection from the stipends of graduate and undergraduate higher educational institution students and secondary specialized educational institution pupils who are studying without continuing to hold a job.

This will require the finding of over 1 billion [milliard] additional rubles a year under budget deficit conditions. We have introduced a proposal to make use, not only of USSR State Budget funds, but also of funds of the ministries and departments and industrial and agricultural enterprises in order to increase the stipend amounts.

We hope that the USSR Government also will support our proposals concerning the creation of a set of state benefits for student and pupil youth. First of all, in our view, it is necessary to establish fixed discounts for student and pupil youth on the effective fares in rail, air, automotive, sea, and river transport, as well as on the cost of a monthly transit ticket on intracity routes and tickets for attending theatrical/concert and athletic/spectator events, and to accord to student mothers the right to receive their stipends in full and a grant-in-aid for caring for the baby.

We are introducing a proposal concerning the creation of a student and pupil social assistance fund, for the providing of financial aid and the seeking out and encouraging of talented youth, at the expense of the State Budget, the State Social Security Budget, and funds of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, and other public organizations on a shares basis, and, on the part of the USSR State Workers' Savings and Credit Bank [SSSR Sberbank]—the offering of monetary loans to students and pupils, with repayment of the received sums after graduation from their educational institutions.

We hope that the USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Government will support the proposals of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the USSR State Committee for Public Education, and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Youth Affairs, and that the country's public will greet them with understanding.

Tajik SSR Roundtable Focuses on Youth Problems

*18001657A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 16 Aug 89 pp 1, 3*

[Roundtable on Youth Problems involving academic specialists and top party and Komsomol officials:

"Towards the Tajik CP Central Committee Plenum: Socialism, Democracy, Youth"]

[Text] The problems of the young people—their life, work, studies, and political and public activeness are today among the most urgent. At a "roundtable session" organized jointly by the editorial boards of the newspapers KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA and KOMSO-MOLETS TADZHIKISTANA, those present shared thoughts about ways of solving them. The following took part in the discussion: Sh.D. Shabdolov, deputy chief of the Department of Party Building and Cadre Work of the Tajik CP Central Committee; T.B. Gayratov, secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee of Tajikistan; F. Akhmedov, secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the Tajik Medical Institute imeni Abuali ibn Sino, D. Lolayeva, secretary of the Frunze Raykom of the Komsomol; M. Saidov, candidate of philosophy, scientific associate of the sociology sector of the Department of Philosophy of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences; K. Kholikov, docent of the Department of History of the CPSU of the Humanities of Tajik State University imeni V.I. Lenin.

How Did the Republic Enter Restructuring?

In the beginning—the simple thought: To select the correct direction for forward movement, it is necessary, as a minimum, to find our position within the starting coordinates. In what stage of socio-economic development does Tajikistan find itself now? What are the distinguishing starting features of the republic, which, together with the entire country, has entered into the period of restructuring?

[M. Saidov] First of all, is it correct at all to regard the republic as outside the socio-economic system of the whole country? The lack of development of the republic, is it not characterized by the lack of development of all of our society?

[Sh. Shabdolov] But in my view, the formulation of the question is correct: To take correct steps forward, it is necessary to know the point of reading. Where do we take our start from? Perhaps we will have to do what in other regions of the country was done 20-30 years ago. Let us say, the Baltic and Tajikistan, in terms of the problems confronting them now, are at opposite poles. For this reason it is necessary to understand at what stage of socio-economic development we are finding ourselves.

[M. Saidov] If previously we said that Tajikistan is an agrarian-industrial republic, I would now define it our republic as backward agrarian with elements of industry. Moreover, the industry of the republic is very poorly linked with the type of management of the economy being practiced in our republic. The Tajik Aluminum Plant, for example, no matter how you turn it, is working on imported raw material. What is more, the finished product—aluminum—for the most part is also not used in the republic. Of course, the plant helped in the formation and development of a national working class,

but not on the scale of the entire republic! But here the industry which processes the chief raw material—cotton, fulfills its function to the extent of not more than 10 percent.

Now about the level of development. To compare Tajikistan with the Baltic does not seem possible, if only because these republics approached the construction of socialism without escaping the stage of capitalism. The cultural traditions there were not interrupted, but underwent logical development. But here in the Baltic, as soon as restructuring began, they understood at once what is advantageous for them—republic *khozraschet*. Our economists timidly advance hypotheses of the economic development of the republic. The philosophers and social scientists are silent. Practically no one has yet come out with a normal conception, even a hypothesis of the future political organization of the republic. But you see, we soon will have to go over to regional *khozraschet*. Without comprehending our own ways of development, we may turn out to be in an economic hole.

[Sh. Shabdolov] The structure of public labor in the republic is such that it splashes out problems in the form of unemployment among women and young people. Urgent is not only the problem of simple employment, still more acute is the increase in the quality of labor.

Where is the way out? Our science of economics became confused in broad daylight. Not a single, at all acceptable conception of a reasonable way out from the situation created has been developed. It also is not to be found even in the decisions of the party and soviet organs.

[M. Saidov] Since the scientists do not manifest active-ness, it is necessary, in my view, to activate them from above. It is necessary through special-purpose appointment, to create, under the Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet, a powerful group of economists, having put before them a concrete task—the development of a program for the economic development of the republic.

At present very many speak about the increase of purchase prices for cotton. But it is impossible to put one's hopes only on the increase of purchase prices, not giving any thought to a change in the production method, the improvement of the tools of labor, and the standard of labor itself. You see, without this, there is no way to change the life of the *dekhkanin* [peasants].

What is striking in the conduct of sociological research is the primitive conception of requirements. It is his catastrophically low wage and the living conditions which for the most part make the *dekhkanin*.

[T. Gayratov] Yes, research shows that 60 percent of the republic's population are pleased with the standard of living, on the order of 15 percent are satisfied with it, and only 5 percent of the population consider it intolerably low. On the one hand, there are the most difficult working conditions in the cotton fields, and, on the other, the complete satisfaction of the *dekhkan*

[peasant]. So that the change of the consciousness of the toilers is still another most important problem.

[M. Saidov] You watch the television broadcast "This You Can Do" and you wonder: The Georgian has some sort of automatic digger in his kitchen-garden, the Balt has a small tractor running on his farmstead, but what do we have? Even if there is a good kitchen-garden, the master does not at all think about how to improve the tools. Why?

Demography: Troubles and Hopes

[Sh. Shabdolov] We have come to an interesting aspect—the analysis of the "oriental method of production." Marx called it the Asiatic formation. It has shortcomings, of course, but there are also merits, and it is a great fortune that we have not lost these features.

When personal ties are lost, this is strongly reflected in people, especially in young people. If the tie between grandfathers, fathers and children is lost, nothing leads to negative phenomena as much as does this loss.

In my view, a large family has a basically positive influence on the young person. In families where there are 8-10 children, the mutual obligations are stronger and any sort of anti-social manifestations are fewer. But in small families, you see, they are more frequent, although here people live in greater prosperity.

But, of course, the family with many children also has negative aspects. For example, the father sometimes usurps power, individually disposing of the income of the entire family.

[Correspondent] But *khozraschet*, which is coming, does it correlate with the family community?

[Sh. Shabdolov] Of course, you see, lease relations are introduced best of all where there are large families—I know this from my work experience. The family contract strikes root very well in the village. It is quite another matter in the city, where the large family is being destroyed.

But in the village, too, we have our problems. The main one is a shortage of land. On five-hundredths parts of a hectare there live families of 10-15 people. Such a scrap of land simply cannot feed them. How to solve this problem in the conditions of our general lack of land?

Whether we want or do not want this, but as soon as we begin to look at the economic situation in the village, we at once also come to the demographic processes.

[M. Saidov] It seems to me that, without a radical revision of the property relations in the village, it is impossible to solve a single problem. First of all, it is necessary to secure the right for every man to have his own plot of land in the village, then the man will be interested in the results of his work.

[Correspondent] But no fewer economic problems confront the young people in the city. . . .

[T. Gayratov] No fewer. Moreover, I dare say that the young people here at the present time find themselves on the verge of a social breakdown. First of all, there is the problem of housing. Secondly, the difficulties with work—the new khozraschet relations in production lead to the fact that it is, first of all, young people with low qualifications who are dismissed from work. And the washing away of cheap commodities on the market, which not last of all strikes at the young people!

Look, at the age of 22-23 a young man stands in line for an apartment, and he receives one, as a rule, when he is somewhere around 35. But it is exactly during this time that he has to establish his family! The young family without an apartment, with an extremely low wage, under the constant threat of dismissal—this is the real situation of the republic.

[Sh. Shabdolov] During a trip to the United States, I became convinced that young people there get accustomed to an independent life much earlier than in our republic.

[D. Lolayeva] And this happens not only due to our lack of trust in the young people, but also due to the socio-economic situation that has taken shape. Even the graduates of prestigious vocational-technical schools in the Ukraine and Russia, upon finishing their studies, are unable to find work in our republic although we sent them to study there. And in this case the raykom cannot be of any help—the economic mechanism of the enterprises proves to be stronger.

In our country, not to speak already about the republic, 75 percent of the young people are materially dependent on their parents. In the socialist countries, this indicator is somewhere around 30 percent, but in Japan, for example, only 10 percent. In our country, most perceptibly the parental subsidies go for the support of the children. Thirty-five is a critical age, when a man secures some kind of apartment and furniture for himself, and at once begins to work for the future of his children. And if it would only be possible to make use of the potential of young people before 35 years!

True and Imaginary Values

[M. Saidov] We have not so much a conservative family structure, as parental experience and the views of the family. Let us take, for example, the evenings in the school where they frequently invite veterans. They say without fail: "In our time, we were content with a piece of bread, you have everything, you should be happy." What is there to be glad about, why feel happy? It is necessary, I believe, to completely change the conceptions of values, which for 70 years have dominated the consciousness of Soviet man. But how do you change it when the family, the kindergarten, and the school actively support this system of values?

[Correspondent] But what can one propose instead?

[M. Saidov] Let us recall the dictum of Marx: People create systems, but subsequently already the systems themselves reproduce the people, similar to themselves.

I think it is necessary to talk about the fact that we, in the process of the formation of socialism, did not simply admit some individual deformations, but ignored the most important Leninist thesis on the new economic policy. This is why the whole pre-perestroika economy represented nothing else than state monopolism. You simply cannot speak about the creative development of the individual in the conditions of state monopolism. But for the duration of this entire stagnation time, we shouted about the new man. But where are these young new people? But you see, our task is not only to build the new society, but also to create the new man.

Being determines consciousness, but we are all the time trying to change the superstructure, to introduce some kinds of changes in the political structure. But the issue is to change the base, the economy, since it, in the expression of Lenin, goes through the entire society like a red thread. But it is precisely the economy which we ignored.

It was not so long ago that scientists declared the thesis that Central Asia made a leap from the feudal-patriarchal order with patrimonial-tribal relations to socialism, bypassing the most important stage of capitalism. But have the patriarchal-tribal relations been dissipated? In my view, no, and today we have typical feudal-patriarchal relations in the conditions of Tajikistan and in general throughout Central Asia. And a corresponding type of consciousness: Elements of Oriental despotism in the psychology of the present-day Tajik. And this psychology dominates its economic vagaries and dictates all forms of economic interrelations.

[Correspondent] If we are logical, we must develop capitalism in Tajikistan—is that your view?

[M. Saidov] In order to correct the situation, capitalism is not mandatory. It is sufficient to conduct, in full scale, a new economic policy in the Leninist understanding and in full scale. But what is happening now is inadequate. One does not see radical changes in the economy.

So What Did We Build?

[Sh. Shabdolov] You have touched on a very important question. And nevertheless, let us define it more precisely: What was built in our republic—socialism or another society? Here, I think, we should not confuse two concepts—base and superstructure. The distinctive trait of any socio-economic formation is the basis, and in it—the property relations, this is the ABC of Marxism. So that, as far as the basis is concerned, it, undoubtedly, corresponds to the society of socialism. The superstructure elements are another matter. In the sphere of the superstructure, I agree, the elements of feudal, patriarchal relations could not disappear so simply. In the consciousness of people, these elements—the same

bride-money, religious intolerance, and so on—are present, from this you don't escape anywhere.

[M. Saidov] Any socio-economic formation is determined by the form of ownership: To capitalism, it goes without saying, the private form of property is peculiar, to socialism—public property, which, as we understand now, is no one's. Man is alienated from this property, does not have the possibility of exerting any kind of influence on it. This is why it is impossible to separate Tajikistan from the general problems of the Union.

When Khozraschet Is Coming. . .

In connection with this, will there be a change in the psychology of people with the transition of the republic to khozraschet? You see, all funds for social development will already come from our own budget. And the second thing, We have noted today the advantages of the patriarchal family. But we do have the highest population growth—3.4 percent a year! Where take the funds from? And is the democratic path of development possible given such a demography?

And further: Has an analysis been made how much the manpower resources in the republic will increase in 5, 10, and 15 years? Can we guarantee work for all of them?

[K. Kholikov] Our republic is so rich that we can provide work for still very many people. For example, we produce 900,000 tons of cotton. From one ton alone, we can obtain a minimum of 10,000 rubles worth of production. If we will process only half the cotton in the republic, we will turn out additional production worth 5-6 billion rubles. Now the entire gross industrial product is 5 billion.

A small detail. Once in Moscow I saw an enormous line for packets with seasoning—ordinary grass, which can be grown in the republic in such abundance that the whole country could be filled with it. Gems! What is more, there are a lot of unutilized reserves in the republic!

Extensively, Intensively. . .

[M. Saidov] Here there is a question: Should the republic develop intensively, would it not be more reasonable to develop extensively, which would correspond to our demography? But, you see, the development of the state along the extensive path is an indicator of its backwardness. It is impossible to talk about the primitive increase of working places, without talking about their quality. For this reason, the main thing in our conditions is intensive development. But owing to what? What we need is a clearly thought-through economic program. Not a single sensible capitalist will build a factory far from the raw material. Where the raw material is, there should the factory be, too. If we put the republic on the agrarian-industrial rails, that is if we will develop the textile and cotton-processing industry, we will provide our entire population with working places. Even for the next 200 years. The only thing that we need to do is to introduce the textile industry not along the line of the

primitive processing of fabrics, but also for the manufacture of ready-made clothes, on the level of normal, let us say general European models. We should go for the broadest contact with foreign partner firms.

[T. Gayratov] We have talked here about the difficult demographic situation. However, there is broad expression of the view that after a certain time the demographic features may become stabilized.

[Sh. Shabdolov] The most difficult demographic situation at present, as is well known, is in India. Recently I read Rajiv Gandhi on the subject of how this country intends to solve the problems of demography. Administrative and economic measures, moreover, can have only a temporary effect. The main thing—we need to raise the education of women. Indeed, when the level of the material and, above all, the spiritual development of man is raised, he himself will understand that it is impossible to support a family of 10-15 members normally, that it is impossible in such conditions to let children and the parents themselves have everything they have deserved in life. For this reason, the rise of the material and cultural level of the young people, and above all, girls, has a positive effect on the solution of both economic and demographic problems.

[Correspondent] But this is in the future, but we need to live now. In the creation of new working places with high technology, there already now arises the need for highly-skilled workers. But for the time being, we do not have them. What is to be done?

[K. Kholikov] The way out, I think, lies in the creation of joint enterprises. It is necessary for us to obtain access to Japanese and Chinese technologies. New working places for young people will appear, which in itself is important, not only skilled manpower will appear, but there will also be an increase in the level of consciousness.

Who Will Awaken the Young People?

Without a doubt, it is necessary to decide today how the republic is to develop further (both on the economic and on the social plane). And, of course, with the participation of the young people, who subsequently will reap the fruits of this work. And the problem of the activeness of the young people today is the most important. But why are the young people passive in the broadest aspects of this concept? Why is the indifference of the young people to the processes that are going on in the country being observed in the republic?

Why do we not have such a response to the dethronement of the cult of the personality, to voluntarism and stagnation? Why are the associations of informal groups [neformaly] springing up extremely slowly? Why, if we are talking about democracy among young people, is everything limited to meetings?

[T. Gayratov] I would call the situation among young people contradictory. On the one hand, an aktiv appeared which is striving for changes, striving to do

something, but for the time being they have a poor conception of how. But there is still a great mass of young people who is not interested in anything and does not aspire to any changes. The alienation which arose when we, without wanting to do so, alienated the young people from politics, is expressed even now. It is necessary for the older generation to transmit to its children not only enthusiasm and faith, but also its skepticism in regard to the plans and programs that only declare changes in society.

The dissatisfaction with these programs is what generated the disillusionment and various negative phenomena. Something needs to be done.

[Sh. Shabdolov] Did you even once raise the question about the position of the young person in the family and in public production at Central Committee plenums, gorkoms and raykoms of the Komsomol? In the manner in which we are doing this today?

[T. Gayratov] Yes, of course. Quite recently a joint plenum of the Oktyabrskiy Party Raykom and the Komsomol took place, which examined the integrated Molodezh Program. On the basis of serious sociological research, the plenum created a special purpose program called upon to solve the youth problems. But all of this, clearly, represents only the first sprouts.

[Correspondent] When we talk about the political passiveness of the young people, we name as one of the basic factors the indifferent attitude to the criticism of the periods of the cult of the personality, voluntarism and stagnation.

[K. Kholikov] Indifferent—this is not completely correct. Our young people have a difference with the young people of the same age from the central oblasts of the country. When the conversation turns, for example, to Stalin, many object, I heard, that Stalin did a great deal.

[Correspondent] With what do you connect this?

[K. Kholikov] Mainly with the fact, I think, that it was precisely during those years that Tajikistan was transformed from a feudal region into a socialist republic. This process is connected with one man by both the representatives of the older generation and by the young people.

Is Stalin With Us As Before?

[T. Gayratov] I think there is still another reason. We know a great deal about the negative consequences of the cult of the personality, which originated precisely in the center. And at the same time, we have a poor conception: What of it in Tajikistan, how much were the same repressions detrimental for us? In the newspapers, true, one encounters isolated publications, but on the whole we do not have a full picture of this period in our republic.

And second. This, most likely, also depends on psychology and on traditions. Once an individual possesses

great power, he cannot be bad. We ourselves have constructed for ourselves such a system, and not one generation was raised in this psychology. Hence—the reaction.

[M. Saidov] I have been lecturing in an institute for the improvement of teachers for 4 years. I often ask about the attitude toward Stalin. The absolute majority answers me that Stalin was a figure, which is how there was order. I raise another question: And how do you regard the fact that today the Tajik language has lost its natural significance? This is bad, they answer. But, don't you see, it was precisely under Stalin, I say, that the alphabet was changed to the Latin alphabet, and then to the Cyrillic alphabet? Eh, muallim [not further identified], they reply, all the same, Stalin was a good man. How can such a man be bad?

From the Swamp of Stagnation

[F. Akhmedov] Why do we today not ask ourselves, this concerns especially the people of middle age? You see, it is precisely we who were the perpetrators of this stagnation. Today all believe that someone else is responsible for the stagnation, but not we ourselves, who helped with all our strength to strengthen this stagnation.

I will speak for myself: Once people gave to me, a young member of the Komsomol, "Malaya zemlya", "Tselina," and "Vozrozhdeniye", and they told me—go and conduct propaganda. And I went, I conducted propaganda, in my soul not agreeing with the inordinate praise of one person. So whom am I to blame? Young men and young women see very well: Those who still yesterday argued passionately for Brezhnev, today call themselves followers of perestroika.

And another thing. After Brezhnev there was Andropov—all felt the intensification of discipline. Then, under Chernenko, the country once again slid down into the swamp of stagnation. Under Gorbachev, all really believed in the possibility of quick changes, but now, not seeing any perceptible progress, some are beginning to have doubts: Are we going along that path?

[K. Kholikov] Yes, my interlocutor is right. We have to change the entire political system. And the new Supreme Soviet of the country is trying to do something in this direction, true, up to now without perceptible successes. Opposing forces exist as before, and they are not so small in number.

Toward a Society of Equal Possibilities

[Correspondent] Today, in the selection of the further path of movement, our country, and more correctly, some of its representatives are looking to the side of the West. Incidentally, Americans consider a society healthy when it is in a position to give to all, young people included, equal opportunities for the development of the individual. We have already casually touched on this subject, but now I invite you to discuss the following

question: To what extent, in your opinion, are the ideals of the West acceptable to us?

[F. Akhmedov] In school and in the VUZ, we had it repeated to us: There is nothing to learn from them, this is a decaying society.

[Sh. Shabdolov] But we are talking concretely about the young people. Let us take, for example, the problem of paying for higher education.

[F. Akhmedov] I think that there cannot be two points of view—it is necessary to pay for a good education.

[Sh. Shabdolov] But what is to be done in the following case: A director of a cooperative, let us say, has an annual income of 15,000-20,000 rubles, you have—1,500-2,000 rubles. You can give the VUZ 10-15 rubles a month for your son, but the director of the cooperative—five to six times as much. Who has the realistic chance to enroll?

[K. Kholikov] The way out here is clear. The state is obligated to grant poor families, which have a capable child, subsidies for study in the VUZ.

[T. Gayratov] If we talk about equal opportunities for the development of the individual, there is no sense in talking about such a thing not only with respect to the West, but also within our country and our republic. In the city, the situation is one thing, in the kishlak—it is quite another thing. A young man, who comes from rural locality, has much less opportunity for the development of the individual.

[Sh. Shabdolov] A would like once again to dwell on my impressions from a trip to the United States. I saw fine schools there, computer instruction from the second grade. But here is what is strange. When we talked with the teachers and students of the higher grades, it turned out that the children have absolutely no conception of classical, let us say, American literature, not to speak of contemporary literature. A paradox? I don't think so. This is what I want to talk about. Now it has become fashionable to criticize our society—everything, they say, is bad in our country. There is a grain of truth in this, but there is also a great deal in our country that is good.

[Correspondent] I agree, we give the main attention in school, if one may put it this way, to the ideological training of the individual. The West put the accent on economic training. And here after so much time after the victory of the socialist revolution, we are becoming convinced that we have disregarded the experience of the West in this respect to no purpose.

[Sh. Shabdolov] And again I would like to repeat: The points of reading in our country are so very different. Indeed, look, only today we are beginning to create the real basis on which the building of socialism is placed. And nevertheless, there is a rational kernel in your words. Along with that ideological training, which we have assimilated pretty well, greater attention must be given in the schools to the teaching of business, to

economic principles, so as for man to be able, after school, to be well guided in life.

Discussion Democracy: "For" and "Against"

[Correspondent] I propose to return again to the question of the political activeness of the young people. Lately a wave of various kinds of meetings and other actions has swept over our country, and here already some people are beginning to reproach democracy with everything. Question: What can be counterposed to discussion democracy, and is it necessary to counterpose anything to it?

[F. Akhmedov] I believe that we need discussion democracy, there is nothing strange in this. Previously, you see, there was a prohibition on everything. And one or two examples, where in the course of meetings disturbances developed, not even to speak of the fact that this form of participation of young people in politics will not be of benefit to us. The meetings which took place in our republic awakened the young people and made it possible for them to express their opinion.

[T. Gayratov] I do not agree at all. When we, in the Central Committee of the Komsomol, analyzed the reasons for the meeting of February 24, we drew two conclusions. The first consists in the fact that the young people were not informed about the events that were taking place, and for this reason extremely contradictory considerations were expressed at the meeting. And the second—the young people have no confidence that the problems will be solved in the way in which they should be solved. It seems to me that discussions are not the path for the solution of the problem. Undoubtedly, the political activeness of the young people today is simply necessary to the young people, but personally I am more impressed with, for example, the Rubaru Political Club for Young People in Dushanbe. The young people invite party and soviet executives to the sessions of the club, they solve problems together, they search for a way out of the blind alley. And they find it.

[Correspondent] Thus, the form of informal political associations for young people is preferable?

[T. Gayratov] What does preferable mean? For whom? We are now trying to get away from such a formulation of the questions. Preferable is what leads to real, tangible results. And in this sense, a meeting, where the majority of those present have an extremely poor concept of the final goal of their action, is hardly useful, above all to the young people themselves. Associations of students—here, I repeat, is perhaps the most effective form for increasing political activeness.

[F. Akhmedov] I think that we need not only informal political youth organizations. Among the Tajik-speaking population, for example, there has appeared a trend to increase the number of associations in which the lads would engage in the study of their culture, history, and literature. And this, I believe, is correct.

[Correspondent] But what are the prospects for the development of informal associations among the Russian-speaking population?

[F. Akhmedov] You understand, most often the Russian-speaking young people in our republic are connected with trends which have come from the West—the various hippies there, punkers, rockers, etc. So that this does not exist and never will exist in our republic, of this I am convinced. But I think that it would not be bad for the Russian-speaking population to become accustomed to Tajik culture, in order to better understand the present of the republic. Of course, not forgetting, in so doing, about the study of their own, Slavic culture.

Are the Young People Going the Way of the Komsomol?

[M. Saidov] Informal associations are necessary to the young people, argument is unnecessary here. But here I have a question—are they necessary to the Komsomol? The situation in our country, in my view, is changing, at the present the Komsomol already no longer lays claim to the role of leader in the youth movement?

[T. Gayratov] Yes, you are right. The Plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee, which recently took place, arrived at a very important conclusion, I think—the Komsomol should not lay claim to a monopoly of the entire youth movement. In any undertaking, monopoly is one of the reasons for stagnation.

[M. Saidov] Once we have started to talk about the Komsomol, I think it is necessary to touch on membership in it. It seems to me that in this matter it is necessary to adhere to the ideas of M.S. Gorbachev about a differentiated approach to entry into the ranks of the Komsomol, to accept not all in succession into membership, but through selection—as into the party.

[T. Gayratov] As far as acceptance is concerned, there should not be any restrictions. There is a definite procedure, not the gorkoms and raykoms, but rather the primary organizations must decide who is to be a member of the Komsomol.

But there is still another aspect here. I cannot say that among the 700,000-strong detachment of the republic's Komsomol all share the views of the Komsomol. And for this reason, the right of young people to unite in other youth organizations, movements, and organs of public independent action is inalienable. It is another matter—what they are. If they stand on the platform of restructuring and support positive ideas, we will actively cooperate with them. If they are of an antisocial orientation, it is another matter. And in connection with this, it is necessary to adopt a law about independent public organizations as soon as possible.

[Correspondent] Once the discussion has turned to this, it is impossible not to touch on the state of affairs in the Komsomol itself. What is happening today? What is the Komsomol like today?

[T. Gayratov] The question is not simple. The situation in the Komsomol now is assessed as a crisis situation, although the assessments are extremely contradictory—from the view that everything is normal to the acknowledgement of a crisis.

The crisis began a long time ago, when we started to talk about the Stalinization of the Komsomol, when it was transformed from a public organization into an appendage of the party, its transmission belt, i.e., it was practically deprived of independence. At present stormy discussions are under way about the right of the republic organizations to create a federative statute of the Komsomol, to create Komsomol organizations not on the basis of the production principle, but on the basis of interests—unions, for example, of workers and students, etc. There is also discussion under way about the fact that Komsomol organizations do not without fail have to be created in all enterprises and institutions. That is, we will have to radically revise the statute and program in order to create a more flexible structure of the union.

[K. Kholikov] I cannot but agree. Why do the Komsomol primary organizations practically not solve anything? Because they do not have any independence, by themselves they are not capable of doing anything. And for this reason changes in the Komsomol are a question of the very existence of the Komsomol.

And once again about meeting democracy. I cannot accept the view of the secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, meetings are necessary to the young people. It is necessary to let out energy, it is necessary, finally, to explain to young people if they fail to understand something. For this, a meeting is a quite appropriate form. But all of this, it goes without saying, with the observance of order and discipline.

Alternatives

[M. Saidov] Yes, we simply have not gotten used to many forms of the political youth movement, from this we must proceed. And on this plane, I believe that the party must set an example for the young people. Be that as it may, the Komsomol has always learned from the party and it is learning from it up to now. So that the various political currents must arise above all in the Communist Party. Precisely there.

[K. Kholikov] Moreover, I am convinced—whether we like it or not, but the alternative parties have a right to exist. I am a communist, and I have confidence in the ability of the Communist Party to lead society behind it, and nevertheless I am—for alternative parties, if only in order to see more clearly the shortcomings within our organization.

[Sh. Shabdolov] The discussion about the creation of alternative parties is not new. But let us examine this question in terms of substance. Parties are created when the necessity appears to defend the interests of one class or another. Naturally, the necessity of expressing the interests of the basic mass of the workers was the

objective basis of the appearance of the USSR. It goes without saying, the CPSU cannot express the interests of all citizens without exceptions, of anti-social elements, for example. For this reason, when we are talking about the creation of an alternative party to the CPSU, and in our republic—the Communist Party of Tajikistan, we must, above all, attempt to explain—whose interests it will defend and on what ideological platform.

[M. Saidov] But I would like to return to my statement. So let us turn to Lenin. Discussing with Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin emphasized: There is no sense for us to create several parties, one is sufficient, but it would really have to express the interests of all strata of the population. However, within the party, in the opinion of Lenin, there must be discussions and various currents. Today we are beginning to talk about Bukharin and Rudzutak with respect—they did quite a lot for the party. Stalinism cancelled out the legacy of Lenin, today we have condemned Stalinism, but to date there is not sufficient courage to condemn the “transformations” in the party that were introduced by him.

A way out, thus, has been found in our country—in order for real changes to occur in the Komsomol, similar changes must take place in the party. Indeed, the Komsomol in our country is inseparably linked with the party. Incidentally, not long ago I was invited to sociological research, and I tried to establish how they become leaders of party organizations. And this is what is interesting—the overwhelming majority came here from the Komsomol. There turns out to be an exclusive circle. In the Komsomol, a man who is looking at the party, formalizes his work to the utmost. Having served some time in the Komsomol, he arrives in the party for a leading position, he begins to raise a new Komsomol functionary.

[T. Gayratov] Excuse me, I do not agree. The fact that they come into the party from the Komsomol in and of itself does not indicate anything reprehensible. The important thing is, what sort of person this man is. M. Saidov: I would like once more to touch on the problems of our republic. Do you know that an enormous number of the Komsomol members of Tajikistan are believers?

[T. Gayratov] Yes, but indeed I said that not all share the views of the Komsomol.

[M. Saidov] Thus, you do not see anything odd in this? But what is a believer? It is he who “successfully” combines the views of both the exemplary Muslim and the active Komsomol member. But I am inclined to think—more of the exemplary Muslim. In Leninabad Oblast, for example, the majority of Komsomol members kept the ruse. This, above all, is what the attention of the Komsomol Central Committee of the republic should be focused on. And not to persecute, but to give the young person the right of choice—either Komsomol, or—not.

We have, in general, outlined the basic range of the problems of the republic's young people. It is difficult for the young people themselves even today to find their

bearings in the difficult political situation—they simply do not have the experience of action. Active assistance on the part of the communists, the Komsomol leaders, and the youth leaders is needed. This concerns also the spheres of the further socio-economic development of the republic, questions of increasing the political activity of the young people, and the creation of informal associations of various sorts. Also needed is a decisive turning-point in the activity of the Komsomol—at any rate, for today—the basic exponent of the interests of the young people in our republic.

The discussion that developed around the youth problems on the eve of the Plenum of the Tajik CP Central Committee is a good herald of future changes. And today's discussion around the “roundtable” has shown once again with sufficient obviousness: It is necessary to solve the problems of the young people in close connection with the problems of today. And your opinion? The editors await your reflections and suggestions. Write, call, suggest.

Working Conditions Harmful to Women, Contribute to Infant Mortality

*18300834A Alma-Ata PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN
KAZAKHSTANA in Russian No 8, Aug 89*

[Article by G. Chumakova: “In the Status of Poor Relatives. Women Workers are Often Merely Regarded as a Reliable Work Force.”]

[Text] There were no milk maids on the farm and the morning milking session had ended, but I at least wanted to see them, talk to them about their work and everyday life. From the broken windows in the cow shed and the lack of any utility rooms it was obvious that the working conditions here, as they say, were antediluvian. But that was not all the bitter truth. When I asked the secretary of the kolkhoz im. Sverdlov partkom, Shaymerden Myrzaliyevich Myrzaliyev, to arrange a meeting with any one of the milk maids, he strangely hesitated, and then informed me that we would not be able to find a single one of them in the village now.

And what are the women doing during the break between milking sessions. Are they not home taking care of their children, household chores, or simply resting? It turns out that the management of the kolkhoz had sent them out that day to the fields to collect stones. Well then, let's go out and take a look at how milk maids still have the time and strength to gather stones. It must be admitted that it was with difficulty that we persuaded the kolkhoz party leader to take us out onto the field. They had started to talk us out of it, claiming that it would be too far to travel, and the milk maids would be coming back soon anyway...

But here we are at the edge of the winter wheat field (which was not far at all). We, i.e., the chairperson of the Sverdlovskiy Rayon women's council Rosa Nikolayevna Metsker, the chairperson of the women's council of the kolkhoz Frida Khristianovna Borgard, and the author of

these lines, accompanied by the party committee secretary. At a distance of about 500 meters ahead of us we saw a group of workers. Shaymerden Myrzaliyevich, while watching this ghostly picture with us, explained that the stones in the field had to be cleared quickly within a few days before the winter wheat shoots come up, otherwise they would be a hindrance to the combine.

We go between the rows of wheat plants to the workers. And so it was: the persons collecting and loading the stones were all women—all nine milk maids. The tractor trailer was already filled to the top with cobblestones and boulders. The women were in boots, padded jackets, bandannas, their faces were wind-blown, their hands... It was painful to talk about their hands. After we introduced ourselves, the milk maids all started to talk at once, venting their complaints:

"We are constantly being pushed into all kinds of jobs and we never have time to prepare meals for our children..."

"We are given so much manual labor that our fingers can't straighten out..."

"There's not even tea for sale in the store..."

"We are not getting extra pay for milking above our quota..."

The party committee secretary heard all of this with us, lowered his eyes, and remained silent. And I must admit I didn't want him to remain silent. I wanted him to respond in some way to the women and to admit that this kind of attitude toward them was abnormal and that their working and living conditions should be changed. But he kept silent, or to be more accurate said absolutely nothing. Apparently, this was by habit. And then it occurred to me: Well, then, if there was such an emergency job to clear stones from the field in the spring, then why not organize a voluntary unpaid Saturday or Sunday? And why were only women from that farm mobilized to do the job when quite a few men were working there too? And why, finally, were the men, the office inhabitants, including the party committee secretary, the trade union chairmen, who were after all young people and described as "the very picture of health," not included into the emergency job? But they prefer the quiet and comfort of offices.

In bidding farewell to the milk maids on the field (with the silent "blessing" of the party organization they remained and continued to load rocks), we took one of them along with us, Tleukul Daurenbekova as a "delegate" in order to look into the matter of extra pay for above-plan milking. The chief economist of the kolkhoz K. T. Shopanov explained at length the shrewd formula which did not provide for extra pay, but in conclusion declared that the additional wages would be given to the milk maids. Then there was the natural thought: was the extra pay an established rule or not. In any event the women should be told precisely and clearly what was expected of them without waiting for false rumors and perturbations.

After all of this upheaval Tleukul Daurenbekova invited us to her home to see how a family with many children lives on the kolkhoz. Yes, I must admit that I wanted to visit her house after we learned that Tleukul was the mother of eleven children. The housewife took us to a yard where alongside an old mud hut stood straw blocks that would be the walls of her future house. Just the walls, and they have been standing there for more than three years because there was no money to buy construction materials or anywhere to buy them. Tleukul's husband was an invalid and worked as a watchman so that the family was in a difficult situation. The house had neither a refrigerator nor washing machine, not to mention any furniture. In the yard the only animal they had was a little calf. Providing the children with food, clothing, and shoes was a serious problem for the parents. But is it possible that the kolkhoz was not giving them any help at all? Tleukul responded to this question firmly and categorically: The kolkhoz never helped them with anything. Moreover, she and the other milk maids are "hurled" into the fields to work, so to speak, on a voluntary basis. Rosa Nikolayevna Metsker, chairperson of the rayon women's council, said in conclusion that one could find innumerable families in similar situations both in this kolkhoz and in the rayon.

So this is how one of first meetings turned out in the Dzhambul Oblast where I came to get to know the situation of working mothers and the work of the women's councils. I intentionally described in detail this situation with the milk maids in the Sverdlovsk Rayon inasmuch as I saw in that situation a reflection of a currently prevalent attitude toward women both in industry and in domestic life. As a representative of the weaker sex who often has to rear children on her wages alone, she is often seen as a reliable working unit who, because of her family situation, would be willing to take the hardest and most harmful kind of work.

In that connection I recall my discussion at the Khimprom production association in Dzhambul where the deputy chairman of the trade union committee B. A. Korotkov explained why, for example, it was easier to retain women in the yellow phosphorus shop. The men feel that the working conditions are harmful, breathing is difficult, and there are night shifts to boot, and a wage of 170 to 200 rubles is not enough, whereas it is difficult for a woman to earn such money at another job. So she keeps her job at the shop even to the detriment of her health, not to mention the jobs where the pay is even higher.

Engineer of the industrial and technical safety department of the Khimprom association V. A. Valintseva told me that in accordance with the decree of the USSR State Committee of Labor and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions of June 25, 1988 which forbids women labor under all harmful conditions, a list was prepared which enumerated vocations that were contraindicated for women, and it turns out that in their own association it was necessary to withdraw the weaker sex from almost all the shops, and this was not so easy since it accounted for more than a thousand persons.

From 400 to 800 women are working at the Novodzhambul Phosphorus Plant, the Primary Wool Processing Factory, and at the factories of the Karatau Ore Administration at each of which enterprises the conditions are harmful.

One cannot say that the leaders of the city and oblast are not thinking about this problem. There were attempts to "withdraw" women from particularly harmful shops, and a work schedule was even compiled. But the effort hardly got anywhere because the women workers themselves didn't want to leave their field of specialization which guarantees them a reasonable salary and gives them the right to a preferential pension. The only realistic solution is not to accept future female applications for jobs at harmful shops. But of this is only a half measure because there are many women who are pre pension age and young women at "harmful" enterprises.

The most radical, although, of course, difficult way of resolving the problem would be to create new non-harmful jobs where women would be given the opportunity to earn as much as they are earning now. But the supervisors are not willing to discuss that solution, not to mention the problem itself. More often we hear talk about the need to improve working conditions, to introduce mechanization, air-conditioning, etc. Although chemistry will hardly stop being chemistry after this. But this work is important and everything depends on its execution.

Secretary of the oblast trade union N. T. Vrublevskaya who is also deputy chairperson of the oblast women's council, informed me that there are about six thousand women in the oblast who are working under hazardous conditions. And that the working conditions have improved for five thousand of those women over the past three years. That is, almost for all of them? It must be admitted that these figures troubled me. Well, in the first place, I learned from a conversation with the party raykom secretary R. K. Yedygenova that 7,100 women were employed in hazardous industry in the Zavodskiy Rayon alone of Dzhambul. As regards improvements in their working conditions, I had before me several pictures at once. I remembered how drafts were blowing in shop No. 7 of the Khimprom production association when I was talking to the supervisors because almost all of the windows on the premises (and not only in this shop) were broken. Later at the primary wool processing factory I had occasion to observe how women were lifting heavy bales of wool because the conveyor belt wasn't working. Even more depressing was the picture in the washing shop where 86 women were employed. The air was heavy and the people were moving about like in a fog because the ventilation system was completely inoperative and many windows had foam instead of glass. The shop foreman S. Sh. Shamayev said that he had been there for 14 years and ventilation has been a constant problem.

Then, would it not be better for the oblast trade union council to leave those dubious figures in peace and help the women by deeds? In concert with the women's

council the trade union should sound an alarm to the State Agro-Industrial Committee which jurisdiction over the wool-processing plant, and demand the electric motor for a ventilator or force that to be done by those who are responsible for ventilation at the plant.

The position of the women's council in the oblast is surprising. Their activists seem to be reticent and decisions are not being made as to raise the most crucial questions where necessary, those problems that are vitally important to women—such as working conditions, pay, food provisions, and health care. The position of the council is claimed to be the following: These are serious problems and they are being considered there by those "on the top", but what can we do...

Perhaps thought is being given to these problems "at the top," but this thought process is far from helping people everywhere by deeds.

For example, I had a conversation in the Sverdlovskiy Rayon with chief physician of the rayon hospital E. Zh. Aytekhova and her deputy for therapy K. K. Nuaryzbayeva. These physicians cited pathetic statistics: The rayon child mortality per thousand births is more than twice the national level and approximately double the republic level. But even in these sad indices the Sverdlov inhabitants yield their "leading position" to two other rayons, the Moyunkumskiy and Saryuskiy rayons. In that connection there has been no observed decrease in the mortality rate. Out of a thousand births in 1988 50 children died, and 54 died in the first quarter of this year.

The reasons? There are many. There is no model pediatric hospital building. The present hospital is in a makeshift building which doesn't even have hot water. There is a shortage of at least one-half of the necessary number of pediatricians, and the educational and sanitation work is being poorly carried out. But physicians believe that a no less and perhaps more important circumstance is the social conditions of the people. According to the observations of scholars who have been working in one of the best kolkhozes in the rayon, Trudovoy Pakhar, the diets of children are chronically lacking up to 40 percent of the necessary proteins and vitamins. Naturally, the women and mothers also are getting this deficient diet. Consequently, child development defects are already third among the reasons for deaths.

Is this known to the rayon authorities? Of course. Last year the party raykom held a meeting of the party kolkhoz aktiv on health problems which was attended by all those upon whom improvements in living conditions and health care depend. What were the results? The figures cited to me by the physicians indicate that we do not yet have positive results. And if one judges by the results of the inspection made by the oblast people's control committee in February of this year, it becomes clear that, as before, little is being done for the health of the rayon's children. For example, general preventive medical examinations are not being given in a single kindergarten, and there are not even thermometers. And,

as before, products intended for pediatric institutions are being openly squandered from the base store. Last year that included 50 tons of meat and 148 tons of dairy products. An analysis taken in five kindergartens showed that the dishes served were from 20 to 60(!) percent deficient in nutritional content.

The construction of medical facilities is proceeding very slowly in the rayon. And although health stations have been organized at two dairy product farms and a poultry farm, and the sovkhos Rovnenskiy has built an outpatient clinic, the most important problem of building a hospital remains unresolved. Whereas previously there were hospitals in almost all of the major farms, seriously ill patients in the remote settlements must be brought to the rayon center.

And what is the rayon women's council doing? Has it presented its demands to the higher authorities and managers, has it tried to appeal to public opinion concerning the outrageous incidence of child mortality and child nutritional deprivation? The women's council headed by R. N. Metsker has not attempted anything of the kind. The party organs are not directing the activity of the women's council along the necessary path.

In a discussion in Dzhambul with the chairperson of the oblast council of women Rosa Bayzhanovna Kutubayeva, I tried to find out what was the position of this social organization and what work was being carried out among women, what were the goals of their struggle, and to whom were demands being presented? But I did not perceive any independent action there. In a few cases the women's council approaches the commission of the oblast ispolkom on problems related to women labor and living conditions and mother and child care, but it does not have its own approach to the broad range of problems concerning women. Consequently, the annual work plan of the council obviously includes insignificant goals such as the issuance of posters, participation in a meeting commemorating March 8, etc.

But life itself knocked at the office door of Rosa Bayzhanova (her official position is chief of the Gosbank administration), literally interrupting our conversation. The head of the Dzhambul city health department A. G. Fayziyeva and her deputy L. M. Kim had arrived to establish official ties with the women's council. They were brought here by extraordinary circumstances associated again with the child mortality rate and with the alarming women's health statistics.

"Within the structure of child mortality," said Afrida Galimzhanovna, "there is a growing number of congenital defects, genetic anomalies, and premature births. All of this is directly tied to the ecological circumstances in which a woman finds herself as well as with heavy labor and poor nutrition."

Poor nutrition (the problem will not be solved for many years with the opening of a special store for pregnant women) can cause anemia in future mothers. According to data from the commission of the oblast ispolkom on

women labor and living conditions problems and mother and child care, last year one-half of the pregnant women in the oblast were suffering from anemia. The percentage of anemic women was particularly high in the Zavodskiy Rayon of the oblast center where the chemical enterprises are concentrated. According to an analysis undertaken by physicians, the female morbidity rate here is 20 times higher than, for example, in the Tsentralnyy Rayon of Dzhambul. The child mortality rate, an average of 40 per 1,000 births for the whole city presents an alarming figure.

One must add to that the hospitals and polyclinics in the city are 1.5 to 2 times over capacity as are the pediatric preschool institutions in which the infant morbidity is growing.

This is what the physicians came to tell the chairperson of the oblast council of women. The physicians are confident that only 20 to 25 percent of the success in the struggle for health and life depends on the medical profession, and the rest on the people's living and working conditions. Thus, is it not time for the women's council to sound the alarm?

R. B. Kutubayeva lamented in her discussion with me that no one listens to the opinion of the women's councils and that they have no rights. This was also mentioned by the chairperson of the women's council of the Tsentralnyy Rayon of Dzhambul K. O. Oshakbayeva who cited examples in which supervisors of enterprises and partkom secretaries ignored her appeals, requests, and invitations to conferences.

Of course, one cannot issue orders here. But the women's council has the right to mold public opinion around any one particular adverse situation, and there is the opportunity to control the implementation of adopted laws and decisions through the executive organs. For example, the aforementioned decree banning woman labor in hazardous shops is not being carried out. The shop supervisors have a singular explanation for this that relieves them of any responsibility, and that is that the women, they claim, themselves do not want to leave the hazardous shops. But is it all that unequivocal?

Would those really refuse "to leave" if other non-hazardous jobs were created where they could earn decent salaries? Has the women's council of the oblast studied this problem, has it discussed the problem with the public, has it posed the problem before the appropriate authorities? Alas, no.

And what is more. I believe that quite a few women who are working in those very "chemical" shops simply do not fully know and completely realize how harmful it is to work under such conditions. In shop No. 7 of the Khimprom production association which produces biammonium phosphate, I asked women whether physicians had discussed this subject with them in detail, and whether they were explained the adverse consequences of prolonged contact with chemicals? It turned out that there were no discussions. Marina Fedorenko has been working as an instrument control person for four years. She is still young, but Natalya Pavlovna Druchinina has had a "hazardous" 16 years of experience on the job (and

she is suffering from many diseases), but neither the former nor the latter recalls even a single conversation with a physician in which they were warned of the consequences of their work. Is this not grounds for the women's councils to address themselves to the officials of the House of Sanitation Education who, judging by their reports, given thousands of different lectures, but which do not reach every woman who happens to be working under adverse health conditions?

In general, the position of the women's councils and their supervisors with whom I had occasion to meet on this assignment, seemed rather passive. The reticent role which they have adopted for themselves has forced them to remain meekly silent in the presence of their supervisors and to accept everything as it is. Hardly anything will be substantively resolved with that attitude.

The partkom and party bureau secretaries of other enterprises have been no less indifferent to the "women's problem." They too prefer to remain silent. In the same way that our already familiar party committee secretary of the kolkhoz im. Sverdlov before the perturbation of the milk maids. There are a good number of such examples. And the fact that the party secretaries of the Zapchast plant, the sugar combine, and the vehicle repair plant in Dzhambul have not responded to the request of K. O. Oshakbayeva to revitalize the women's councils at work, says a lot in itself. And the party bureau secretary of the wool-processing plant S. U. Dosybiyev without any difficulty declared to me upon our meeting that they did not have any party leadership of a women's council inasmuch as the women's council was itself just being organized.

But this indifference is apparently not accidental, and to a certain degree is due to the attitude of the higher party authorities to the problems of the women's councils, to the status of women workers who in many cases find themselves either in the role of "Cinderella" or in the role of the poor relatives. Under such circumstances there has been practically no demand from the party committees for quality supervision of local women's council activities.

The Zavodskiy Rayon party committee can probably be registered as one of the many raykoms that heard the problem of women's council efforts last year at the

bureau. But, alas, a most important opportunity was lost. The raykom bureau for some reason did not analyze the role of the party organizations as a directing force in the women's council operations. And the decision-making segment of the party committee and party bureau did not in any way concentrate on that effort. But after all, without their help the women's councils find it difficult to develop and define their tasks.

Secretary of the party obkom A. A. Iskakov, with whom I met, held to the opinion that it does not pay to hold a lot of sessions, that is was obligatory to hear out the women's councils at the bureau. They will obtain "in due course" the necessary help. Of course, excessive sessions do no good. But the help needed by the women's councils must not be speculative as it is now, but realistic and perceptible. Help in the placement of goals, in working out a strategy and tactics, so that the women's councils understand the entirety and breadth of their rights and ultimate destination.

After all, by all accounts, the women's councils are called upon to implement control over the fulfillment of all decisions that are concerned with the labor, health, and recreation of women, children, and family problems. And in the Dzhambul Oblast, where thousands of representatives of the weaker sex cannot find jobs, this also means the need to provide them with jobs.

A more difficult task is to instill women's social action, to teach them to champion their own interests. Not the least of these interests is the realistic opportunity for women to be nominated for supervisory positions. Judging by current practice, they are noticeably frustrated in this matter. How else can we explain the fact that, let us say, out of the 899 listed officials of the party obkom women hold only 120, and only 22 of that number are primary supervisors. The situation is not much better within the staff positions of the Dzhambul party gorkom where there are four times more men than women.

For some, even in the obkom, this kind of apportionment is customary. It neither surprises nor disturbs. Does not the hesitancy to resolve the "women's question" lie in this adherence to the old standards?

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